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THE FALLACY OF ENDLESS GROWTH 
EXPOSING CAPITALISM’S INSUSTAINABILITY 
by 
William Strauss 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2008 
What if we were to have 100 years of no growth?  What if conditions were such that 
there is no future scenario under which growth will ever occur again?  We might characterize 
this as impossible, as a vision that violates the outcome that we as innovative people must 
realize.  
In the document that follows I will show you our world as it must be sometime in the 
future.  I will describe a world in which the real growth of the world economy is zero and 
remains zero.  I will tell a story of a world that is so different from what we take for granted that 
today’s economic systems, political systems, and social systems will no longer work. 
Importantly (and unique to this research), this story will be told from within the 
boundaries of modern economic growth theory.  That is, rather than follow an ecological and/or 
geographical path to explore limits to growth, this research is an “inside job” that suggests that 
when modern growth theories are decoupled from assumptions that have no basis in how the 
real world is developing but are, for the most part, mathematical conveniences applied for the 
sake of “stability,” then the long-run economic outcome is no longer capitalism. 
In the shadows beneath the foundations of capitalism lurk assumptions that are so 
ubiquitous as to be almost invisible.  This research works back to the source of the myth of 
endless growth and suggests that the source is simply something we have made up.  
xii
Furthermore, with increasing rigor, it exposes the fallacies that allow our world-view to 
take endless growth as a given and natural state upon which we can make choices; upon which, 
in the aggregate, are taking humankind on a very bad trip. Unaware, we are blinded from 
knowledge because we do not question the assumption of more forever.  The regime of endless 
growth is a sort of fission-like chain reaction in which, depending upon one’s perspective, the 
by-products are desirable or toxic. This research shows that some of the by-products are social 





 “Capitalism - An economic system in which the means of production and distribution are 
privately or corporately owned and development is proportionate to the accumulation and 
reinvestment of profits gained in a free market”  (American Heritage Dictionary, 2006). 
“Inside job - A crime perpetrated by, or with the help of, a person working for or trusted by the 
victim“ (American Heritage Dictionary, 2006). 
“If it was straightforward, then simple laws operating in simple circumstances would always lead 
to simple patterns, while complex laws operating in complex circumstances would always lead to 
complex patterns. . . .  This no longer looks correct, but it’s taken time to find out because we 
seem to be predisposed to such a principal” (Stewart, 2001, p. 171). 
 
A Vision of a Zero-growth World 
Imagine a year in which the national economy does not grow.  This is not hard to do.  
We have all experienced and read stories about recessions of various lengths and depths.  But of 
course these recessions always end, and the economy resumes its “normal” rate of growth.  
Opinions vary as to what this long-run normal growth rate is, but opinions unanimously assign a 
positive value to it:  there is no doubt that we will come out of it and get on with the business of 
growing our economy.   
Now imagine 10 years of no growth.  No one will argue against characterizing this 
situation as “bad.”  But again, we fully expect that the cycle will follow a pattern that returns us 
to our rightful condition: the growth of the aggregate output and aggregate income of the 
nation.   
What if we were to have 100 years of no growth?  What if conditions were such that 
there were no future scenario under which growth would ever occur again?  We might 
2characterize this as impossible, as a vision that violates the outcome that we must realize as 
innovating people.  The good news is that this situation is unlikely–soon.  The bad news is that 
this situation will occur and will persist indefinitely–someday.  In the pages that follow I will 
show you our world as it must be sometime in the future.  I will describe a world in which the 
real growth of the world economy is zero and remains zero.  I will tell a story of a world that is 
so different from what we take for granted that today’s economic systems, political systems, 
and social systems will no longer work.   
Perhaps most importantly (and unique to this research), this story will be told from 
within the boundaries of modern economic growth theory.  That is, rather than follow an 
ecological and/or geographical path to explore limits to growth, this research is an “inside job” 
that suggest that when modern growth theories are decoupled from assumptions that have no 
basis in how the real world is developing but are, for the most part, mathematical conveniences 
applied for the sake of “stability,” then the long-run economic outcome is no longer capitalism.  
There are times in the following chapters when the economic stories create political by-
products, but the path is neither via resource depletion or waste-sink constraints, nor by the 
complex outcomes that migration and agglomeration create, nor by any pathway other than 
that predicted from within modern economic growth theory.   
There are many opinions about how social, economic, and political forces create 
change, and there are many viewpoints about how those forces have brought us to where we 
are today and will take us into the future.  In a sense, however, this investigation will be 
released from the traditional constraints associated with understanding the world as we know 
it: it will describe a future in which growth by any measure is zero and, as you will see, much of 
the diversity of opinion will dissolve into irrelevancy.   
3 
The End of Economic Growth 
We believe in the inevitability of economic growth with something that approaches a 
religion.  It is unquestioned, fully expected, and inevitable.  Policymakers may botch economic 
development with various degrees of severity, but, given time, the natural processes of social, 
political, and economic activity will correct these mistakes.  Even if the basis for decision-making 
is flawed in our globalized interconnected transnational world economy, persistent bad spots 
will be cured by osmosis as the influences of successfully growing systems permeate the 
underperforming areas.  Economic thought in general holds that someday there will no longer 
be a developing world but only a developed world growing together harmoniously.   
One might immediately disagree with that last statement.  One might say there will 
always be conflict, always be a significant segment of the world population that is poor and 
marginalized, always be areas of the world that will not fully participate or even move towards 
the standards of living that the many enjoy.  It is possible that repeated cycles of conflict at the 
global level will delay the inevitable (perhaps even for a very long time if we play out the full 
potential for destruction that we hold in our arsenals).  However, assuming that humankind 
survives and maintains not only today’s infrastructure but continues to innovate and develop 
better ways to undertake economic activity, common orthodoxy suggests that it is inevitable 
that all of the world will converge towards a common level of prosperity.   
The foundation of this belief is the foundation of our understanding of our motives as 
humans: we seek to maximize our wellbeing and minimize our suffering.  The aggregation of 
these motives combined with the rule of law results in people working in systems that 
ultimately increase the aggregate wellbeing of the nation.  History has demonstrated that 
systems that fail to do this are replaced by systems that do.  Since the industrial revolution 
4humankind has had a long and somewhat consistent history of growing the world’s output and 
the world’s income, not only in absolute terms but in per capita terms as well.   
What about those marginalized sectors?  Although the story of development continues 
to weave tales of income inequality and growing disparities between wealth and poverty, it is 
impossible for some of the world to grow faster than the rest of the world forever.  The ability of 
the disadvantaged masses to threaten the stability of the wealthy minority is continuously 
gaining strength as communications and information infrastructure open channels of strategic 
coordination that did not exist a decade ago.  The poor majority, both within and among 
nations, will vote with violence when necessary until the disparities begin to shrink consistently 
and continuously.  Furthermore, ideologically the developed world espouses a world of 
opportunity, and, in spite of disjointed rhetoric that often divides rather than joins, underlying 
the warring words are real dreams for a future in which everyone can share in the rewards of 
world growth.   
This work does not pretend to ignore or minimize the challenges facing the world today 
with respect to the integration of diverse social and religious systems.  It is true that the 
foundation of this work is the belief that just as the past has produced a somewhat consistent 
pattern of aggregate world growth, the future will do the same; that social, economic, and 
political agendas will emerge that will allow not only consistent growth but also convergence.  
Underlying this work is a belief that everything will mutate, that the world’s social, political, and 
economic landscape centuries from now will be different in ways so profound that our best 
ideas today will appear naïve or foolish. 
But at the heart of this work’s thesis is the profound need to overcome a deep 
pessimism regarding the ability of our world civilization to overcome the challenges of moving 
past an era in which differences trigger destruction.  The reader needs to know that the author 
5struggles with that challenge.  Unless there is a deeply fundamental shift in how the rhetoric of 
freedom and free-market economics translates into policy and action, it will be a long, dark, and 
bloody period.  We can only hope that solutions are found and that great leaders emerge that 
can work toward implementing those solutions.  However, the final chapter of this work offers 
some suggestions for change now that will improve the probability of having a long-run 
outcome in which harmony and balance are achieved. 
Let us suppose that humankind manages to overcome the challenges outlined above 
and that a Darwinian evolution brings us forward to a future vantage point.  
The chapters that follow are a vehicle to that vantage point:  a world in which 
population growth has stabilized and productivity growth has reached some limit such that it 
too becomes stable.  The journey to that conclusion will be carefully taken in many steps.   
First the paper will tell a story of how we have arrived at today’s vantage point.  It is a 
story of a long history in which most of humanity lived in a persistent Malthusian trap.  It is the 
story of how, only in the past few hundred years, certain economies have broken free from that 
trap, embarking on a regime of permanent increases in the standard of living.  This is an 
important story because it creates the foundation for the “econocentric” ideas that growth is 
naturally and forever part of our civilization. Part of that story, however, also identifies how 
some economies have been left behind in the transition.  The last section of the first chapter 
tells the story of how we might transition the violent by-products of growth and continue the 
history of humankind into a stable future.   
Then the paper looks at economic growth theory.  It will investigate how the assumption 
of growth forever has become an invisible assumption in all of our ideas about what is good and 
bad for nations.  At each step the work shows what happens to the model’s predictions if the 
assumptions that drive growth in the model are revised to have a zero growth outcome. 
6Next, using simulation, a search is undertaken of the future for sets of potential paths 
for our society.  The model’s components are based on the theoretical models developed in 
earlier sections.  The search is for a path to a stable and sustainable socio-economic system.  
Insight will be found in understanding how today’s parameters must be adjusted to reach that 
future. 
Although we are temporally far from the zero-growth world, we are inexorably 
connected to it: our decisions today determine how (and if) we find the stable future at the end 
of everyone’s rainbow.   
A More Rigorous Discussion of the Topics of this Project 
The socio-economic system that dominates decision making depends upon an 
assumption of endless growth.  This assumption is fallacious.  Furthermore, the imperative for 
continued growth is the foundation for current and continued deteriorating indicators of social 
and ecological well-being. 
This project has three primary objectives:  1) to unmask how the assumption of endless 
growth has become an invisible but vital bridge to a systemic denial of the ability of current 
dominant economic systems to provide a basis for an equitable and sustainable world system; 2) 
to identify and codify the necessary elements of an ideal world system in which decisions are 
considerate of the current and future needs of the entire ecosphere and in which all living things 
live with a decent happiness; and 3) to create a realistic plan that can actualize the necessary 
interventions and transform the dominant decision-making algorithms. 
One would like to be optimistic about the future, yet in every dimension there are 
troubling trends.  This research project is an attempt to find a way to understand the elemental 
source of the path-defining mechanisms that seem to be leading civilization into deeper trouble. 
7To understand the underlying motivators, one must explore the context of our 
perceptions.  At the foundation is a system that has become both massively connected and 
massively disconnected.  We (herein, “we” is a characterization of the aggregated choices and 
actions that lead to aggregated outcomes) rely on ever more complexly integrated systems of 
supply.  These systems for supply generate ever more complex relationships among the 
inherently complex symbiosis of the planet’s inanimate and animate components.  At the 
human level the dynamics of culture, religion, and politics, mixing with the economic realities of 
transnational dependencies, offer forces and pressures that add to the discordance in relations 
rather than moving us toward harmony.  At lower levels of the animate space, the dominance of 
human-derived outcomes is causing changes that are becoming more easily observable as the 
pace of change switches from the long-wave ecologically balanced evolution of species and 
habitats to a new regime of rapid alteration and extinction.  Supporting the animate space, the 
complex systems of earth, air, and water are being stressed by this regime of rapid alteration.  
The source and sink functions that have allowed the animate space to exist are being distorted 
and disconnected.   
The title page of Marshall’s Principles of Economics (eight volumes from 1890 to 1920) 
states, “Natura non facit saltum” – nature does not take a leap.  In other words, the orthodoxy 
upon which decisions affecting the systems of earth, air, water, and life are made assumes 
continuous connections over time.  In a world in which reality moves gradually and steadily 
through a Darwinian evolutionary process, this assumption does not seem inappropriate; 
Marshall should not be faulted for his axiomatic proclamation.  But over the last century, the 
pace of change and the magnitude of human-dominated outcomes have altered, and our 
confidence of stability from within a Newtonion world-view has come under great pressure. 
8Although mathematics, the hard sciences (physics, biology, and earth sciences) and 
many academic economists have accepted the significance of the reality of dynamic 
discontinuity, dominant decision makers are connected to the politics of a system that relies on 
an ever more complex supply chain to maintain the orthodox expectation of an endlessly 
growing standard of living.  As a result, they continue to assume that changes today will lead to 
predictable and/or reversible outcomes. 
This is a myth.  There are fallacies inherent in the assumptions of predictability, 
reversibility, and endless growth. 
And that is part of the purpose of this project: to expose and elucidate upon these 
fallacies that live at the lowest levels of our decision models.  Connecting the reality of how the 
world is changing to the way in which decisions are made is an interdisciplinary undertaking 
wherein economics, ecology, social systems, politics, psychology, and science overlap. 
But if this undertaking were only to expose the flawed epistemology 1 that guides our 
choices, the project would be unfinished.  This project must also find a way to get from now to a 
future in which balance is restored.  Excluding the potential for interplanetary travel as a safety 
valve for the planet, this means identifying a future system in which the actions of humans and 
the responses of the rest of the ecosystem result in a sustainable outcome.     
An important aspect of this project is charting the path of transition from now to that 
future system.  It is not as simple as identifying a rational set of requirements and milestones.  
When reasons are based upon a flawed foundation, bad choices can appear reasonable.  
Perceptions, the conduit for knowledge, can be denied or altered by dependence.  Since the 
                                                             
1 Epistemology is the study of theories of knowledge. Its subject matter includes the role of sense 
perception in the acquisition of knowledge, the possibility of attaining objective knowledge, the 
psychological aspects of knowledge, and – on some accounts – the sociological aspects of knowledge
9system depends upon growth, this research suggests that this leads to a form of addiction 2.  
One of the undisputed facts about addiction is that it is a source of perceptual distortion.  So the 
system’s growth imperative is complicated by a feed-back loop that not only compounds the 
problem but also provides all of us with an invisible veil of denial that allows us to delink action 
and consequence.  In the terms of addiction, recovery is necessary.  
What is the Value of this Research? 
This project has both theoretical and practical value.  The theoretical value will be 
realized through the deconstruction of mainstream economic growth theory.  In this 
deconstruction it will be shown that the foundation of capitalism, a positive rate of return on 
capital investment, requires growth.  The work shows how the current system is, in essence, an 
epic  Ponzi scheme.  As in all Ponzi schemes, there are those at the top of the pyramid and those 
at the bottom; that necessary structure is replicated and is magnified over time.  Furthermore, 
the growth imperative that spins off from the quest for endless positive returns (a bigger and 
taller pyramid) generates forces that are realized in the ongoing alterations to the urban/rural 
relationships and more generally to developed/less-developed/undeveloped societal 
relationships.   
There is a vast literature on growth theory and a large literature on specialization and 
agglomeration.  However, in general, the literature says little about capitalism’s growth 
imperative (Gordon and Rosenthal, 2003, are a rare exception) and how this addiction to 
growth, with its ever larger pyramid scheme and the systemic denial of the inevitable outcomes, 
                                                             
2 “Addictive behaviors may be considered as those that meet two criteria. . . .  First, they are motivated by 




links to the inevitable broken promises for wellbeing for all, be it at the micro level, among 
nations, or among regions.  Although writers have documented how cultural identities are 
subsumed by the transnational supply chain and how environmental deterioration accompanies 
this loss of history, none have reached down to the first principles upon which the rationale for 
these changes is based and looked deeply into the economics of a future that will not be what it 
was supposed to be. 
This work follows a few small branches in the economics literature that recognize the 
fundamental fallacy of endless growth.  The research also bridges from the new literature that 
builds upon the roots of complex systems, chaos theory, economic discontinuities, and non-
linear systems to the dreadfully real malsymptoms that are being observed in the rapidly 
altering interfaces between those that have much and those that have little.  The malsymptoms 
extend even to those that are full participants in the richest places as a psychological malaise 
manifested as a persistent sense of unfulfillment.  This research suggests that the actions of 
impaired decision makers and the reactions of the affected masses are feeding back into the 
dynamic complex life-supporting systems that we are supposedly trying to make better, but are 
in fact making worse. 
There is a scarcity of work that challenges the exemplar of endless growth.  A quick 
Google search shows in excess of 7,630,000 hits for the phrase “economic growth.”  A search for 
the phrase “sustainable economic growth” yields 719,000 hits (thus showing the relative 
popularity of this oxymoronic tool of denial for many).  Just two years ago, “zero-growth 
economy” and “steady-state economy” yielded far fewer results (2,400 and 41,300 
respectively).  As of this writing in June, 2008, they yield 66,900 and 939,000 results 
respectively, suggesting a growing awareness of the importance of investigating a future that is 
unlike anything we can image now.   But a look at the Google links reveals that all of the 
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websites envision the general ecological story and none, as this works does, pulls the rug out 
from under the rubric that drives policy and decision making in our capitalistic system.  In 
contrast, the phrase “growth addiction” in conjunction with the word “economic” yields 611 
results.   
The theoretical contribution of this work will begin to remedy that shortcoming in the 
literature.  However, this work also has valuable practical uses.  The simulation that is the 
centerpiece of Chapter Three will identify changes now that will lead to a future that works.  
Although beyond the boundaries of economic growth theory, we can infer that the changes will 
connect to the ecological story and promote a balance between economic/ecological sources 
(production/depletion) and sinks (depreciation/pollution).  But we will demonstrate rigorously 
that the changes could dismantle capitalism’s pyramid scheme and ameliorate the symptoms of 
the exploitation of natural and human capital. 
This project broadens the literature that unifies growth, capitalism, complex systems, 
geography, and social relationships.  It identifies a set of practical, fundamental, and realistic 
(within the current paradigm) changes for a process of evolution away from the current system.  
The research identifies behavioral choices that can provide for safe passage into a balanced and 
harmonious future in which zero-growth is okay.  And, by the way, we have to suspend concern 
about the current and real challenges that face our civilization since the path to a balanced 
future in economic terms will occur over the long-run.  As already noted, this research will rarely 
stray outside of economic theory for defining the pathways and thus will in many cases ignore 
the current real problems, not the least of which are competition for finite energy resources and 
the “clash of civilizations” that face our world now.  This does not mean that these problems 
should not be considered critical.  But the purpose of this “inside job” is to expose something 
fundamental about how we think about the future—that “Capitalism - An economic system in 
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which … development is proportionate to the accumulation and reinvestment of profits gained in 
a free market (American Heritage Dictionary, 2001)” cannot go on forever. 
As a scholarly work, this project does not just broaden a subset of the literature but also 
breaks new ground.  Not one author, including those for whom the assumption of endless 
growth is observed to be a false god–for example, Ayres (1998);  Daly (1991, 1996 1999a, 
1999b); Meadows (1992)–provides us with a rigorous deconstruction of the foundations of the 
economic theory (and thus the consumption and production choices) that underlies the world 
system.  A deconstruction of the received wisdom from the mainstream and almost universally 
accepted economic models of progress will be at the heart of the exposé.   
We observe significant increases in the ability of our civilization to produce goods and 
services that make many of our lives more comfortable, generally healthier, and longer.  Yet we 
also observe changes in relationships among nations, regions, cultures, and classes that one 
finds hard to classify as a progression toward a better world (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992; Sassen, 
2000; Kaldor, 2003).  There are also many warnings of threatening changes to the planetary 
systems that support life (Clark & Munn, 1986; van den Bergh & Gowdy, 1998; Daly, 1991, 1996, 
1999a, 1999b).  Progress3 as defined within the regime of endless growth is a sort of fission-like 
chain reaction in which, depending upon one’s perspective, the by-products are desirable or 
toxic.  This research suggests that some of the by-products are a social and ecological anti-
matter.   
In the shadows beneath the foundations of capitalism lurk assumptions that are so 
ubiquitous as to be almost invisible.  What follows works back to the source of the myth of 
                                                             
3 The word is italicized because the definition is an “advance toward a higher or better stage” ( The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2001).  However, this work suggests that progress 
as it is currently created also causes changes that are not part of an advance toward a higher or better stage.
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endless growth and shows that the source is simply something we have made up.  When that 
myth is removed, the entire set of choice templates is radically altered.   
The Search for Ideas and Tests of Truth 
This research project is about the accumulation of man-made capital (the basic source 
of economic growth).  The work will certainly acknowledge how natural and social constraints 
affect the future of growth and what that will do to alter the future world system (both 
manmade social and political systems as well as the complex ecological systems upon which life 
is based).  In fact one of the deconstructions in Chapter Two shows the inevitability of chaos 
(both social and mathematical).  Thus this project follows paths that identify how, from an 
economic perspective, the returns to capital are connected to changes in the relationship 
between man-made capital and exhaustible resources.  If, for example, investment falls 
continuously, future generations’ welfare levels will fall behind those of current generations.  If 
sustainability is defined as the maintenance of welfare levels over time, then long-term 
development will not satisfy the sustainability criterion.  That is not to say that the future needs 
to be grim, just different.  After all (and this will be explored more rigorously later), how much 
“stuff” do we really need? 
The investigation, particularly in the early growth models looked at in Chapter Two, 
challenges several conventional assumptions: the standard received wisdom of mainstream 
economic thought assumes that either there is never-ending resource-augmenting technological 
progress or that the elasticity of substitution between natural resources and man-made capital 
is equal to or greater than one (Stiglitz, 1974; Dasgupta & Heal, 1974; Meadow, 19724).  Also, 
the assumption of no limits to the accumulation of man-made capital is necessary to justify a 
                                                             
4 Meadow assumes an elasticity of substitution of zero! and derives a catastrophic outcome in the near 
term.
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sustainable future.   (See Cleveland & Ruth, 1997, for a critique of this assumption.)   These 
assumptions will be looked at carefully in Chapter Two.     
The more recent view of man-made capital (endogenous or new growth theory) allows 
for a shift from goods to services as knowledge or human capital supplements the accumulation 
of physical capital as the foundation for continued growth.  These models (see, for example, 
Grimaud & Rougé, 2003) do yield sustained growth in the presence of non-renewable resources. 
For a rebuttal to this assumption, which returns the argument for long-run growth to that 
shown in Stiglitz (1974), see Agnani, Gutierrez, & Ize (2003).   But, as will be argued, the 
underlying assumptions about the marginal cost of innovation are flawed.  In fact, in all of the 
growth theory models from Solow to the present, foundational assumptions are shown to be 
flawed.  Chapter Two, with increasing rigor, identifies the fallacies that allow our world-view to 
take endless growth as a given and natural state upon which we can make choices; upon which, 
in the aggregate, are taking humankind on a very bad trip. 
The search for understanding cannot stop at the end of the last equation that proves it 
is possible to have an economically hard landing (very hard, like from 10,000 feet without a 
parachute).  Coupled with the mathematics must also be an investigation of the broad 
implications of the futures identified in this paper.  Throughout the next chapters these 
implications will be highlighted.  A comprehensive investigation necessitates a multidisciplinary 
approach and a multi-methodology approach that shows how these predictions will affect the 
complex systems that make history.  That comprehensive discussion will be presented in a 
future extension of this work beyond the boundaries of this paper. 
This paper is organized as follows: 
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Summary of Chapter One: Economic Growth and the Rise of Capitalism 
At the heart of this entire project is the life source of the current world system: growth.  
In our system today growth is good; zero or negative growth is bad.  It is uncontroversial to 
expect that if one is poor relative to many, then one desires to grow richer.  It is uncontroversial 
to expect that if one is growing poorer, one is unhappy with one’s fate.  We also take for 
granted the expectation that over time there will be economic growth and thus that societies 
will become better.  What then is this wonderful growth-stuff coveted by so many, and why is it 
so ingrained into our perceptions of what is best for the world? 
Rather than attempt to deconstruct that question into an investigation of the genesis of 
how living organisms make choices, this research tells the story of how the majority of the 
human race moved from a long history of living at or near subsistence levels to the relatively 
recent regime of sustained growth in per capita consumption.  That journey through recent 
history chronicles the evolution of capitalism (Golor, 2005; Galor & Mountford, 2002; Kalemli-
Ozcan, 2002; Cervellati & Sunde, 2002; Bourguignon & Verdier, 1999; O’Rourke, 1999; Hannson 
& Stuart, 1990).   
The story is basically one in which the idea of investment transmutes from simply 
putting up food for the winter and having lots of offspring to transferring surplus wealth into the 
development of more productive systems (by improving both material and human means of 
production).  The fundamental separation between the operators of productive systems and the 
owners of productive systems not only brought industrialization and a growing array of goods 
and services but also created the imperative for continuous growth (Gordon & Rosenthal, 2003) 
because without growth, the return on investment evaporates (Foster, 2002). 
Since growth is necessary for the financial well-being of investors, the growth 
imperative permeates all of the cultural and political folkways and mores of the capitalism-
16
dominated world via decisions influenced by those with surplus wealth (Angeletos & Kollintznas, 
2000).  Studies of the mechanisms underpinning decision-making cross many disciplines, but 
they all hinge on how individuals choose to make themselves happiest, which is fundamentally 
an economic choice.  From that simple root, a vast literature has grown.   (See Long and Wong, 
1997, for a comprehensive survey of economic growth theory.)   Lurking in the vast literature 
about utility maximization, profit maximization, and well-being is an unsettling circular 
dependency.  The definition of well-being is culturally derived; culture is a response to history; 
history is the chronicle of decisions; decisions are the result of choices; choices are culturally 
defined; and well-being is sought through choices that are meant to increase one’s stock of 
goods and wealth (Crimmins et al., 1991; Scitovsky & Frank, 1992; Schor, 1998, Ng, 2000; Argyle, 
2002).  That system of logic generates the requirement for continuous growth, and the feedback 
loop is endless and forever amplifying.  
However, endless and forever amplifying growth is impossible.  The first chapter’s 
models show that the logical outcome of a continuation of this system into the future is 
compounding and amplified social unrest.  Given the story told in Chapter One, it is no surprise 
that terrorism is on the rise and that an increasing proportion of the wealth of those at the top 
of the pyramid must be dedicated to countering this force. 
Summary of Chapter Two: The Ubiquitous (and Dangerous!) Growth Assumption Lurking in 
the Shadows 
Chapter Two of this research demonstrates that endless growth is impossible and then 
investigates the theoretical outcomes of removing the assumptions that lead to positive growth 
from those models that are most widely used by mainstream decision-makers.  By viewing the 
altered outcomes, the research will have a perspective from which to critically assess the real 
effects on our current world systems of perusing policies that are slaves to growth addition.  
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Chapter Two details the history of modern economic growth theory.  But the narrative 
and the mathematics are not the usual textbook review.  At each stop along the historical path 
from Solow to the present, an investigation into the sources of the growth predictions yields a 
troubling pattern:  ingrained in the thought are assumptions that, if removed, lead to 
uncomfortable outcomes. 
This chapter also connects these insights regarding the economic thought that 
underpins policy choices to the policies that are necessary to maintain the cycle of endless 
growth.  Many of the politico-social by-products of “progress” are observable through the 
reactions of people.  (As shown in Chapter One, they are manifested in terrorism, crime, war, 
hunger, and premature mortality).  However, many are also manifested through the reactions of 
the ecosphere to the actions of people.  Critical changes to the earth’s life-supporting systems 
and the connections to policy choice would appear to be easily correlated (Robinson & 
Srinivasan, 1997; Rao, 2000; Hardoy et. al., 2001).  However, a majority of policy-makers deny 
(or ignore) rigorously proven connections and make policy accordingly (Congressional Vote 
Watch5).   
Obviously political choice and socio-economic effects are connected.  This chapter’s 
contribution to the body of knowledge regarding the social and ecological consequences of 
“progress” is to reveal the economic axiomatic fallacy that allows the denial of certain 
consequences to exist.   Choices, from policy-makers guiding the outcomes for many, to 
individuals whose sphere of influence and accountability is small, are made from within an 
expectation of a regime of endless growth and thus an exponentially larger set of goods and 
services for all forever.  Chapter One shows that the spin-offs of this continuously accelerating 
chase for more has created many of the malsymptoms of modern society.  The research  and 
                                                             
5 Retrieved from http://whistler.sierraclub.org/votewatch/.
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particularly this chapter  suggest that persistent inequality and marginalization, environmental 
abuse and ecological short-sightedness, and an increasing willingness to exploit labor in the 
name of productivity are not the result of bad people being overtly selfish and greedy but are 
the result of people’s inability to perceive the full array of choices and thus to understand that 
their choices are suboptimal.  As Chapter Two demonstrates, in some cases, using insights 
gained in Chapter One, the growth theory we depend on for policy making results in chaotic 
outcomes (both in mathematical and social terms).  Unaware, we are blinded from knowledge 
because we do not question the assumption of more forever.  
Summary of Chapter Three: Complex Dynamics, Complex Systems: Where are We Going? 
We are on a treadmill that is running faster and faster.  We have more of everything, 
but we are less able to feel comfortable about our lives (Scitovsky, 1992; Argyle, 2001; 
Easterbrook, 2003).  Chapter Three investigates how the growth imperative has entered the 
dynamics of humankind’s artifice of economic systems and what that could mean for the future 
by building a simulation.  But the research also finds a way off the treadmill.  The outcomes of 
the simulation are used to find behavioral characteristics that might be altered to chart a path 
that is rational. 
The chapter centers on the construction of a simulation.  A technique developed for this 
research uses a systems dynamics software;  this chapter integrates the lessons learned in 
Chapters One and Two into a simulation.  The outcome is an investigation into the expected 
paths going forward and what growth outcomes can occur in the long run. 
Guidance is derived by following the literature on complex systems and chaos.  For 
example, microeconomic foundations altered to accept discontinuities in imperfectly 
competitive markets and the connection into complex macroeconomic dynamics  (based on 
Rosser, 2000, 2001) provides insight into how to build the feedback loop structure of the model.  
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The simulation is informed by the work in Chapters One and Two.   The simulation shows how 
choices within a growth-addicted world lead to outcomes that concatenate into unpredictable 
and potentially catastrophic outcomes.  Furthermore from chaos theory we also see that even in 
deterministic systems, unexpected changes, large jumps, and seemingly random behavior are 
possible.  The simulation will find these even without the need for random seeding. 
The academic, quasi-academic, and popular literature are robust with predictions about 
what an ideal sustainable future would be (see among others Hawken et. al. 1994, 1999; Wilson, 
2002; Copeland & Taylor, 2003) and with ideas for how a sustainable future should be organized 
(see among others Ostrom, 1990; Daly, 1991, 1996; Cognoy, 1999; Korten, 1999; Rao, 2000).  
What is universally missing, however, is a strategic plan for transitioning from now to that future 
that is founded from within mainstream capitalism-centric economic theory.  In finding ways to 
change the outcomes of the simulation so that a sustainable non-chaotic future is possible, this 
research identifies behavioral choices that lead to that outcome.  That is not to say that the 
prescriptions may be any different than those offered in the diverse ”limits-to-growth” literature 
in terms of consumption choices and how wealth is distributed; what differs is that the rationale 
is shown to be driven by deeply ingrained economic assumptions that lurk in the logic of policy 
making. 
Yet identifying the fallacy at the root is insufficient if real action for change is to occur.  
The psychology of the growth addiction (McMurran, 1994), which distorts personal and public 
choice, suggests that axiomatic changes are necessary for beginning that transition.  That 
research suggests that it is (and has been) useless to use predictions of dire outcomes as a 
motivator for change.  This is particularly true when linear thinking based on an apparently 
endless growth curve dominates the forecast models used by policy makers (i.e., the world in 
which we live now).  However, by showing clearly and unambiguously that the assumptions 
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underlying these models are flawed and that the problems that are being generated by the 
growth quest are only going to magnify in ways that increasingly challenge capitalism’s basic 
promise (a positive return on investment), this work indentifies a starting point for change.  For 
example, in Chapter Two, using a favorite tool of capitalism, a discounted present value model, 
the real current-value cost to capital of chasing positive returns is shown to be overbearing not 
in the long-term but in the medium-term.  Perhaps that finding  will get some attention. 
The model also integrates the insights from Chapter One on revolution and social unrest 
to identify those behavioral changes that can begin to interfere with the positive feedback loops 
that are amplifying zealotry.  Although the “clash of civilizations” is not within the purview of 
this research, the socio-economic story told in Chapter One provides an entry point into 
understanding some of the motives for violent choices. 
Addiction (to growth) is powerful, and change, even in the face of rational current-event 
reasons, is likely to be resisted.  Short-term gains and continued growth will be fought for from 
intra- and internationalistic perspectives with policy choices and military forces.  This work will 
end before a strategic plan for change is written.  That will be the basis of future work.  But we 
can envision that the plan will include interventions that can be accomplished by a rational, 
democratically placed majority who have heard and will understand the message of the fallacy 
of endless growth.  One needs great optimism to hold onto that hope, but that is another story. 
Conclusion to the Introduction 
This project demonstrates that the expectation for endless growth is fallacious.  In 
Chapter One we follow the pathway from zero growth to sustained growth.  In Chapter Two we 
come to understand why endless growth is not questioned but in fact is supported with subtle 
(and not so subtle) parameter and specification choices.  Then in Chapter Three the work, 
through a simulation, shows potential outcomes.  This will leave a strong foundation for carrying 
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this project forward in future work (Chapter Four and beyond) into perhaps the most important 





ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 
Part One: From Subsistence to Plenty 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one 
most responsive to change”6 
 
Economic growth is the bottom line.  It is what is expected and what is desired.  It is the 
foundation of all of our expectations about the future and of our evaluations of the present.  We 
expect sustained and continuous growth.  If an economy is not growing, there is something 
wrong with it. 
The definitions of growth are oddly inconsistent.  Economics texts generally define 
growth as an increase in output per person (gross domestic product or GDP per capita). Growth 
in GDP per capita also implies in increase in the average standard of living since each person, on 
average, gets a bigger slice of the economic pie.  This is true because the national output 
approximately equals the national income.  
Yet when reference is made to whether we have a “normal” economy or an economy in 
recession, the metric of choice is just the aggregate output of the economy or GDP, not GDP per 
capita.  They are not at all the same.  It is possible for aggregate growth to increase at exactly 
the same rate as population growth.  If that were so, then GDP would be growing, but GDP per 
capita would not.  Thus, although there may be absolute growth in the value of economic 
                                                             
6 This quote has become attributed to Darwin and is cited frequently; but it does not appear in his published 
works.
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activity during a year, an increase in the standard of living will not occur unless output increases 
faster than the growth in the population. Both definitions of “growth” are important.  However, 
as we will see, it is the growth in output per capita that is the key to a regime of sustained 
welfare-enhancing social evolution. 
History has not always provided humankind the luxury of sustained growth in our 
standard of living.  For most of our past we have experienced absolute growth as the population 
has expanded but not growth in output per capita.  Drawing upon recent work that synthesizes 
evolution and economic growth, we can tell a story that takes us from the long history of 
agrarian/peasant society into the world we currently inhabit. 
In summary, this chapter will show how a simultaneous relationship between the 
evolution of humankind and economic growth during the long history of economic stagnation 
prior to the transition to sustained growth promoted a process of natural selection that shaped 
the evolution of humans; the evolution of the human species led to changes that eventually 
allowed humankind to evolve from the long period of stagnation to the current regime of 
sustained growth. The framework that we will build allows us to tell a unified story of the 
evolution of productivity enhancing technology, of population growth, and thus economic 
output per capita.  We will span the transition from a Malthusian epoch of stagnation, which 
lasted for most of our recorded history, to the regimes of sustained economic growth that 
developed nations experience in today’s world.   
We also note that even in today’s modern era many economies have failed to make this 
transition.  The framework we will build in this chapter will tell a story in which the patterns of 
international trade have delayed or excluded some economies from following the path we map 
out. 
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During the Malthusian era7 technology evolved slowly, and the growth of population  
prevented a sustained increase in the standard of living (output per capita).  A Darwinian 
decision-making schema created a tension between the quality and quantity of children.  The 
tension is as follows: a quantity preference had a positive direct effect on fertility rates, but it 
negatively affected the quality of offspring, their health, and therefore their fertility rates. In the 
Malthusian era, the evolutionary pressure created an evolutionary advantage to quality 
preferences.8  Eventually this process of natural selection increased the quality of the 
population, which in turn caused faster technological progress and which ultimately launched 
the transition from the long dark era of stagnation.  The developed world that we live in now 
and our fundamental expectations for sustained growth are derived from a demographic 
evolution that had breached a critical mass.   
But for the most of human existence economies have been in a Malthusian stagnation. 
Missing the basic addition of productivity growth that we take for granted today, the 
diminishing returns to labor had a self-equilibrating effect on the size of the population.  
Gradual improvements in technology or increases in the availability of land lead to a larger but 
not a richer population. The growth rate of output per capita had been negligible for most of 
recorded history.  In Europe between 500 and 1500 the average growth rate of GDP per capita 
was about zero.  This is particularly striking considering that the average annual rate of 
population growth in Europe between 500 and 1500 was 0.1 percent.  World population also 
grew at an average rate of less than 0.1 percent per year from the year 1 to 1750, suggesting 
that the pattern of population growth over this era follows the Malthusian pattern.  Changes in 
                                                             
7 According to Thomas R. Malthus (1798), if the standard of living is above the subsistence level, 
population grows, whereas if the standard of living is lower than subsistence, population declines by either 
a purposeful drop in fertility (“preventative check”) or by malnutrition, famine, and disease (“positive 
check”).
8 In this era “the perpetual struggle for room and food” (Malthus,1798, p. 48) left limited resources for 
child rearing.
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the growth rates of population and wages are also congruent with the Malthusian regime.  After 
the Black Death there was a period of higher real wages followed by faster population growth 
associated with a strong positive correlation between rising real wages and marriage rates.   
Figure 1 plots the real farm wage for the period 1265-1800.9  The figure illustrates a key 
characteristic of the Malthusian era.  When population falls, there is an increase in real wages.  
The increase in real wages causes fertility rates to increase and population growth increases; as 
the population begins to recover, the real wage falls.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Real wage and population 1250-1800 (Hanson and Prescott, 1999). 
There was a gradual shift from the long era of Malthusian stagnation into the current 
regime of sustained growth.  In Europe between 1500 and 1700 the average growth rate of 
income per capita was 0.1 percent per year.  This rose slightly to 0.2 percent between the years 
                                                             
9 Hansen and Prescott (1999 note that the English population series is from Clark (1998a) for 1265-1535 
and from Wrigley et al. (1997) for 1545-1800. The nominal farm wage series is from Clark (1998b), and the 
price index used to construct the real wage series is from Phelps-Brown and Hopkins (1956). The data 
have been normalized to be 100 in 1265 and have been smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100. 
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1700 and 1820.  As income per capita grew, population growth increased.  From 1500 to 1700 
population grew at a rate of 0.2 percent and from 1700 to 1820 at 0.4 percent rate.  The linkage 
of higher income to higher population growth was the same in this period as it had been 
throughout the era of Malthusian stagnation, but there was a counteracting effect.  Whereas 
traditionally a higher population had diluted resources per capita and lowered income per 
capita (often to below the sustenance level thus triggering Malthus’s positive check) , 
technological progress was increasing at a rate rapid enough to allow income to keep rising. This 
is a remarkable shift, all the more remarkable because it took place during a concurrent fall in 
mortality.  The growth of the population increased at an increasing rate because more children 
lived to be old enough to have children and, of course, because each person lived longer. 
Between the 1740s and the 1840s, life expectancy at birth rose from 33 to 40 in England and 
from 25 to 40 in France.  Remarkably the growth in output per capita still remained not only 
positive but increasing.  Over the period 1820-1870 the average growth of output per capita in 
Europe rose to an annual rate of 1.0 percent.  
Key to the shift from the Malthusian trap to sustained growth was a dramatic change in 
fertility rates.10  Fertility rates had been increasing in Western Europe until the second half of 
the nineteenth century, peaking in England and Germany in 1870s.  The reduction in fertility 
became most rapid in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century.  In England, for example, live 
births per 1000 women age 15-44 fell from 153.6 in 1871-80 to 109.0 in 1901-10.  This drop was 
clearly a demographic shift and not the cause of increased infant mortality.  In fact, infant 
mortality was declining during this period. 
                                                             
10 Malthus (1798) predicted that fertility would fluctuate rationally with income expectations. “But as from 
the laws of our nature some check to population must exist, it is better that it should be checked from a 
foresight of the difficulties attending a family and the fear of dependent poverty than that it should be 
encouraged, only to be repressed afterwards by want and sickness” (p. 29).
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There was a concurrent shift in how children were treated.  The average number of 
years of schooling in England rose from 2.3 for the group that was born between 1801 and 1805 
to 5.2 for the group born in the years 1852-56, and 9.1 for the group born from 1897-1906.  
Parents were choosing quality over quantity. 
The population growth decline and the improvement in the quality of the labor force 
resulted in a sustained average annual increase in income per capita of 2.2 percent over the 
period 1929-1990.  Something happened that allowed many of today’s economies to shift gears, 
leave the era of subsistence living behind, and embark on a path of sustained growth in the 
standard of living. 
What happened, however, did not happen universally.  Clearly much of the world 
population does not have a rising standard of living.  Much of the world’s population continues 
to live (and die) at the subsistence level.  As we will see, the Malthusian pressures not only 
influenced what parts of the world first experienced technological development but also how 
that progress was enhanced or impeded.  We will show that harsh and cyclical environmental 
conditions along with limited land promoted a natural selection process that increased the 
proportion of the population with preferences to spend more time working, to save and 
accumulate permanent structures, to be less likely to overuse the land, and to devote higher 
and more focused resources to the education and upbringing of fewer but more fit offspring.   In 
a climatological setting in which there were winter/summer cycles, people making choices that 
resulted in a more certain and higher per person consumption were favored.  In a demographic 
setting in which there were few choices to expand into new lands, people with the ability to 
innovate given resources into greater output were favored.  In the north, the demographic 
transition from Malthusian stagnation was enhanced by the climate.  
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Once the transition began in the north, the south was at a disadvantage.  If there is no 
demand for skilled labor, parents will raise unskilled children.  In a world of open trade, those 
economies that were first starters in the transition progressed to specialize in the production of 
industrial goods,11 whereas those economies that did not reach the transition point first 
progressed to specialize in agricultural (or raw material) production.  International trade not 
only widened the technological gap between advanced and less advanced economies;  it also 
reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage.  With world trade, the demographic 
transition of the advanced countries were (are) accelerated and the transition for the less 
advanced countries was (is) retarded.  If the less advanced economy’s share of world income 
continues to fall over time, the country will never experience the demographic transition that 
lowers fertility rates, increases the number of skilled offspring, and allows the economy to 
eventually experience a rising standard of living. 
This inequality is unsustainable in the long-run.  We discuss this and propose several 
scenarios for how this imbalance will be corrected in Chapter Three.  
  
                                                             
11 The industrial revolution began in northern Europe.  Industrialized nations continue to be 
overrepresented in regions with harsh winters.
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A Story of Demographic Transition 
For the most part modern economic theory has concentrated on the current regime, 
and the models are often inconsistent with the long period in which per capita income was 
stagnant.  A common flaw is the assumption that population growth is exogenous.  These 
economic models, which do not incorporate Malthusian elements, imply that a market economy 
will result in strictly positive growth.  This is not what most of recorded history has documented.  
Models that do not account for the relationship of the economy to population growth are 
unable to explain the long epoch of Malthusian stagnation in which the output per capita varied 
around the subsistence level.  
Since this work is looking at a broad span of time, we must search for a more unified 
approach to understanding how growth has been determined.  The models that we use for 
understanding growth are based on endogenous population growth: that is, population growth 
that is determined by other factors in the social system.  A unified evolutionary theory must 
recognize the integral relationship between the evolution of the human species and the 
transition from a Malthusian era to the current regime of sustained growth. At the heart of this 
approach is the premise that due to a Darwinian process of natural selection, the characteristics 
and the weights that these characteristics have in determining choices are highly relevant for 
the understanding of the evolution of economic growth.   We focus on the evolution of 
preferences in humankind in recent history and the simultaneous relationship between choices 
regarding offspring and changes in the aggregate productivity of social systems.  
Darwinian models generally relate population growth to the ability of members of the 
species to survive.  The models develop an evolutionary theory in which decisions regarding 
offspring (how many and the tradeoff between the number of children and the level of 
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resources that are placed into their education) are based on household decisions that are 
natural outcomes of environmental pressures.  This framework allows an indirect relationship 
between population growth and income. This is an important component to the model since 
this framework enables the model to capture both the direct relationship between population 
growth and income per capita that persisted until well into the 19th century as well as the 
reversal in this relationship that occurred during the demographic shift that lead the way to the 
current regime of sustained economic growth.  We will see that the connections between 
economic growth and actual evolutionary changes in humankind shifted history from 
Malthusian stagnation into what we see today as the model for the world economy.  In later 
chapters we will extend this model well into the future and see where our evolutionary path will 
lead us. 
 The story of the evolution of economic growth from pre-history to the present takes us 
through four stages.  
The first stage mirrors the majority of the history of humankind.  It is the Malthusian 
world. The economy relied only on the land as a source of output.  The majority of the 
population existed near a subsistence consumption level.  Spurts of technological improvement 
in hunting or farming permitted the per capita output to rise above the subsistence level of 
consumption.  As a consequence of these improvements, the population grew.  The greater the 
difference between the level of subsistence income and the increase in income resulting from 
 these improvements, the more rapid was population growth.  But as the population increased, 
the rise in output that was realized from the incorporation of the better hunting or farming 
techniques was spread among the larger population.  If there were no further technological 
progress, within a few generations, people’s share of the output returned to the subsistence 
level.  This return to subsistence could happen much more rapidly given unfavorable 
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environmental shocks such as drought or disease.  Over time the average per capita share of 
output was self-equilibrating and fluctuated around the subsidence level. The economy was 
trapped in a Malthusian stagnation.  During the long Malthusian era that stretched back into 
prehistory, people toiled for survival.   
In that early era in the history of mankind, the population of the world placed little value 
on the quality of their offspring versus the quantity of the children.  The world in those times 
evolved exceedingly slowly.  There was an imperceptible change in how one generation to the 
next carried on with the task of surviving.  Output per capita and the population were essentially 
unchanging.   
Events that reduced population or increased the food supply induced changes in the 
share of output per person and caused changes in fertility.  If the population was reduced due to 
an epidemic, the remaining people could live above the subsistence level and would have both 
more children and longer living children. Within a few generations, the population would return 
to a level at which the share of output per person returned to the subsistence level.  If food 
supply was increased due to finding more land or an improvement in how food was grown and 
hunted, the population would again grow until the share of output per person was at the 
subsistence level.  
Although there was little incentive to choose to raise “quality” children, quality children 
did occasionally arise.  Certain members of the population, often by rights of power, received a 
larger share of the output and lived more comfortably.  History records a long record of family-
based ruling regimes.  These regimes, due to increased income and wealth, were able to have 
consistently high fertility rates without being exposed to the self-equilibrating forces of 
Malthusian stagnation.  Somewhat insulated from the struggle for survival, these groups were 
differentiated from the general population.  Given a choice between physical or intellectual 
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ability, offspring that displayed intellectual ability inherited the positions of power.  As 
civilization progressed, other family groups (some members of the merchant class, for example) 
shifted toward a propensity for selecting intellectually superior offspring as their income and 
wealth increased. 
The effects of Malthusian pressure on fertility rates combined with a Darwinian process 
of selection affected the genetic composition of the population.12  These gradual changes in the 
population are at the heart of how our model for the history of economic growth evolves. 
The second stage of our stylized history focuses on the Darwinian process.  In the 
Malthusian economic environment (as, in fact, at any point in time in history), variety and 
natural selection continued the evolution of the human species.  People’s preferences were 
formed by a Darwinian survival strategy.  As in the survival and evolution of all species, the 
evolution of humankind selected those who fit the changing economic environment naturally, 
increasing the likelihood of the survival of the human species.  
Individuals’ preferences were naturally influenced by a desire for consumption to be 
above the subsistence level.   This choice was integrated into a fundamental choice over the 
quality versus the quantity of their children.  These choices go right to the core of Darwinian 
survival representing the seminal trade-off that exists in nature: the trade-off between 
resources allocated to the parent versus the offspring and the trade-off between the number of 
offspring and the resources allocated to each offspring. 
                                                             
12 The evolution of preferences through a Darwinian economic process is nicely developed in 
“Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and other Economic Institutions” by 




The primary desire for consumption to remain above subsistence is the basic insurance 
for physical survival of the parents.  This also increased the likelihood of the survival of the 
family since resources allocated toward parental consumption beyond the subsistence level 
raised the parents’ labor productivity.  This increase in output helped to provide a buffer against 
famine.  The positive effect on the fitness of the parent also helped to resist disease, but these 
positive effects had countervailing effects on the survival of the family line.  The allocation of 
resources to the parents implied a reduction in the resources allocated to the offspring. 
The other dimension of the fundamental choice that human beings confront, like all 
species, is the trade-off between an offspring’s quality and quantity.  An evolutionary advantage 
may be derived by choosing quantity.  This has a positive effect on fertility rates.  However, the 
choice for more offspring adversely affects the quality of the offspring.  Regardless of whether 
the measure of quality is physical or intellectual, on average, their ability to produce will be 
lower.  Thus the choice for more quantity may generate an evolutionary disadvantage.   
In any era the household must make choices regarding the number of children to have 
(and thus the quality of those children).  This choice is influenced by the total amount of 
resources that can be devoted to child-raising and labor market activities.13  In the era that 
marks the transition from the Malthusian world toward the modern era of constant growth per 
capita, the Malthusian pressures generated an evolutionary advantage for individuals whose 
preferences were biased toward child quality.  This evolutionary advantage increased their 
numbers, and, since preferences are hereditary, more and more of the population chose quality 
over quantity. 
The third stage of our history connects the process of economic growth and the natural 
selection process.  The link between the levels of education received and the resulting effects on 
                                                             
13 This concept is developed by Becker(1991) in A Treatise on the Family. 
34
technological growth is well documented.  Thus it follows that since the process of natural 
selection resulted in an increase in the number of individuals whose preferences were for child 
quality and this increase had a positive effect on the average quality of the population, the rate 
of technological progress increased.   
The fourth stage in our history brings us to the present, linking the increase in the rate 
of technological progress to the transition into sustained economic growth.  The increase in the 
rate of technological progress increased the expected benefits of having workers with broader 
and deeper knowledge and thus parents were more motivated to substitute child quality for 
child quantity.  We can envision how this motivation was reinforced if we simply note that 
technological progress reduces the adaptability of the current workforce in the more rapidly 
changing work environment. Education, however, helps both children and workers to mitigate 
the effects of increasingly more rapid technological progress.  In a nutshell, skilled individuals 
possessed a comparative advantage over unskilled individual in adapting to the changing 
technological environment.  
Based on our ideas about the evolution of preferences, we see that technological 
progress caused two effects that are both complimentary and opposed. The first effect caused 
an increase in the expected value of having skills versus being unskilled and induced parents to 
reduce the number of children and simultaneously raise the quality of each child.  Parents 
substitute quality for quantity. The second effect was a result of the general benefits of the 
increased output that technological progress generated.  As the income of households rose 
above the subsistence level, the families had more resources for both providing education 
(quality) as well as having more children (quantity).  Since both effects increased the average 
quality of the population, technological progress was further accelerated as the relative number 
of skilled individuals increased. Once technological progress became sufficiently rapid, the 
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substitution effect (quality over quantity) dominated the income effect, and technological 
progress, operating through a Darwinian process that changed preferences, caused a reduction 
in fertility rates.  An historical demographic transition occurred that changed how developed 
nations grow.   
What follows is a detailed expansion of this summary.  The text will carry us from the 
early days to the present.    
A Discussion of the Transition from the Malthusian Era into the Current Regime  
In the text that follows we will first model how people came to possess the preferences 
that allowed the demographic transition from the Malthusian era in which per-capita 
consumption determined population growth.  We will then create a model for how the 
transition takes place that allows a disconnection between per-capita consumption and 
population growth and thus a sustainable rise in the standard of living.  Finally, based on the 
insights from the first model, we will show that if some nations begin the transition before 
others, they will have a persistent advantage over the late starters. 
This final insight will provide us with a starting point for discussing how to transition 
from the world we now live in into the future. 
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Natural Selection, Environmental Pressures, and Lifestyle Preferences 
 
"Then a policy-maker was heard to say, ‘Forget grand optimality. Solovians are a simple 
people. We need a simple policy...If we make investment a constant proportion of 
output, our search for the ideal investment policy reduces to finding the best value of s, 
the fixed investment ratio.’ ‘It's fair,’ Solovians all said. The King agreed. So he 
established a prize for discovery of the optimum investment ratio" (Phelps, 1961, p. 638) 
 
Suppose that long ago in pre-industrial times there were two groups of people.  
Members of the one group had a heritage of being prone to idleness and immediate 
consumption.  The other group’s heritage was to work and accumulate an excess stock of food.  
The second group would be more likely to survive unexpected production shocks.  The second 
group would also be more likely to have better fitness due to more consistent consumption 
patterns.  Since per-capita consumption determined population growth, this group would also 
have more consistent growth in its numbers.  Over time, members of the group that was prone 
to work and save would be become the majority group.  As we will see, Edmund Phelps’s golden 
rule will play an important role in the selection process. 
The model that follows is based on the work of Hansson and Stuart (1990).  The key 
component of the model is that the forces that promote the selection of preferences for work 
and saving versus indolence and immediate consumption are based on optimizing the number 
of sustainable offspring though intergenerational savings.14  The “savings” in this case is the 
sacrifice of consumption in the current generation that benefits the next generation.  This would 
include the degree to which the parent takes time from their labor or leisure to support, raise, 
                                                             
14 Laurence Kotlikoff and Laurence Summers (1981) estimate that intergenerational savings (versus 
intragenerational savings such as wealth accumulated early in life and decumulated later) is as high as 80 
percent of total savings.
37
and educate the offspring as well as transfers of accumulated assets such as a dwelling or other 
physical objects that represent wealth. 
The Trade-off between Current Generation and Future Generation Consumption 
 
The model abstracts the world into unique groups of people with unique preferences.  
These preferences are developed from a process of natural selection that favors those choices 
that yield optimal survivability.  Preferences are then passed on to the next generation.  The 
total population of this world is constrained by the carrying capacity of the environment.  Thus 
the land and fisheries are a public good that are part of the production of output.  For simplicity, 
the growth rate of the carrying capacity is exogenous.   (This assumption is removed in later 
sections.)     
If the total population of all of the groups in time period t is denoted by Nt then the 
quantity of input available of the public good in each of the group’s production functions is 1/ Nt 
(the total of the public good is normalized to one for simplicity).  The production function is 
assumed to have characteristics that are consistent with pre-industrial output; thus the function 
is amiable to being manipulated as a concave continuous twice-differentiable function around 
changes in both 1/ Nt and per-capita capital kt.   
The model is focused on the connection between the size of the population and the 
choices made by the clans, so the production function used will be ( , )t tf N k .  The inversion of 
1/ tN  to tN  implies that an increase in the total population of the world will increase the 
crowding of the commons and will lower per-capita output; i.e., 0Nf ? .  Augmenting the 
specification slightly can allow the carrying capacity of the environment to grow by discounting 
the population effect with the growth rate; / (1 )tt tN g M? ? .   
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Both for mathematical purposes and in terms of common sense, if either input equals 
zero, output equals zero.  It is assumed that the Inada conditions hold for the marginal product 
of capital, kf .  
Consumption above the subsistence level results in a higher resistance to environmental 
shocks and malnutrition.  Thus, given higher consumption, the average number of children that 
survive to have their own offspring will be greater, and adults will also live longer and have more 
children.  Therefore, the population growth rate, p, from time t to t+1 will be a function of 
consumption: ( ) 0tp c ?  with 1 (0) 0p? ? ?  , 0cp ? , and 0ccp ? .   
Specifying the basic model of production to show how the total output for an active 
generation of a given clan is split between consumption and savings (savings is assumed equal 
to investment in capital, k) yields the following: 
 1( , ) [ (1 ( )) ]t t t t t tf M k c k p c k?? ? ? ?  (1.1)   
The split is between current consumption and increasing the stock of capital by forgoing current 
consumption. 
In the very-long-run,15 population will be constant (given a fixed level of the public good 
and no technological growth).  At that equilibrium point equation (1.1) becomes 
 ( , ) ( )f M k c kp c? ?  (1.2) 
In other words, to maintain constant capital per capita, an investment of ( )kp c is required to 
offset population growth.  Also, in the steady state where the carrying capacity of the 
environment grows are rate g , the rate of population growth must be ( )p c g? .  That is, per-
                                                             
15 In this case we distinguish the very-long-run from the long-run in as much as in the long-run there is a 
complete adjustment of inputs and outputs to a given set of tastes and preferences.  In the very-long-run 
tastes and preferences are also stable.
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capita consumption will be at the level that holds population growth equal to the growth rate of 
the carrying capacity of the environment. 
By requiring that the selected behavior in the steady state be the result of a choice that 
maximizes the well-being of the clan, the model relates optimum well-being with the choice for 
capital formation and thus optimal consumption.  By differentiating (1.2) with respect to capital 
and choosing the maximum for /dc dk , i.e., / 0dc dk ? , we see that 
 ( , ) ( )kf M k p c?  (1.3) 
This outcome is the “golden rule for capital accumulation.”16   In a Malthusian environment the 
tendency for surviving groups will be to converge towards the golden rule savings rate by 
selecting the best split between consumption and investment. 
The mechanics by which this tendency is enforced are illustrated by the following 
numerical example.  Specify that .5( ) 1p c c? ?  and .5( , ) ( / ) .5 .5f M k k M k? ? ? .  For 
simplicity, set the maximum population to one and growth, g, at zero.  It follows that the very-
long-run equilibrium rate of population growth must be zero; *( ) 0p c ? .  If the population 
growth is zero, then * 1c ? .  Therefore output must be * * .5 *( / ) .5 .5 1k M k? ? ? .  The golden 
rule requires that the marginal product of capital be * * .5.5( / ) .5 0kf k M
?? ? ? .  Figure 2 
illustrates this relationship: 
 
                                                             
16 The level of savings and investment that an economy enjoying balanced growth would need to support in 
order to maximize the long-term value of consumption per head. 
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Figure 2.  Golden rule. 
In the example, in the steady-state the optimal level of capital per-capita is 1.0.  If 
certain groups made choices that were at variance with *k , it would cause the population to 
decrease.   Choices other than *k  would be bad choices, and natural selection would disfavor 
groups that passed on preferences that carried forth these choices.  Groups that made good 
choices would replenish the population until it returned to the steady-state quantity.  To see 
this, suppose population decreased from 1.0 to 0.95.  Figure 3 shows this situation: 
 





Figure 3.  Golden rule with population change. 
Groups that choose k at the golden rule would experience positive population growth and the 
total population would rise.  The converse is also true so that any level of population other than 
1.0 will evoke Malthusian pressures that will favor groups that get the investment/consumption 
choice right and drive the population back to the carrying capacity of the environment.   
If the growth rate of the commons is allowed to be above zero, then all surviving groups will 
grow at the growth rate of the carrying capacity of the environment.  Thus ( )p c g? .  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4, where the total population is again set to 1.0: 
 





Figure 4. Carrying capacity. 
How the groups determine the optimal consumption / investment split 
In the spirit of this analysis, in which natural selection is relied upon to continuously 
improve the survivability of the species, the expectation is that that the aggregate of choices will 
result in the best possible outcome.  This is modeled using the standard utility maximization 
approach in which each generation makes choices that are based on seeking the best approach 
to the long-term fitness of their members.    
As has been demonstrated, the criterion for this selection is to maximize the population 
(and thus consumption), given the carrying capacity of the environment.  Each generation will 
choose the current period’s consumption (and the implied investment level that is the residual 
of that choice).  They will also consider the future generation’s consumption in terms of optimal 
survivability (in terms of optimal population growth rates which are a function of the 
consumption choice).  The utility of future generations will be discounted by ?  such that a 
larger discount rate means that the current generation is more selfish (or shows less concern for 
the well-being of their offspring and future generations). 





Thus for generation x  the utility they gain from consumption in a future period t  is 
discounted by the compounded discount rate.  But the utility they gain is also a function of the 
compounded growth rate of the population.  A higher future growth rate will increase current 
utility.  Generation x’s utlity from consumption in period t can be written as 
 1 1( )[1 ( )][1 ( )]...[1 ( )] / (1 )
t z
t x x tu c p c p c p c ? ?? ?? ? ? ?  (1.4) 
Assuming that the planning horizon is finite to time T the utility maximizing problem for 
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subject to the constraint described in (1.1).   
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 (1.6) 
 1 1( 1) (1 ( )) 0t k t tf p c? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  (1.7) 
where 1x t x T? ? ? ? . 
The investigation is concerned with the very-long-run solution and the determination of 
whether or not there is a unique discount rate that will satisfy the maximization problem when 
consideringT ?? .   
To this end, on the path to the very-long-run, sequential generations will act the same.  
That is, natural selection will insure that these generations will have discovered the correct 
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(equilibrium) rates for k*, c*, and M*.  Thus plugging in the equilibrium conditions and 
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By allowing T ??  there are two potential outcomes that maintain the equality.  First 
setting ( *)p c ??  and letting T ??  would require that kf ?? , which would further 
require that 0k ? .  Zero capital would extinct the population and thus is not an allowable 
choice.  Setting ( *)p c ??  and let T ??  then (1.8) reduces to 
 kf? ?  (1.9) 
This is an important conclusion.  The intergenerational discount rate is exactly equal to 
the marginal product of capital (evaluated at the equilibrium values for per-capita capital, *k
and the growth discounted equilibrium population, *M ).  Recalling the golden rule and 
combining that with (1.9) yields 
 * ( *)p c? ?  (1.10) 
Because the discount rate that is selected from the process of natural selection (the 
assumption is that the survivors get it right) is the same as the population growth rate and, 






? , which is one, current utility is just the un-weighted sum of 
all future utility derived from the consumption levels of future generations.   
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To reach this conclusion (that is, to require that the current generation maximize their 
utility based on current and all future generations) requires that all future generations receive 
exactly the same weight in the summation as the current generation.  For utility maximization, 
the current generation must have great care for future generations’ consumption.  This implies 
great care in the selection of savings (investment) versus consumption. 
An interesting conclusion that will be referred to in later chapters is based on
( *, *) ( *)kf M k p c? .  That is, the marginal product of capital or the real interest rate equals 
the growth rate of the population given some * /1N g? .  In other words, the real interest rate 
is based only on g ; productivity is the sole determinant of the real interest rate since the 
growth to the steady-state population is already discounted (assuming, of course, that the 
investment/consumption choice for current and all future generations is optimal for the survival 
of the species).  
The expectation that current and future generations make optimal choices may sound 
fanciful.  However, recall that this exercise looks to a very-long-run equilibrium; thus the 
expectation is that consistently poor choices will result in the ultimate demise of a regime and 
the replacement of that regime with one that does make consistently optimal choices.  In a later 
section of this chapter there is discussion about how social unrest and war are mechanisms for 
affecting the resolution of imbalances that arise from consistent suboptimal choices.   
Notice also that the requirement for the model is that the rate of population growth is 
the same as the growth rate of the carrying capacity of the environment.  This is not the 
observed fact in the post-industrialized era in areas that are “developed” wherein population 
growth rates have been lower than the growth rate of output.  In Part II of this discussion this 
disparity is reconciled, showing how, at a certain point, preferences for the quantity versus 
quality of offspring shift.  The analysis will use the conclusions developed in this part as a 
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foundation for the model.  However, as will be shown in the next section, some groups will 
move forward toward the transition more rapidly than others.  Furthermore, as will be 
demonstrated in Part III of this discussion, once different rates of growth are established, then 
they tend to persist.  Later chapters will discuss how these differences might be undone in the 
long-run.  However, first the discussion of how natural selection drives the determination of 
which of the groups progress and which do not needs to be completed.   
Natural Selection and Productivity Growth 
In A Study of History Arnold Toynbee (1934) suggests that economic evolution has been 
guided by responses to environmental challenges.  He suggests that “hard countries,” for 
example, have elicited a response from the inhabitants that selected traits that raise the 
probability of surviving the difficult conditions.  In an agrarian pre-industrial world harsh winters 
would favor groups that were better at accumulating (saving) and building shelter (investing).   
This concept is incorporated into the model by adding an environmental harshness 
parameter to the population growth function.  An increase in the parameter ?  indicates a 
harsher environment and lowers the population growth rate; i.e., 0p? ? .   
It is also sensible to expect that there will be different preferences for labor versus 
leisure given harsh versus moderate climates.  If we call labor per-capita h , then leisure per-
capita is 1l h? ? .  Furthermore, more leisure will result in higher population growth.  The 
intuition for that statement is that greater leisure time versus labor time will promote better 
health, more sexual activity, and higher level social institutions.  However, more leisure, by 
reducing labor, also lowers the group’s output for consumption and capital formation.  Thus l  is 
added to the population growth function and h  is added to the group’s production function.   
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The partial second derivatives for population growth are as follows: 0cp ? ? , 0clp ? .  
These derivatives show that if the environment is harsher, then the marginal benefit of 
consumption increases relative to leisure. 
For the production function, both kf  and hf  are greater than zero.  It is assumed that 
0Mkf ?  and 0Mhf ? .  These signs are based on the fact that as population is larger, given the 
fixed size of the commons, per capita output falls ( 0Mf ? ).  Thus, if M is increasing, both kf  
and hf  are reduced. 
Environmental conditions will influence behavior, so both the leisure and harshness 
parameters are now included in the utility function.  Thus, as before, to investigate the behavior 
that maximizes well-being (population growth which is now a function of consumption, leisure, 
and harshness) a constrained optimization relationship is formed.  This is described as a 
Lagrangian on ( ( , , ))U p c l ?  subject to 
 ( , , ) ( , , )c f m k h kp c l ?? ?  (1.11) 
The total population, M , for simplicity is calibrated to one. 
The first order conditions for population growth maximizing choices are 
 ( , , )kf p c l ??  (1.12) 
 
1 1c c
h l l h
kp p
f kp p f
? ? ?? . (1.13) 
Equation (1.12) is the golden rule for capital accumulation.  Equation (1.13) describes the well-
being maximizing mix of consumption and leisure.   
In order to investigate how different degrees of environment harshness influence 
natural selection, comparative statistics are performed on the equilibrium conditions (1.11)-
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(1.13).  Recall also that ( , , )p c l g? ? ; that is, the total population growth rate is equal to the 
growth rate of the productive capacity of the environment.  The analysis is also simplified by 
specifying a linear form for ( )p ?  is the form of 
 ( ) ( ) ( )c l? ? ? ? ? ?? ?  (1.14) 
Also stipulated is that an increase in the harshness of the environment will reduce 
output for given inputs; i.e., ( , , ) 0f M k h? ? .   The validity of the conclusions thus relies on 
whether or not an increase in environmental harshness lowers output across all inputs.  The 
scope of this analysis suggests that an increase in harshness that does cause a negative impact 
on production will cause groups to adopt preferences that differentiate them from groups that 
do not face such environmental challenges.  Therefore our stipulation is does not unfairly bias 
the conclusions. 
The cross derivatives among inputs to production are assumed to be positive.   
The effect of harshness on per-capita labor is shown below. 
 0c h kh MkMh
c kk
p f f fdh dMf CdM p f dB
?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?
 (1.15) 






?? ? . 
Signing 0dM
d? ?  is straightforward and suggests that if environmental harshness 
increases, then the equilibrium population density is reduced.17    The components of 
dh
d?  are in 
                                                             
17 This conclusion is well supported in both historical and current population demographics. See the 
following map (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2006):
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? , is greater than zero because as the environment becomes 
harsher, the relative value of consumption rises; that is, 0cp ? ? .
18  The terms augmented by 
0dM
d? ?  combine to be less than zero.     
The fact that 
dh
d?  is greater than zero shows that per-capita labor increases with an increase in 
environmental harshness.  This conclusion is reinforced by  
 0Mk kh
kk kk
f fdk dM dh
d f d f d? ? ?? ? ?? ? ,
 (1.16) 
which shows that capital increases with increased harshness.  Also, the comparative statistics 
show that per capita consumption increases with harshness due to a fall in population density 
combined with a rise in per capita labor: 
0M h
dc dM dhf f
d d d? ? ?? ? ? .                                                    
(1.17) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 Higher caloric intake, more consistent caloric intake (storage and storage shelter), and conservation of 
caloric intake (clothing) are all considered as consumption.
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These comparative statistics provide the basis for the next section in which the subject 
is the transition from the Malthusian era into the modern era of sustained increases in per 
capita income.   In this model of the pre-industrial world, natural selection, which favors choices 
that return optimal rates of population growth, can explain preferences for work versus leisure.  
We see that the choice between consumption and saving has been determined by the golden 
rule at which consumption per capita in the current and in all future periods was maximized 
consistent with steady-state growth.  The tendency of these forces was to differentiate groups  
across regions in response to different levels of environmental challenges.19 
This conclusion provides a foundation for the next sections.  The transition from the prolonged 
period of economic stagnation into the current regime of sustained growth in per-capita income 
that the developed world has enjoyed for nearly two hundred years required an increase in the 
pace of technological change.  As we have seen, natural selection and utility maximizing 
behavior differentiated certain groups from others.  In the next section, a model is developed 
for how this differentiation not only increased the proportion of skilled labor, but also 
eventually changed preferences that led to a key disconnection between economic well-being 
and fertility rates.  Without this disconnection, increases in output would be diluted by increases 
in population as they were in the Malthusian era. 
                                                             
19 Lower population density combined with a preference to devote more resources to the upbringing and 
education of children (spending per pupil in real US dollars) as a trait of those living in harsher climates is 
supported by data from the World Bank and the US Dept. of Education on average spending per pupil. 
Comparisons were made for northern and southern Europe and northern and southern US.  (See World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, 2001, Table 2.11, Education Inputs; and National Center for 
Education Statistics, Statistics in Brief, May 2002.) This anecdotal observation’s basis is further supported 
in the next section.
Work done by Hansson and Stuart (1988) suggests that northern European countries have a lower 
tax-driven elasticity of labor supply than southern European countries.  By no means conclusive, this work 
does suggest that controlling for macroeconomic influences, northerners have a stronger work ethic.
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In the last section of this chapter, the differentiation across regions that was shown to 
be a product of environment above is the basis for understanding how, in today’s world, there is 
such a large disparity between income per capita. 
Part Two:  Natural Selection and the Transition to Sustained Economic Growth 
In this section a model will be developed that will allow the heterogeneity of the groups 
to eventually bring the proportion of individuals in those groups to a level after which utility 
maximizing behavior leads to a disconnection between income level and fertility.20  The first part 
of the analysis will outline how labor is augmented by human capital (based on the quality of 
upbringing) to enhance the production of goods from the land.  Decisions made by each 
generation influence the well-being of following generations.  Next the analysis works out the 
time paths for the key variables that drive the utility maximization problem faced by each 
generation.  Finally, a dynamic system is analyzed, and phase diagrams are derived that show 
that when the proportion of certain types of individuals in the group exceeds a critical level, the 
economy experiences a release from the bounds of the Malthusian stagnation and “takes off.” 
The Decisions Facing each Generation 
This section and the next will simplify the economy to only two input factors for 
production: labor and land.  Physical capital is not included in the production function.  The role 
of this model is to explore human capital rather than the role of physical capital and asset 
accumulation.  Using physical capital (and thus a need for interest rates and property rights) 
would make the model intractable.  Their exclusion does not detract from the fundamental 
qualitative inferences that will be made.   
                                                             
20 The analysis that follows gains its inspiration from work by Galor and Moav (2002).
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The inputs of land and labor are augmented by an endogenously determined 
technology.  The supply of land is considered fixed over time and is exogenous.  The supply of 
effective labor (efficiency units) is a function of the preceding generation’s choices for the 
number or children and the amount of education that each child receives. 
Production at time t  is  
 1 ( )t t tY H A X
? ??? . (1.18) 
The output is from constant returns technology where tH  is the aggregate quantity of 
efficiency labor, X is the land, and tA  is the level of technology, and (0,1)? ? .  The product of 
tA X  represents the effective resources available to labor. 
There are no property rights in this conception (perhaps not an unreasonable 
assumption for most of pre-industrial history), so that there are no rents.  Wages are derived 








Each generation represents one time period.  Each individual lives for two periods.  In 
the first period, 1t ? , they are children and in the second period they are parents.  In the 
second period the parents allocate their one unit of time between labor and child rearing.  They 
must choose between the quantity and the quality of children.  They also must participate in the 
labor market to receive wages that they consume in the second period.  The amount of the 
parents’ time that the child consumes in the first period determines the quality of the child. 
Individuals in each generation t  are differentiated by their preference for the quality 
versus the quantity children.  Members of each preference type, i , pass on their preferences 
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from generation to generation.  The distribution of types will change with time given changes in 
the social and economic systems.  In other words, a basic Darwinian survival mechanism will 
assure evolutionary change that maximizes the survival of the population.  Depending on the 
economic regime, preferences will shift between greater fertility or greater nurturing and 
education of offspring.  
The base level constraint is to maintain a subsistence level of consumption.  
Consumption above that level has a positive effect on the wellness of individuals and thus their 
ability to weather adverse shocks such as disease, famine, and the seasonal variations of output.  
Consumption above subsistence also improves labor productivity. 
Utility is derived from a choice of the number of children and their quality, given that 
the parents’ time must be allocated to child-rearing and wage earning.  Utility is also a function 
of household consumption.  It is assumed that utility is derived from consumption above the 
subsistence level only.21  Thus the preferences of persons of type i  in generation t  are: 
 1 1(1 ) ln [ln ln ]
i i i i i
t t t t tu c n w h? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?   where (0,1)? ?  and (0,1)i? ?  (1.20) 
i
tc is the consumption of households, 
i
tn is the number of children, 1
i
th ? is the human capital of 
each of the offspring, 1tw ? is the wage per efficiency unit of labor, and 
i?  is the relative weight 
given to quality by the people of type i .  The distribution of i?  in each generation will change 
over time as the population reacts to changes in the economic environment.  The utility function 
is strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave and will yield an interior solution, 
given that wages are of sufficient magnitude for consumption to be above the subsistence level.  
If wages are insufficient and consumption is at the minimum 0c ?  , then a corner solution is 
reached.   
                                                             
21 This simplifies the mathematics but does not impact the analysis.
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 Two components contribute to the time necessary for raising a child.  n? is the fraction 
of a parent’s total time endowment that is required to raise any child.  As long as n? ??   there 
will be population growth.   If n?  were greater than ?  , there would insufficient time to raise 
offspring after the time necessary to provide subsistence consumption and the population 
would shrink.  The other component that consumes the parents’ allocation of time is the 
providing of education beyond the basics.  If the quality (i.e., the level of education) for a 
member of type i  in generation t  is 1
i
te ?  and the fraction of time allocated to providing that 
education is e?  then the total time cost for a parent is 1n e ite? ? ?? .  
 If a type i  person in generation t  is endowed with a level of human capital and their 
entire life were spent in labor, the (potential) income is: 
 i i it t t t tz w h x h
?? ?  which implies that ( , )it tz x h . (1.21) 
This potential total earning is divided between consumption and the cost of raising children.  
The opportunity cost of raising a child is 1[ ]
i n e i
t t tw h e? ? ?? ;  therefore the parent faces the 
budget constraint: 
 1( )
i i n e i i i i
t t t t t t t tw h n e c w h z? ? ?? ? ? ?  (1.22) 
 The final component necessary for solving the optimization problem is the process for 
human capital production.  We already see that the level of education improves human capital.  
The feedback from technological improvement into the Darwinian process is intuitively 
understood as a complimentary relationship between skill level and survivability in an evolving 
socioeconomic environment.  In other words, technological progress increases the returns to 
education (a positive productivity effect).  Technological progress also effectively lowers the 
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value of human capital for a given level of education (a negative attrition effect).  If the rate of 








??  , then  
 1 1 1( , )
i i
t t th h e g? ? ??  (1.23) 
where ( ) 0h ? ? , 0eh ? , 0eeh ? , 0gh ? , 0ggh ? , 0egh ?  for 1 1( , ) 0it te g? ?? ?  and 
1lim (0, ) 0g th g?? ? ?  and (0,0) 1h ? . 
 In Chapter Two we will investigate what happens to this model when the rate of 
technological growth becomes zero.  
The Optimization of Intertemporal Utility 
 The people of a given generation must choose how many children to have and the level 
of quality that these children will be provided.  This choice also determines their level of 
consumption.  Combining (1.22) and (1.23) into (1.20) yields: 
1 1 1 1 1{ , } arg max{(1 ) ln [1 ( )] [ln ln ( , )]}
i i i i n e i i i i
t t t t t t t t t tn e w h n e n w h e g? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? , (1.24) 
subject to 
1[1 ( )]
i i n e i
t t t tw h n e c? ? ?? ? ? ; 
1( , ) 0
i i
t tn e ? ?  
If z  is the quantity of potential income (where / (1 )z c ?? ? ) below which there is no longer 
sufficient time for child rearing, then if itz c? , it follows that 0itn ? ; in other words those type
i ’s become extinct.  If the potential income itz z?  , then a person must use a larger part of 
their allocation of time (larger than1 ?? , the time spent not raising children) to attain 
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subsistence consumption.  For increasing levels of human capital it takes less time in the labor 
force for achieve subsistence consumption; thus there is more time for raising offspring.   
 It is clear that higher labor efficiency will yield more time for raising offspring.  However, 
it is not the level of income that determines the preference between the quality and quantity of 
offspring.  What is important is the rate of technological progress and the preference for quality,
i? .   
 Noting that as long as potential income is greater than that necessary for subsistence 
consumption, itz c? , we have  
 1[ ] 1 ( / )
















? . (1.25) 
The parent, if faced with a potential income that is lower than z , must then allocate more than 
1 ?? of their time for acquiring subsistence consumption.  This also implies that the fraction of 
time left for child-rearing is less than ? .   
 The trade-off between consumption and child-rearing is illustrated in the figure below.  
Consumption is on the x-axis, and time spent raising children is on the y-axis.  The budget 
constraint, z , is shown in three progressively increasing levels.  Since the specification for utility 
is such that only consumption above the subsistence level adds to the function, the income 
expansion path is vertical until z is greater than that required for subsistence consumption and 
is horizontal thereafter.22   
                                                             
22 If the specification were for the consumption portion was to be (1 ) ln( )itc c?? ? , then the income 
expansion path would be convex.  
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Figure 5.  Consumption and child-rearing. 
The relationship between education and technological progress is what inspires the Darwinian 
process of selection for quality offspring versus mere quantity.   This relationship can be 
characterized as a function of both the cost of child-rearing and the preference for quality 
children.  It is intuitive to state that the quality of children is positively linked to the rate of 
technological growth.  Thus at a given preference for quality, if 1 1( , )
i i
t te g? ?? ??  , then 0g? ?  
and 0?? ? .   
 The level of human capital for the i  type in the period 1t ?  is thus: 
 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( )
i i i t
t t t t t th h e g h g g h g? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? . (1.26) 
If we substitute 1 1( , )
i i
t te g? ?? ?? into (1.26) and note that
( ( ; ), ) ( ( ))i i it t t t t tz x h g g x h g
? ?? ?? ? , then if income is greater than subsistence, we can make 





/ [ ( ; )]
( , ; ) ( , ( , ( )); )
(1 [ / ] / [ ( ; )
n e i i
t ti i i i i
t t t t t ti e i i
t t t
g if z z
n n g z n g z x h g
c z g if z z




? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??? .
(1.27) 
If we note that education, 1te ? , responds to growth, 1tg ? , in such a way as to counteract the 







? ?? .  As 
long as the consumption constraint, / ( )i tz h g  is not binding, a partial derivative on (1.27) is 
1( , ( , ( )); ) / 0
i i
t t t tn g z x h g x??? ? ? .  If 1// ( )it tx z h g ??  .   The partial is greater than zero, and 
the second partial is less than zero. 
 It follows then that evolution has the following influences on the choice of quality versus 
quantity children (Conclusion One): 
1. Growth from technological progress causes parents to choose to have fewer 
children of higher quality.  That is 1/ 0
i
t tn g ?? ? ?  and 1 1/ 0it te g? ?? ? ? . 
2.  If the subsistence constraint is binding (they are below subsistence 
consumption, itz z? ) , then an increase in income raises the number of 
children but not their quality.  That is, / 0i it tn z? ? ? and / 0i it te z? ? ? . 
3. If income is above z , then an increase in income has no effect on quantity or 
quality of children. 
Therefore what determines the quality of offspring is not income but, for some level of 
technological change, it is the type of parents.  Differences in human capital, particularly the size 
of the quality parameter, ? , between groups of parents determine the choice. 
It becomes important to understand the distribution and the types of human capital in 
order to construct an evolutionary story.  As a foundation, assume that the population is of two 
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types. Type a is the quality type and possesses a high quality parameter a? ??  and type b is 
the quantity type and possesses a low quality parameter.  At any time t the population total is 
a b
t t tL L L? ? .  Mutation may occur, and members may migrate from group to group.  However, 
for our argument we keep each group homogeneous.   
Based on the conclusions above, the sole determinant of how educated the offspring 
are is technological progress.  But if we assume that the group with quality offspring makes 
decisions based on their attitude about child quality, we can state that they do invest in the 
human capital of the offspring even if technological change is zero: 0ate t? ? .  That is, even if 
1 0tg ? ?  , the type a’s invest in education.  We can see this by noting that as long as a? ??  , 
then it must be true that 1 1( ) ( )
a a b b
t tg g? ?? ?? .  There exists some ( ) 0ig ? ?  so that it is only 
necessary for 1tg g? ?  or i? ??  for 1( ) 0i te g ? ? .  This is illustrated in the figure below by 
plotting the effect of technological growth on the choice for education. 
 
Figure 6.  Technological growth and education choice. 
The aggregate level of education is a function that averages the two.  If /at t tq L L? (the ratio of 
quality people to the total population), then  
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 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )a bt t r t t r te q e g q e g e g q? ? ? ? , (1.28) 
which is increasing and strictly concave with respect to tg .   
 Making itf  the amount of time that a type i individual devotes to labor force 
participation, the aggregate supply of efficiency units is 
 [ ] (1 )a a a b b b a a b bt t t t t t t t t t t t t tH L f h L f h L q f h q f h? ? ? ? ? . (1.29) 
From (1.25) and the fact that ( )i it t tz x h g











f f g x
c z if z z
?? ? ??? ??? ??
 (1.30) 
with the partials ( , ) 0ix t tf g x ? , ( , ) 0ig t tf g x ?  for the second case. 
A Dynamic Story of Evolution 
We are now ready to discuss how natural selection and the choice for the level of 
quality is a necessary component of for the transition out of the Malthusian trap into the 
current era of sustained growth in income per capita.  In a later chapter, we will revisit the 
conclusions reached in this section.  However, as we will see in that chapter, the model 
responds differently under a zero growth assumption. 
For now, suppose that technological progress is a result of the level of education in the 
society.  The progress in technology, A , that takes place from time t  to 1t ? is a function of the 
average level of education/quality amongst the workers at time t , te .  Thus  




??? ?? ?  (1.31) 
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with the rate of progress increasing on average education.  Solving (1.31) and substituting, we 
have  
 1 1[1 ] [1 ( )]t t t t rA g A e A?? ?? ? ? ? . (1.32) 
From (1.28) and the above we can say that growth in the period following is determined by 
growth in the current period and the average quality of the workforce: 
 1 ( ( , )) ( , )t t t t tg e q g g g q?? ? ?  (1.33) 
with the first derivatives on g and q positive.  Diminishing marginal benefit assures concavity. 
 We must also specify the time effects on population size and fertility between the two 
types of individuals.  Recall that /t t tx A X H?  denotes the effective resources per efficiency 
unit of labor.  If itn  is the number of offspring (fertility rate) for type i , then the population for 
type i  is 1
i i i
t t tL n L? ? .  From the work above, we know that  
 ( , , )i it t t tn n g x q? . (1.34) 
Since the total population is the sum of the populations of each type and the ratio of quality 
people to the total population is /at t tq L L? , then  
 (1 )a bt t t r tn q n q n? ? ? . (1.35) 
Therefore the evolution of the proportion of quality types is 
 1 ( , , )
a
t
t t t t t
t






We now have the information necessary to illustrate the relationship between the economy 
(i.e., the level of effective resources or wages) and the evolution of the types of individuals.   
 When early man was simply surviving, the wealthier quality households had an initial 
advantage over the quantity households.   However, at some level of effective resources, x?  that 
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This conclusion follows logically from (1.27)  and Conclusion One reached in that section.  (1.37) 
is true as long as 1/ 1/([ / ( )] ,[ / ( )] )i i it t tx c h g z h g
? ?? ; thus 
( , ; ) / ( , ; ) /b at t t t t tn g x q x n g x q x? ? ? ? ? .  So although the quality types have an initial 
advantage, as effective resources per efficiency unit of labor rise sufficiently (that is, 
( ; )t tx x g q? ? ), the Malthusian pressure reduces and the rate of population growth among 
quantity types overtakes that of the quality types.  Note that Conclusion One also suggests that 
as the rate of technological progress advances, the substitution of quality for quantity will bring 
about a demographic transition, and fertility rates will decline.  We will investigate that farther 
down.  This early relationship between wealth and fertility is illustrated in Figure 7 below: 
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Figure 7.  Wealth and fertility. 
 Consistent with the arguments above, we can also say that the growth rate of the 
efficiency of labor is also a function of technological progress, effective resources, and the 
proportion of quality individual in the population.  Thus,  
 1 1 1 1 1
(1 )1 1
(1 )
a a a a a a
t t t t t t t t t
t a a a a
t t t t t t t
H q n f h q n f h
H q f h q f h
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ,
 (1.38) 
and as long as the society is above the basic replacement level of fertility, therefore 
1 ( , , )t t t tg x q? ?? ? .  So effective resources per efficiency unit of labor, /t r tx A X H? , is a 
function of the rate of technological change and the growth rate of efficiency units of labor: 
 11
1
1 ( , , )
1
t
t t t t
t







 It is clear that the development of the economy is described by the path of output, 
population, technology, education, and human capital.  The path is determined by tx , tq , tg  
(the time path of effective resources per efficiency unit of labor, the rate of technological 
progress, and the fraction of quality types in the population) so that equations (1.33), (1.36), 
and (1.39) are satisfied in every period t .  The analysis is facilitated (and simplified to two 
dimensions) if the equation of motion for growth, 1 ( ( , )) ( , )t t t t tg e q g g g q?? ? ? , is recognized 
to be the outcome of 1 ( )t tg e?? ?  and ( , )t t te e g q? . 
 This relationship can be illustrated in the relationship of growth to education.  The 
relationship of education to technology to the demographic dominance of quality types allows 
an endogenous shift that creates dramatic changes on the resulting steady-state outcome.  As 
q increases, the curve ( , )t t te e g q?  shifts upward.  Below are three charts: Figures 8 , 9, 10, 
where the superscripts L, U and H refer to those levels at which stable steady state equilibriums 
are reached .  The first shows the outcome in a world in which the fraction of type a  individuals 
(those that prefer quality) is zero.   The second chart shows where the fraction is below that 
required for take-off.  And the third where the fraction is above qˆ .  
 In the first and second charts, there is a low steady state equilibrium (L) where 
( )L bg q g? (and only individuals of type a  invest in education) and a high steady state 
equilibrium (H) at which both types of individuals invest in human capital.  In the third chart 
since ˆq q?  there is only the high steady state node.  The unique critical boundary node 
between the low and high nodes is designated with a U. 
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Figure 8.  Steady State A. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Steady State B 
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Figure 10.  Steady State C. 
In the final chart, both types of humans invest in human capital.  
The analysis above also yields a two dimensional representation of the relationship 
between the rate of technological progress, tg , and the effective resources per efficiency unit of 
labor, tx , for a given ratio of the type a individuals, q .  It can be shown (see Appendix A for 
details) that in the plane of tg and tx  there exist three loci that create a phase diagram of a 
dynamical system in which for all time, 1 ( , )t tg g g q? ?  and 1 ( , , )t t tx x g x q? ? are both jointly 
satisfied.  The three loci are  
? The subsistence consumption frontier (CC), which separates the region where 
the subsistence constraint is binding for some individuals from the region in 
which it is not binding for any individuals. 
? The labor/technology equilibrium (XX) along which, given a level of q , the 
effective level of efficiency units of labor, tx  is in steady state.  Along this locus 
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the growth rate of efficiency units of labor, tu , and the rate of technological 
progress are equal.   
? The technology equilibrium (GG) which is the relationship between tg , the rate 
of technological progress, and tx , the effective resources per efficiency unit of 
labor, so that for a given level of type a  humans, the rate of technological 
progress, tg  is in steady state (GG). 
The diagrams below (Figures 11, 12, 13) illustrate the conclusions above.  
 




Figure 12.  Dynamics B. 
 
Figure 13.  Dynamics C. 
The first and second phase diagrams above (11, 12) show the world in an era when the 
ratio of type a individuals, q  is either non-existent or small.  Notice that the GG locus consists 
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of three vertical lines at the steady state levels of g for three conditions that are based on the 
three outcomes from the relationships shown in figures 7, 8 and 9 above.23  In the first two 
diagrams the world always seeks a stable steady state equilibrium at the intersection of the XX 
and GG loci.  In both cases the world is locked in a Malthusian trap in which the aggregate of 
income per person is constant.   
As development progresses and tq  increases, the Malthusian trap disappears, and the 
system enters a stage of permanent positive growth in effective resources per unit of labor as 
illustrated in the third phase diagram.  Note also that the system converges to a steady state 
level of technological progress that is high.   
At the point at which type b  individuals start investing in the quality of their offspring 
(point bg  on the charts above) the growth rate of the average level of education increases.  
There follows an acceleration in the rate of technological progress such as that seen in the 
Industrial Revolution.  The relationship between technological progress and the level of 
education reinforces the growth process.  Society eventually crosses the subsistence 
consumption frontier (the CC locus), and a demographic transition occurs.  The rate of 
population growth declines, and the average level of education increases. 
As we will see in a later chapter, a minor alteration of several of the assumptions 
required to derive the loci will change the outcome of the exercise and allow the system to 
return to a neo-Malthusian trap:  a constant income per person is the normal state in the zero 
growth world of the future.  
                                                             
23 See appendix A: The GG locus is unaffected by the effective resources per efficiency unit of labor.
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The Effects of Trade on the Process of Transition from the Malthusian Regime 
This section presents a simple model that follows upon the conclusions reached above.  
Suppose now that we have two economies  identical in all ways except that one of the 
economies has developed somewhat better technology.  The two economies produce both a 
manufactured good and an agricultural good.  
The reader may recall that in an earlier section of this work we see that exogenous 
pressures differentiate populations.  Now suppose that Economy A has responded to 
environmental harshness and has developed a set of technologies that improve both their 
production of an industrial good and an agricultural good.  So  
[ ] [ ]m A m Bt tA A?  and [ ] [ ]a A a Bt tA A? .  Also, if we assume that progress is more rapid in the 







? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
.  In 
autarky, the relative price of the agricultural good in the technologically more advanced 
economy A, Ap , is higher than the autarkic relative price of the agricultural good in the less 
advanced country; that is, A Bt tp p? .   
 If trade is established, the open economy relative price of the agricultural good, *tp , is 
between the autarkic prices.  Thus, *B At t tp p p? ? .  If we remove the possibility of equality of 
prices, each country will completely specialize in production.  Members of the less advanced 
economy perceive an increase in the price of the agricultural good and are induced to produce 
more.  Members of the more advanced economy perceive a reduction in the price of the 
agricultural good and thus produce less.  Country A specializes in the skill-intensive industrial 
good, and Country B specializes in the agricultural good.   
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 This demand for skilled or unskilled labor feeds back into the mechanism for the 
selection of the number of offspring that we developed above.  As we noted above, population 
growth is affected positively by the level of aggregate resources in the economy and negatively 
by the return to human capital.  The production of skilled offspring simply takes more time and 
a more concentrated effort.   
International trade amplifies the process.  The transition into the post-Malthusian era is 
expedited by trade for the advanced country and is retarded by trade for the less advanced 
country.   As the ratio of skilled to less skilled workers rises in the advanced country and falls in 
the less advanced country, the gap between the two will widen and further reinforce the 
patterns of comparative advantage.   
If the share of world income for Economy B falls over time as Economy B completely 
specializes in agricultural production, then the economy would never create a demand for 
skilled workers and would never transition from the Malthusian trap. 
The solution would be for Economy B’s share of the world’s income to rise over time.  
Then eventually Economy A will have insufficient productive capacity to meet world demand for 
the skill intensive good, and Economy B will begin demanding skilled workers.  
We could also tell this story based on reliance upon a natural mineral wealth as well as 
the agricultural good.  The lesson is the same.  There is a self-reinforcing mechanism put into 
play by world trade that widens rather than narrows the gap between developed and 
undeveloped economies.  This is illustrated in detail in Chapter Two in the context of growth 
theory. 
Conclusion to Part Two 
 This section has set the foundation for understanding how the current regime of 
sustained growth in the standard of living has arisen.  The conclusions we have found will be the 
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basis for advancing this exercise into the future.  That is, we will test the future’s ability to 
maintain a sustained growth in income per capita.  We will identify the conditions that occur as 
we reach farther into the world ahead.   
We have also identified the unpleasant side effects of growth in an international 
environment.  The next chapter will consider more closely these conditions within modern 
growth theory. 
 
 Part Three: The Hurdle: Getting Past the Distributional Problems of the Current Economic 
Regime 
 
"The whole system of capitalist production is based on the fact that the workman sells 
his labour-power as a commodity. Division of labour specializes this labour-power, by 
reducing it to skill in handling a particular tool. So soon as the handling of this tool 
becomes the work of a machine, then, with the use-value, the exchange value too, of 
the workman's labour-power vanishes; the workman becomes unsaleable, like paper 
money thrown out of currency by legal enactment. That portion of the working-class, 
thus by machinery rendered superfluous, i.e., no longer immediately necessary for the 
self-expansion of capital, either goes to the wall in the unequal contest of the old 
handicrafts and manufactures with machinery, or else floods all the more easily 
accessible branches of industry, swamps the labour-market, and sinks the price of 
labour-power below its value” (Marx, 1906 p. 470) 
 
"We stand at the end of what may go down in history as the Century of Development.  If 
we tear our gaze away from the fantasies of futurology and look at the real world 
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around us, what we see are unprecedented forms of mass poverty, unprecedented 
forms of mass killing, unprecedented methods of regimentation, unprecedented 
pollution, destruction, and uglification of the earth, and unprecedented concentration 
of wealth and power in the hands of few… we tell ourselves that all of this must have 
been some kind of deception, an impostor, a false development, and that surely there 
must still be a true development yet to come.  Modernization and development never 
meant the elimination of poverty, but rather the rationalization of the relationship 
between the rich and the poor.  In this sense development not only includes the 
development of poverty, but the development of the technology of management and 
oppression necessary to keep people in their position of relative poverty… Thus world-
scale development also includes the development of the police state. . ." (Lummis, 1991, 
p. 31). 
 
"In the early stages of rapid economic development, when inequalities in the 
distributions of income among different classes, sectors, and regions are apt to increase 
sharply, it can happen that society's tolerance for such disparities will be substantial.  
But this tolerance is like a credit that falls due at a certain date.  It is extended in the 
expectation that eventually the disparities will narrow again.  If this does not occur, 
there is bound to be trouble and, perhaps, disaster"  (Hirshman, 1973, p.545)). 
 
In the context of our investigation into the transition from the current regime wherein 
the expectation is for continued growth in income per capita to a future regime in which there is 
no growth, we need to investigate what paths are available for passing from the current to 
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future regimes.  From the feasible paths, perhaps we can gain a sense of optimism that the 
turmoil of today’s world system will abate. 
Throughout history the paths that nations have followed have been determined by 
many forces.   But underlying the decisions of most leaders have been considerations for gaining 
and preserving economic power.  Quite often, these decisions, thought national in scope, have 
been less concerned with the distribution of wealth than with the maintenance of a dominant 
regime (Lindert & Williamson, 1985).  The strategic choices facing the political powers often 
were developed, in part, by considering methods for limiting social disturbances so that the 
business of growth (in a very broad sense) could continue with minimal uncertainty (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 1997).  There is little dispute among researchers regarding the relationship of 
uncertainty (i.e., increased non-diversifiable risk) and growth (Barro, 1995).   Nor is there much 
dispute regarding the relationship between increased income inequality and political instability 
(Muller & Seligson, 1987). The source of divergent analysis often resides in the way in which 
long-term growth in inequality results in changes within the regime and what effects those 
changes have on economic growth in both the short and long runs.  Some research (Perrson & 
Tabellini, 1994;  Alesina & Rodrik, 1994;  Rodrik, 1997) suggest that high inequality leads to a 
heightened sensitivity to external shocks and, if the regime is prudent, a strategy of 
redistribution of national wealth will follow.  Some countries, however, have a history of 
following fiscal and monetary policies that, after adverse terms of trade shocks, have resulted in 
large distributional consequences brought about by changes in key relative prices (the real 
exchange rate, real wages, and the rural-urban terms of trade) (Rodrik, 1997b).  Others (Saint-
Paul, 1995;  Benabou, 1996) suggest that less inequality leads to more redistribution through a 
more efficient banking system and better access to credit and that such redistribution leads to 
increased capital accumulation and higher growth.   
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In either case, those in political power must make decisions based on signals received 
from both the social and economic forces prior to altering the regime.  These signals, both 
economic and political in nature, can be used by the regime in power to make changes along 
several fronts.  For example, if inequality and social unrest are growing, the regime may offer 
democracy (i.e., the poor majority can vote on a redistributive policy).  They may choose, rather 
than to raise the income level of the poor, to increase the flow of resources into guard labor and 
guard capital (army, police, private security, secure compounds, jails).  Or, a more humanitarian 
regime may not offer democracy but may, in the guise of a benevolent dictator, redistribute 
optimally.  This essay suggests that there are several mathematically stable outcomes.   Two of 
the outcomes require a degree of distribution such that the gap between the rich and poor does 
not increase.  One of these outcomes has no redistribution so that the gap grows.  The 
mathematics suggests that in the long-run social unrest subsides or grows; interestingly 
however, it is possible that even with the extension of the democratic franchise, social unrest 
can grow.  
It is clear from a preponderance of research (see Zweimuller, 2000, for a review of 
recent data) that income inequality is increasing.  For example, recent data  shows that some 
gini’s have trended higher.  For many developing nations, the disparities have remained high. 
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Figure 14.  Income distribution (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 2007). 
If inequality is increasing within and between nations, then is not social unrest 
increasing?  And if social unrest is increasing, is the reliance on security forces and the hardware 
for enforcing that security increasing?  This section will make those linkages. 
On an intra-country scale, we may imagine the outcome of these linkages as a buildup 
of internal security forces.  Such activities certainly occur in many developing nations, but less 
overtly, internal securitization also takes place in developed democracies.   
This section of this chapter will propose that, over time, the key determinant to the 
growth in the propensity for social unrest will be the gap between the desired and actual levels 
of consumption of the majority of the members of a society.  More precisely, it is the change in 
the gap over past history (promises of improvement will not suffice) that will determine the 
level of satisfaction (dissatisfaction) that the members of the society will have.     
Note that the change in the gap between an agent’s actual level of consumption and the 
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"poor" are relatively well off, then a much larger change in per capita income is required to 
produce a given relative change.  Thus, lower income countries with a high Gini coefficient are 
more likely to have a more extreme change in the gap and a more problematic level of 
dissatisfaction.  The combination of the exclusion of the majority poor sector from the process of 
wealth accumulation that the minority elite enjoy and the misery that the poor acquire from not 
being able to consume desired quantities of goods will be the foundation of the central model in 
this section.  At some point in time, the threat of social unrest (revolution, terrorism) will 
become so great that either the society transforms into a total police state (in which case all 
wealth has been transferred to the army and police, and growth falters completely), or the 
majority will gain power and redistribute according to a voted-upon tax, and growth will 
converge towards the long-run stable state.  The first case may result in a restarting of 
civilization.  The second case is the desirable path. 
According to the model to be presented below, if unfavorable trends in income 
distributions were to persist, either continued growth in police and army (and, in general, 
“guard” labor that could even include workplace supervisory personnel)  would be required to 
maintain stability, or, at some point in time, the threat of anarchy and revolution would become 
real.  Thus, although revolution is generally thought of as a violent conflict, the signal that unrest 
is growing toward a crisis threshold can be rationally interpreted by the elite and may, 
eventually, lead to a more stable blend between capitalism and democracy in which 
redistribution is seen as a necessary component in the process of growth with stability. 
This potential for anarchy also is important in Chapter Two, wherein a simple change in 
an influential growth model shows that the long-run outcome of resisting growing inequality 
with force is chaos. 
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Below we will propose several interrelated models that will investigate the closed 
economy relationships between inequality, income and consumption, civil unrest, and policy.  
The results will then be subjected to an opening to international trade.  This work will build on a 
literature on political economy and growth.  Roemer (1985) posits the possibility of revolution 
but does not correlate it to the level of inequality.  Ades (1995) offers a model in which there is 
concentration of power with the elites.  Neither of these models allows the elite to perceive 
signals of unrest and use them in the decision-making process.  More closely aligned with this 
paper's technique is the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (1996).  However, their economy does 
not allow for guard labor and the associated gradual depletion of the elite’s assets.  And more 
significantly, none of the above techniques specify the way in which zealotry and enhanced 
communications infrastructure may enter into the dynamic process.  This work does and, in 
doing so, extends the literature in a minor but significant way.  Finally, the work of Rodrik (1997) 
has been useful in finding a transition from the closed to the open economy.  Rodrik outlines a 
specification for wage dynamics versus capital mobility that I have adopted, bringing 
fundamental alterations into the income growth patterns and allowing me to explore how my 
model responds to international trade.  Also the work of Diego Puga (1996) has provided 
inspiration for investigating how the mobility of labor and the transportation costs 
manufacturing faces affect income distribution. 
This section proceeds as follows:  the next part will set the foundations for the political 
response to an unequal society.  In the next section, the way in which the changes in income 
and consumption patterns create political forces beyond the simple accounting of present 
values of future incomes will be modeled.  The following section will perform several 
experiments on the model using different regimes with different decisions.  The final section will 
show how the globalization of trade patterns combined with mobile capital and immobile labor 
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accelerate the outcomes identified for the closed societies. Finally, the last part will offer some 
concluding remarks. 
The Foundation for an Unequal Society 
In this opening section, we will simply show how inequality can be tolerated even when there is 
democracy.  In subsequent sections we will show how this tolerance can lead to unstable (in a 
social sense) outcomes.   
Consider a continuum of agents [0,1]i? that have log normally distributed 
endowments shown as 2ln ~ ( , )i ix y N m? ? .  This specification for income distribution is a 
good approximation of the empirical distribution (Clarke, 1992) and also allows inequality to be 
defined as the size of this variance.  We can see that as the variance, 2? , increases, the 
distances between per capita incomes and the median income also increases: 
2 2[ln( [ ]) ]iE y m? ? ? .  The economy has two types of agents that face two choices.  The 
agents are either the non-elite (poor), ? , or the elite (rich),1 ?? .  I will assume that 12? ? .  
The choices they face are between two stylized policies: complete non-intervention by the 
government whereby each agent consumes his/her endowment so that i ic y? for all i, or 
complete redistribution whereby agents pool resources and each consumes [ ]i ic E y? .  If the 
tax rate menu is [0,1]t?  and, for now, sharing is restricted to either zero or one, then the 
proportion, p , of agents in favor of the second policy will be all those whose endowments are 
below the mean: 
 
2 / 2( ) ( )
2
p ? ?? ? ? ?? , (1.40) 
80
where ? is the c.d.f. of a standard normal.  Since the income distribution is skewed left and the 
median is less than the mean, if simple majority rule were to dictate, since the proportion in 
favor will always be greater than 1/2, redistribution will always take place.  The assumption is 
that all agents vote.  If some proportion of the poor, ? , do not vote (or if money buys influence 
and legislation is self-serving), then the threshold for redistribution may not be 12(0)? ? , but 
may be higher:  i.e., 12 ?? .  In Parts Two and Three, the relation between the proportion of poor 
and the effects on redistribution will be more closely examined.  The important point to note is 
that 0p? ??? .  That is, no matter the bias, as inequality increases, the likelihood of redistribution 
increases.  Note that this analysis could be realistically extended by adding a middle class.  If the 
middle class’s income were marginal with respect to consumption, then the threshold for 
redistribution would be even higher since a proportion of the middle class would see their level 
of income decline even with the transfer. 
If we note that any redistribution could entail some deadweight loss, this conclusion is 
reinforced.  Suppose that redistribution requires that available resources y are reduced to 
Bye?  where B>0.  Then 
 
2 / 2( ) ( )
2
B Bp ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? , (1.41) 
and 
p?
?? is even more positive. 
 Thus one would expect that the empirical record would show that more unequal 
countries distribute more.  Although there is support for the notion that inequality hampers 
growth (see Persson and Tabellini, 1991; Alesina and Rodick, 1994, and the chart below from 
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Rodrik, 1999; work by Benabou, 1996; Keefer and Knack, 1995, Lindert, 1996, and Perotti, 1992, 
1994, 1996) all show no correlation between the share of income of the median voter and 
government transfers as a fraction of GDP.  Several reasons for this are developed below. 
 
Figure 15.  Growth versus inequality (Rodrik, 1999). 
 Suppose that the model now allows for a net gain as a result of distribution and agents 
achieve an increased efficiency so that they can consume Bye  (for example, if incomplete 
financial markets which limit access to credit are repaired, or if the tax revenues are used to 
subsidize public education, there will be net gains).  Now the fraction of people who support 
redistribution is higher as 
 
2 / 2( ) ( )
2
B Bp ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? . (1.42) 
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Looking at equation 1.41, we can see that the two effects reinforce each other so that at low 
levels of ?  almost no support for redistribution exists and that this proportion will rise 
monotonically with an increase in ? .  In equation 1.42, however, the effects are opposite.  Thus 
at low levels of ? , p is very high.  But as inequality increases, ( )
2
B ??? first gets smaller as the 
proportion of those who will lose from redistribution increases (the left term falls faster than 
the right term rises) and then, as the number of poor grows large, the right term dominates.  
The pattern is non-monotonic.  Thus, if a society begins with a large enough wealth disparity to 
be at a point below the threshold proportion, there will never be support from the voters for 
redistribution, and disparities will continue into the next generation.  If, however, the initial 
condition is the same as is in the section above, then low inequality will allow political support 
for policies that promote efficiency (perhaps education subsidies24), and disparities may not 
grow.   (Of course, at low deltas the poor have very little political voice.)   Eventually the 
preponderant proportion of poor will cause strong support for redistribution.   Note that the 
addition of a middle class will raise the threshold proportion and widen the span of non-
support.   
However, more recent research (Krugman, 2002) suggests that the middle class, 
suffering from a form of wealth illusion, may actually believe that they are soon to join the ranks 
of the wealthy and thus tend to resist redistribution schemes.  The hypothesis appears 
reasonable and helps to explain, in the absence of the prospect that elected officials do not vote 
the voice of the electorate, why the top of the income distributions continues to gain at the 
expense of all the others.  A strong middle class is good for an economy (see the chart below).  
However, the reality of recent history has worked against the maintenance of that outcome. 
                                                             
24 "A major commitment to mass education is frequently symptomatic of a major shift in political power 
and associated ideology in a direction conductive to a greater upward mobility for a wider segment of the 
population" (Easterlin, 1981, p. 14).
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Figure 16.  Per capita growth versus diversity (Easterly, 2000). 
Thus we see that even in a democracy and even with obvious net gains from 
redistribution, there may not be support for a policy change towards income redistribution. 
The next part of this section will develop a model that brings into account several 
methods by which the poor can affect redistribution.  
A Basic Model of Inequality and Revolution 
 
The economy is now more fully described in a non-overlapping-generations model in 
which generations can bequest an endowment on succeeding generations based upon 
accumulation during lifetime.  The model is also simplified by ignoring (for now) both the case in 
which efficiency gains occur and the stochastic nature of income distribution.  Each agent lives 
one period and has one offspring.  As noted above, there are elite (rich) and non-elite (poor) 
with proportions 1 ?? and ? where 12? ? .  Superscripts r and p will be used for rich and poor.  
We will have a composite good, y , with price one and an asset that embodies physical and 
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human capital, h .  Prior to time zero, the economy is in steady state and at time zero we have 
0 0 1
r ph h? ? .  
We will assume that production is linear in capital and that physical capital is fixed so 
that only changes in human capital will change output.  Labor is fixed at one.  Output is 
described by t tY AH? where tH is the quantity of human capital.  Note that it tH h di? ?  which 
in our simple case is r pt th h? .  We will also assume perfect competition in which the market for 
human capital is undistorted so that wages per unit of human capital (before taxes) are equal to
tw A? .   
We will assume that agents' utility is a function of two components: consumption, tc , 
and the ability to bequeath an endowment upon the succeeding generation, 1te ? . That is, utility 
for agent i=poor or rich is 1( , )
i i i
t tu c e ? . Poor agents are assumed never to be satiated by their 
consumption ptc  if below some level of consumption, tˆc .  Thus, although poor agents may not 
be at a subsistence level, if they are below the desired consumption level benchmark, they will 
allocate all of their income to consumption.  (In a later part of this section there will be a 
derivation of another component of the poor agent's view of income and consumption.  This 
component, the poor agents' political utility, can create a zealotry that acts as a scaling 
mechanism in the accounting used in the decision making process that is used in the concluding 
part of this section.)  Thus, if agents allocate 1 ?? to consumption and ? to their bequest, then 
[0,1)? ? for the poor will depend on the gap ˆ( ) ppt tc c C? ? .  The rich will always be above the 
consumption benchmark and will consume at least tˆc .  At some level of income greater than 
ˆ py , poor agents will begin to save and ? will be greater than zero.  This way of envisioning 
consumption creates the potential for a persistence of non-endowments even as mean income 
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rises.  Furthermore, as we will investigate more fully later, if 1tˆc ? changes, then savings in the 
subsequent generation may be reabsorbed (or enhanced) and dissatisfaction can be augmented.   
Utility can be represented as  
 1 1( , ) (1 ) ln ln
i i i i i
t t t tu c e c e? ?? ?? ? ?       for ,i r p?  and  1 1ite ? ? . (1.43) 
Note that under this specification the minimum savings (education) bequest is one.  Also note 
that until ˆ py  is reached, the poor agent will leave nothing to the offspring.  If I set the minimum 
human capital to unity, then the offspring will have  
 1 1max{1; ( ) }
i i
t th Z e
?
? ??  where 1Z ?  and 0 1?? ? . (1.44) 
Thus, if over time no new bequeaths are given in subsequent generations, human capital will 
depreciate and converge back to the minimum of one. 
If we set the agent's budget constraint as  
 1
i i i
t t tc e y?? ? ? , (1.45) 
where ity?  is the after-tax income of household i , we see that ity?  is equal to the product of the 
price (wage) of one unit of human capital times the level of human capital the agent has, all 
reduced by the tax rate on income, plus a transfer the agent receives from the state: 
 (1 )i i it t t t ty w h T?? ? ??  (1.46) 





t tc e ?
 1( , )
i i
t tu c e ?   S.T. equations (1.45) and (1.46). (1.47) 
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We also require that  
1
i i
t te y?? ? ?  if 1ity? ?? , and 1 0ite ? ?  if 1ity? ?? ,     
which requires that if the agent's after-tax income is below one, they will consume all of it. 
The government is controlled by the elite at time zero, and they set the tax rate.  
Furthermore, the distribution of itT is uniform and thus is tT .  The government is constrained by 
 t t tT AH?? . (1.48) 
The agents in this economy can apply their efforts to either the production process 
using A or to a non-market and untaxed process B .   (Among other things, this prevents a 
100% tax rate as we will show in the next paragraph.)  We will impose the restriction that 
1A? ?  so that without subsidy, an agent with 1ith ?  will be unable to bequest anything to the 
offspring since there is no residual after consumption.  We will also impose that ( ) 1Z A ?? ? .  
This says that when accumulation does take place, some steady state at which 1ssh ?  can be 
reached.  This allows the rich to accumulate in the absence of taxation and transfer (and later, 
as we will show, in the absence of a diversion of capital into guard labor) since there is always a 
residual. 
 If we inspect the thi  agent's tax preference, we see that the agent will recognize that by 
taxing income he/she will be taxing him/herselves.  The agent will also get a return from the 
aggregate transfer. The agent will want to gain the largest benefit, and this can be represented 
as 
 max  (1 )t tA T?? ?  (1.49) 
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where from (1.48) we know that t t tT AH?? .  The optimal tax rate will depend on the 
relationship between the levels of average aggregate human capital, rth  and 
p
th , and the 
relationship of the market to non-market production processes, A  and B .  Clearly, since 
r
t th H?  the rich will always choose 0rt? ?  since, without accounting for efficiency gains (as 
discussed in Part One of this section), the rich will never choose to move to a lower level of 
welfare.  For the poor, however, the problem is not as straightforward.  If some agents do not 
participate in the market production (the taxed) process, then a choice of 1pt? ?  will yield a 
lower benefit than some lower level of tax.  The poor agent wishes to find the inflection point on 
the Laffer curve.  In our simple case that point will be pt
A B
A
? ?? .  Thus if no agents use B  
technology then a tax rate of 100%, i.e., a compete pooling of resources, is optimal for the poor.    
Thus the rich will not wish to be taxed, and the poor will.  If there is not democracy, a 
redistribution may or may not take place depending on the nature of the elite’s relationship 
with the members of society.  Also, the elite’s vision regarding the effect of policy on future 
generations of elite will also play a role in the current decision-making process.  Even if there is 
democracy, as was shown in section above, no redistribution or sub-optimal  redistribution may 
take place. 
The poor also possess a technology for civil unrest (revolution), ( , )? ??  where 
( ) 0P ? ? , 0? ? , and 0? ? .  ( , )? ??  is a function of the level of coordination (organization) 
that the poor possess, ? , and a parameter the measures zealotry, ? .   
We will assume that coordination is a function of the level of development 
communications infrastructure.  As agents become more able to communicate, they are able to 
better coordinate their efforts.  Recent history has been a chronicle of rapidly enhanced 
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communications infrastructure.  Both the ease and speed of transmitting information in many 
forms has rapidly increased the ability of the disenfranchised to work together. Witness simply 
the proliferation of websites operated by non-state actors with violent intents.  In this model, as 
better communication and thus coordination is developed, then ?  goes from less than one to 
greater than one. 
Zealotry is a function of the change over time of the relationship between the rich and 
poor agents’ incomes and consumption patterns.   Intuitively, if the relationship is deteriorating 
(i.e., the gap between desired and actual consumption is increasing) over time, then the poor 
agents will be more willing to engage in civil unrest.  We will develop this parameter by 
considering our economy's two types of people:  type R and type P (rich and poor).  Now 
suppose that at time zero that the rich and the poor have similar endowments.  Also, for the 
moment, assume that the future incomes of P are strongly linked to the fortunes of R but that 
the current incomes of R are independent of P.  Furthermore, assume that the level of 
contentedness that the type P's have with the way in which the economy is moving is such that 
the political utility (shown as PU  or RU ) of P is determined by their own current income, 
( )PY t , by the current income of the type R's, ( )RY t , and by their own expected future income, 
1
( ) ( )t P Pe Y t dt E t?
?
? ?? .  Thus, ( , , )P P R PU U Y Y E? .  Obviously both 1 0U ?  and 3 0U ? .  The 
partial on the middle term is 2 2 3
P P
R R
U EU U U
Y Y
? ?? ? ?? ? .  (For notational cleanliness, the time 
arguments are left off.)  The left-side term reflects the P agent's pleasure (dissatisfaction) at the 
gain (loss) of the R agent.  The right-side term reflects the P agent's concern for the R agent's 
income as a predictor of his/her future income.   
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?  may be positive or negative depending on history.  If 
increases for the rich have resulted in real increases in income for the poor, then the overall P 
political utility will improve as RY  increases.  
Suppose now that as time passes, R’s income improves at a growth rate g and P 
improves at a growth rate l  (the letter “ell”).  Furthermore, suppose that these increases for R 
require that consumption increases.  As time passes and the P agents' real incomes decline, P 
agents consume (or wish to consume) a larger and larger portion of their income.   Over time 
the gap between desired and actual consumption opens.   We can represent these events as 
follows: 
Suppose that P's political utility function is log linear so that  
 ( , , ) ln ln lnP P R P P R PU Y Y E Y Y E? ?? ?? ? .  (1.50) 
 (Note that the “H” parameter can be thought of as the degree of humanitarianism that the poor 
exhibit toward the rich and reflects the positive or negative potential for this aspect of political 
utility.)  
Also, the expected future income is 
 
1
ln (1 )P P R P P RE Y Y E Y Y
? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? . (1.51) 
 (Note that ?  is the weight that the poor give to the way in which the income level of the rich 
influences theirs.)  Combining terms we can represent Poor's political utility as a function of PY , 
RY , and t . 
 ? ?( ), ( ), ( (1 ) ln ( ) ( ) ln ( )P P R P RU Y t Y t t Y t Y t? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ?  (1.52) 
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At time zero (recall we begin with identical endowments in this section)  
 (0) (0)P RY Y Y? ? , (1.53) 
  
and R's income grows at a constant rate g while P's grows at rate l : 
 ( )P ltY t Ye?  and where 0l ?  so that ( )PY t Y?  ; ( )R gtY t Ye? . (1.54) 
Now suppose that 0?? ?  if 0g l? ? ; that is, over time, P's expectations for enhanced well 
being as a result of R's good fortunes declines if the gap between their income and consumption 
is increasing.  Imagine that the function is  
 ( ) htt e? ? ??  where h g l? ? . (1.55) 
We see that as h?  becomes a larger negative number (that is as h gets larger or the difference 
between g and l  gets larger), the weight ( )t?  that the poor agents assign to the rich’s income 
growth with respect to theirs declines. 
Using (1.54), and (1.55) to rewrite (1.52), we see that the poor agent's political utility at time t is 
 ( ) ln ( ) ( (1 )) ( )P ht htU t Y lt e gt e? ? ? ? ? ??? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? . (1.56) 
Taking the derivative with respect to t, we have the differential equation 
 ( ) ( (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )P ht ht ht htU t l e lt h e g e g th e? ? ? ?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  (1.57) 
with the initial condition of 
 (0) ( ) ( )PU l g? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ? . (1.58) 
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Thus political utility is positive at time zero as long as 0??? ? ? .   But can this situation 
persist? 
 Note that a positive ?  indicates that the poor agent is pleased with the rich agent's 
income growth, and a negative ?  indicates displeasure.  (As noted above, think of ? as a 
measure of humanitarianism or altruism toward the rich.) Suppose that the poor realize that 
growth in the rich's income only widens the gap between their desired consumption level and 




?? ?? is increasing, (i.e., the gap between desired 
and actual consumption for the poor is growing), at some point the sign of ?  becomes 





.   
Finding the solution for the differential equation is unnecessary to reach a conclusion.  If 
we simply go to the limit, as time gets large, we see that if g l? then  lim ( ) 0
t





?? ? ?? ? ??  (1.59) 
which, if l  is small, zero (or negative!), and ?  is negative, shows that the poor’s political utility 
is decreasing with time.  Note that if  l  is positive but smaller than g, and ?  is large enough, 
political utility may not be decreasing.  In the context of this model that would suggest that the 




?  is negative, then the poor agents see that in 
real terms that they are not only going nowhere; they are being left behind. So as t gets larger, 
P's political utility declines toward lim ( )P
t
U t?? ? ?? ; that is, the poor agent becomes infinitely 
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miserable.  Note that if the poor are made better off by the rich agent's gains enough to begin 
closing the gap, and thus that 0g l? ?  and 0?? ? , then they share in the asymptotic infinite 
happiness of the rich as t ??  (the concept of infinite happiness is looked at in detail in 
Chapters Two and Three).  If we assume that the poor agents are backward-looking in 
determining their current political utility, then history really does matter, and utility is not 
"expected" in the sense of rational expectations but is expected in that only current and past 
actions, not promises of future changes, mean anything to the poor agents. 
 We can now specify the explicit form for the zealotry parameter: 
 ? ? 21 arctan( ( ) ( )PU t ?? ? ?  (1.60) 
so that ? goes to either zero or two as political utility goes to ?? .  Thus, ?  is a function of the 
change in the gap in income (and thus consumption) between rich and poor.   It should be noted 
that the term “zealotry” as used herein does not imply a connection to a religious cult, nor does 
it imply irrationality.  The term as used in this model is an embodiment of a rational response to 
growing inequality.   
Suppose that the poor agents’ political utility is declining and they consider revolt.  In 
the process of revolt, some proportion of the economy's capital,1 ?? , 0 1?? ? ,will be 
destroyed.   The size of ? , the leftovers after conflict, is inversely related to the resources that 
the rich apply to guard labor and guard capital (armies, police, security efforts, security 
perimeters, jails); that is, if bigger armies and better defenses are created, it will require that a 
higher level of destruction is necessary (smaller leftovers) to accomplish revolt.  Suppose that 
1 ( )G ?? ? , where 0 1?? ?  measures the proportion of wealth allocated to guard labor with 
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0G? ? .  Resources applied to guard labor and capital, however, reduce resources available for 
accumulation and bequests.  We can rewrite equation (1.44) as 
 ? ?1 max{1; ( ) }i rt th Z Ah ?? ?? ? ? . (1.61) 
Thus, if ?  increases over time, then the rich will reduce consumption and/or bequests 
eventually to zero, will lose all accumulated wealth, and will become identical to the poor.  In 
this case the guard labor accumulates the economy's wealth and power. 
We will lay out a sequence of timing below which will allow a decision process by which 
the poor will choose not to revolt in the first place or, if revolt is chosen, they will win.  If a revolt 
happens, then after the overthrow, the poor will gain all the remains, and the rich will have 
nothing.  Thus after the revolution each poor agent's share of output will be  
 t
A H?
? . (1.62)  
So by this specification, if the current income of the poor members of the society is less than 
(1.62), then all poor agents will be willing to participate in an overthrow of the government.  
Finally we specify the form of the revolution function.  Assume that the function is 
based on zeolotry (which is based on the poor’s political utility) and is augmented by the level of 
communications infrastructure.  That is, ( , ) ?? ? ?? ? .  Thus for a given level of zealotry, 
revolution is more likely as communication infrastructure improves.  This makes more intuitive 
sense if we allow that, with poor communication, a higher level of zealotry is needed to reach a 
given level of revolution technology.  As will be more fully developed in the last part of this 
section, because we assume that the rich know the level of the threat, it follows that an 
economy with more advance communication monitoring tools will respond more rapidly to a 
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growing threat of revolution, ( )P ? , and thus that revolution is less likely in a more developed 
country.   
In order to analyze the model developed above, a stylized sequence of events is defined.  
The sequence of events in any time t  are as follows: 
1. The bequests are received. 
2. The elite decide whether or not to allow the poor to vote democratically.  We 
assume that if given the right to vote, all of the poor will vote. 
3. The poor decide whether or not to revolt.  If there is no revolution then: 
4. A decision is made with regard to the tax rate by either the rich agent if there is 
no democracy or the median poor agent if there is. 
5. Capital is allocated between A  and B  processes. 
6. Capital receives its wage. 
7. Consumption and savings decisions are made. 
This sequence disallows the potential of promises not being kept.  Note that the elite cannot 
avoid a revolution simply by setting a favorable tax rate.  Also note that once democracy is 
started, it becomes permanent.   
Autocracy and Democracy 
In all of the cases below, the elite will begin in power and will be able to accumulate at 
time zero.  That is, 10 ( )
r r
ssh h A? ?? ? .    In other words, the rich always begin with an 
endowment such that the level of capital at time zero is less than the steady state level (thus 
growth will occur) and is greater than the share of the wage given to the succeeding generation; 
thus assuring that a residual will exist. 
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(Benabou, 1996, develops a more general specification for intertemporal utility using a 
stochastic model to determine income distribution, a specification for political power gained 
from wealth, and progressive taxes.  Although at very low levels of inequality the conclusions 
are different due to the U-shaped nature of the welfare function, at moderate to higher levels, 
the dynamics he develops are similar to the basic model outlined above and further developed 
below.) 
In order for revolt to occur, what the poor agents get with revolution must be greater 
than what the poor agents get without revolution.  Also, all of the agents scale the after-conflict 
value of the economy with the degree of revolution technology.  That is, if 1?? ? , then the 
poor agents will be more likely to revolt given the same after-conflict value.  Conversely, if 
1?? ? , then revolt becomes less likely.  Thus 
 ? ? ? ?[(1 ) ]r pp t tt A h hAh ?? ? ? ??? ?? ?? ? ?? ? , (1.63) 
















which must be false if revolt is to occur.   
Note that all else held constant, the higher the proportion of poor to rich (i.e., the 
greater is ? ), the less likely a revolt since a small proportion of rich provides a smaller pie to 
divide up after the revolt.  Note also that as ? , the leftover from conflict, decreases (that is as 
the stakes of conflict rise due to larger allocations of wealth by the rich toward armies, etc. 
through an increasing ( )G ? ), all else held constant, the threat of revolution lessens.  Finally 
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note that an increase in zealotry (enhanced or degraded by better or poorer communication 
infrastructure) increases the likelihood of revolt. 
Two possibilities exist: 10 ( )
ph A? ??  or 10 ( )ph A? ?? .  That is, either the poor are stuck 
due to initial levels of human capital and technological skills that are below the threshold, or 
they are not.  In our simple economy, being stuck is the result of a harsh dictatorship.  The 
alternative, in which the poor are able to increase their human capital, is the result of a 
benevolent dictatorship. 
Under the first condition, 10 ( )
ph A? ?? , if there were no revolt, the poor would have 
1 1
p p
t th h? ? ? .  The rich would have 1 ( ( )) (( ) )r r rt t th Z e Z Ah? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? .  The unique steady 
state solution for the rich is given by  
 ? ? 11(( ) )ssh A Z? ?? ? ?? ? , (1.65) 
which, if ?  is small and fixed in time, reveals that 1ssh ? .   If we compare the income of the 







? ? .   Since the initial state is one and steady state is 









and we see that inequality will 
increase over time to the steady state.  










?? ?  (1.66)  
where the superscript denotes autocracy.  The rich, however, can increase the value of the right 
hand side of (1.66) by decreasing ? (increasing ? ) .  If the decrease is a one-time change, the 
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steady state level will be lower.  If, however, over time as ??  increases and the rich respond by 
decreasing  ?  (which means that ? increases), at some point, the assets accumulated by the 
rich will begin a decline as shown in Figure 17 below.  It is possible that revolt will never happen 
as the guard labor inherits the nation's wealth (assuming that the foundations of the nation's 
economy remain intact). 
 
Figure 17.   Accumulation over time of the rich. 
If we assume that the police and army that inherits the country's wealth is a third party 
in this exercise, we can show that the steady state aggregate income in this economy will be  
 ? ? 11(1 ) (( )onessY A Z? ?? ? ? ??? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?  (1.67) 
where the superscript on Y indicates case “one” in this analysis (there are several other cases 
below). 
We see that the rich can prolong their hold on power by keeping their ranks limited and 
their wealth concentrated.   They can also prolong their hold by consistently counteracting the 
growth in zealotry (and controlling the flow of information).  Less obvious is how the cultural 
benchmark for desired consumption may be manipulated so that even though the poor's 




consumption is not increasing; that is, 0
p
C
? ?  even though accumulation is static and real 
wealth is changing negatively.  Note, however, that this technique for prolonging the grip on 
power, like the others noted above, is only transitory.  As long as the gap between the incomes 
of the rich and poor is increasing, at some point in time, there will either be revolt, the economy 
will be relinquished to the military, or successful tax redistribution schemes will be adopted and 
the direction of change in the gap will be reversed.  
 The second condition, 10 ( )
ph A? ?? , where 10 0 ( )r ph h A? ?? ?  , implies that the poor are 
endowed with the skills at time zero so that their wage is sufficient for a surplus.  In this case 
both the rich and poor will converge to the same steady state identical to (1.66).  The gap 
between incomes will be decreasing; thus the need for guard labor (assuming away the rest of 
the world and the problem of inter-country inequality) will not materialize, and the threat of 
revolution will not materialize either.  Note that the steady state aggregate level of income is 
 ? ? 11( )two oness ssY A A Z Y? ?? ?? ?  (1.68) 
and that the outcome here is preferable.  There is an equalizing trend in income distribution and 
an overall higher level of aggregate output.  Of course, this case implies that all agents can 
consume at their desired level and still have a surplus for the subsequent generations.   
Suppose that (1.64) is about to be falsified (that the elite and the poor know that in the 
next period it will switch to a pro-revolt signal).  The elite will, by the timing imposed on this 
society, allow the majority poor to vote on a tax scheme.  Democracy will occur if the benefits of 
taxing the aggregate economy outweigh the benefits of revolt. Thus if 
 ? ? ? ?[(1 ) ](1 ) r pr p t tt t A h hA h h ?? ? ?? ? ? ??? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?  (1.69) 
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holds, no revolt will occur.  The rich perceive that they will either lose everything or must settle 
for an equal share; thus they will extend power to the poor majority.   
The case of democracy is not so simple, however, since assets available for 
redistribution from tax are based only on the proportion of agents participating in the formal 
economy.  Recall that the tax rate will be A BA? ?? , so the larger the number of agents that are 
being taxed, the more the optimal tax rate falls.  Now the equations for accumulation are 
 1
1
max{1, (( )[( ) ( ) ])
max{1, (( )[( ) ( ) ])
r r p rA B
t t t tA
p r p pA B
t t t tA
h Z A h h Bh









? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? .
 (1.70) 
If the poor accumulate from the initial condition 10 ( )
ph A? ?? , then the need for taxation will 
decline over time.  That is, the poor will benefit from the effects of growth.   
If 10 ( )
ph A? ?? , then the rich will converge to the unique steady state 
 
1 1
1 1[(( ) ) ] [( )( )]Dssh A Z A B Z
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? , (1.71) 
and the poor will be unable to accumulate.  Imagine that even with the subsidy there is 
insufficient income to derive a surplus as the potential surplus is consumed in a quest to move 
toward the desired level of consumption. Thus revolt will occur at some time if 
 
1





? ??? ? ?? ??
?? ?? ? ?? ? ? .
 (1.72) 
We can see as before that if the elite increase the proportion of their assets devoted to 
the creation of guard labor and guard capital, they can postpone the revolution.  Note that the 
higher the level of non-market production (or for the rich the higher the level of expatriation of 
wealth) the less likely is revolt, all other things held constant.  The intuition here suggests that, 
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for a given level of income after transfer, the poor are less likely to revolt if they are taxed less.  
But it also suggests that a survival strategy for the elite in a democracy with a large poor sector 
is to expatriate as much wealth from the country as possible.  The result is a lower aggregate 
value for the economy and a smaller pie to divide up after revolt, thus, in effect, providing the 
same effect as raising the level of guard labor. 
Note also that the aggregate income in this economy will be 
 ? ? 11( ) (1 ) (( )three one twoss ss ssY A B Z Y Y? ?? ? ? ??? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? . (1.73) 
This says that if there is a tax scheme but the poor cannot accumulate, then the economy 
converges to a lower steady state. 
 Revolt many not occur if on the path to Dssh  at some point redistribution will 
become sufficient to allow inequality to decline:  i.e., if  
 [( )((1 ) ] 1DssA B h? ? ?? ? ? ? ; where 0 1ph ? . (1.74) 
That is, if the sum of the total per capita transfer plus the poor agents' human capital will at 
some point in time be greater than one;  then after that point in time, poor agents will be able 
to accumulate.  Assuming a small enough B (both a small non-market sector and limited wealth 
expatriation), if the tax scheme is implemented early enough (i.e., the elite understand and care 
about the long-run folly of the military option), then inequality will increase until the level of 
r p
t th h? is sufficient to switch the value of (1.74) to >1.  Then inequality will decline, and the 
economy will eventually converge to (1.68).  Here we require the poor majority to know that 
democracy is permanent and thus be willing to wait until the rich are rich enough to have a 
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surplus.  (Obviously this case presents a host of more realistic scenarios for moving forward in 
time toward the switchover to accumulation for the poor.) 
If the initial conditions are such that for the poor if 
 0 0[( )((1 ) ] 1
r pA B h h? ? ?? ? ? ?  (1.75) 
holds, then inequality will decrease.  (1.75) shows that at time zero, the sum of the net transfer 
from the rich plus the after-tax net wage of the poor must be greater than one.  If this is not 
true, then the economy converges to (1.73).  If (1.75) is true, then the economy converges to 
(1.68) .  
The most favorable outcomes are clearly those in which the poor have the ability to 
accumulate from time zero.  The most favorable is that condition under autocracy.  But that 
autocracy requires a “good” dictator willing to optimally distribute for the long-run outcome.  
Perhaps Singapore is an example of the “good” dictator case.  It has experienced fast growth 
with declining inequality and fairly low country risks (Economist Country Statistics, 2007).  
Perhaps some of the central African nations currently may be an example of the worst 
autocratic disasters in which the poor receive nothing yet are a large sector of the society.  But, 
most troubling, we may consider current world events as a by-product of a rising level of 
perception regarding the relationship between the levels of consumption of the United States 
and the rest of the world.  This is feeding the revolution constraint developed above. 
 The theory suggests that in all cases, it appears that the economic mechanisms 
channeled through the ability of agents to consume at their desired level of consumption is the 
key point at which the outcomes of growth are determined.  So far, this analysis has 
concentrated on a closed economy.  Suppose now we allow trade to enter into the problem. 
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Trade and the Patterns of Growth 
This first part of this section’s analysis will focus on the wage response of a typical 
worker in a world of increasing capital mobility.  The premise is that if there are positive 
movements in the wage but at the cost of significantly increased volatility, then the poor agent's 
utility may decline.  The second part will inspect the effects transportation costs and labor 
mobility (or the lack thereof) on income distribution.   
Using the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model as a foundation, it can be shown that the 
"demand for any factor (labor for example), becomes more elastic when other factors (capital 
for example) can respond to changes in the economic environment with greater ease (by 
moving offshore for example)" (Rodrik, 1997, p. 17).  Suppose that the initial labor market 
equilibrium is at some point A.  Suppose that there is a change in labor standards in the home 
country (like raising workplace standards).  From the point of view of the employer this is like a 
tax on employment, and the labor supply schedule shifts the amount of the vertically.  Both the 
worker and the employer must bear some of the cost of the change.  In a closed economy wages 
fall.  In an open economy the wages fall farther, and the reduction in employment is larger.  
Thus in an open economy higher employment costs (perhaps higher safety standards) cost the 
worker more in both wages and jobs.  If footloose capital is to be prevented from leaving the 
country, the workers must reject the higher standards.  Of course, nations can purchase higher 
standards through taxes or can actively control the exchange rate to nullify any competitiveness.  
But, particularly in the context of the model presented above, these options seem unlikely if the 
political power of workers is low relative to that of employers.  Depending upon the regime, the 
workers (i.e., poor) must suffer the consequences or be buffered by a policy of redistribution.   
Following in the logic above, it is likely that opening a country to trade exposes the less 
skilled to increased uncertainty. This is more obvious if a technology shock is introduced.  The 
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labor demand schedule shifts, and, for the open economy, for a given shift, wages and jobs 
change more.  Openness magnifies the effects on worker’s wages and jobs (Jean, 2000). 
 Using a model developed by Rodrik ( 1997), we can show below that an increase in 
openness makes domestic capital more responsive to changes in international prices and also 
magnifies the amplitude of fluctuations in real wages at home.  The poor majority may or may 
not experience a drop in wages but will be more exposed to risk.  If the government wants to 
maintain the expected utility of the workers to the reservation level, they can increase taxes and 
thus increase transfers.  If the government does not act, the process developed in the sections 
above unfolds with the added negative effects of real wage risk beyond the workers’ control.  If 
the government does act, as long as the compensation is not too great and capital is not too 
mobile, the negative effects can be nullified.  Beyond a point, however, the flight of capital and 
the erosion of real wages doubly accelerate the growth of inequality.  
Suppose that the export sector's production function is ( , )f k l with the usual well 
behaved first and second order conditions (i.e., 0, 0, 0, 0, 0k l kk ll klf f f f f? ? ? ? ? ).  Also let 
the fixed labor endowment of the economy be set at unity so that ( )f k fully describes the 
production function.  The domestic fixed capital stock is 0k  which is not the same as the total 
capital used at home since capital can move into and out of the country.  If p is the relative price 
of the export, then 
 ( )kr pf k ?? ?  (1.76) 
 * 0( )r r k k?? ? ?  (1.77) 
 ( )lw pf k?  (1.78) 
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The domestic return to capital, r is the marginal value product of capital minus the domestic tax.  
The international trade in capital requires that that rate equal the international return r* minus 
the cost of moving capital abroad (that is, the degree of globalization, which increases as ?
falls).  For example, a capital outflow that lowers home stocks would lower the rate of return to 
domestic capitalists to (1.77).  Note that if globalization were such that capital mobility were 
costless, then r= r*.  The last equation is simply the wage rate equaling the value of the marginal 
product of labor.   
 Using these three equations to describe the system, we can show that the equilibrium 
level of capital employed at home is a function of ( , , )k p ? ? .  Figure 18 below shows that the 
higher the degree of globalization, the flatter the upward sloping line (equation 1.77) and that 
with fluctuations in price, the entire downward sloping line (equation 1.76) shifts as the  
domestic return to capital for a given k changes.   
 
Figure 18.   Capital to return on capital based on capital mobility. 





?? ? .  Using (1.78) to get lk
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?? ? .  Both are zero if 0k k? , and changes in the degree of globalization would 
have no effect.  But now suppose p drops.  As the diagram shows, the higher the degree of 
globalization, the bigger the change in the domestic capital stock.  That is, 0k
kk
fdk
dp pf?? ??  , 
and it is decreasing with ? . We can also imagine that the poor become more anxious as the 
value of the marginal product of labor falls.  And the more globally free capital is, the more 




?? ?? , 
which is 
also decreasing with ? .   
 Recalling from the model regarding revolution above that taxes are the source stable 
outcomes for growing nations, we can see that globalization can confound this solution if a 
source of tax revenue is from a tax on capital.  (This can be generalized to expatriated non-taxed 
income, the B technology from earlier.)  Suppose that the unskilled poor worker has an income 
of  
 I w tk? ? . (1.79) 
Then income fluctuates not only due to changes in wages, but also with changes in the tax base 




?? ? ?? ? ? . (1.80) 







?? ? ?  .
 (1.81) 
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This is increasing with ? , suggesting that a tax on capital works better when global mobility is 
limited.  But more interesting is that as ? gets small, dI
d?  becomes unambiguously negative.  






)   This suggests that an increase in the tax on capital will 
actually reduce workers’ incomes when capital is more globally mobile. 
 So generally, more openness exposes the workers to increased income volatility and 
also reduces the government's ability to use fiscal policy to ameliorate the effects of differing 
factor intensities vis-à-vis endowments on wage changes.   
Work by Diego Puga (1996) brings an added dimension into the discussion of the ways in 
which globalization will create changes within nations.  His work, following on Krugmam and 
Venables (1995), develops a model in which higher or lower transportation costs create growth 
patterns in which either firms agglomerate or spread out.  For the purpose of this section, we 
will review the conclusions of Puga's work as they will impact how global integration will affect 
the income distribution over time.  This consideration will be revisited in Chapter Two. 
 As globalization opens business channels between nations, the ability of workers to 
move both within nation and across boundaries in response to income differentials is important 
to the way in which growth affects the nation.  The relationships between firms, 
workers/consumers, and intermediate markets generate forces that will tend to draw labor and 
firms into clusters and potentially separate regions as well as nations.  In general, firms will 
spread out across regions to meet final consumer demand if transport costs are high and labor is 
immobile and will tend to agglomerate as transport costs fall and labor is more willing to move.  
If the relationship of transport costs to prices is above some critical value, firms tend to set up 
production close to their suppliers and workers.  Workers will prefer to live close to the markets 
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where more goods are available locally.  Thus cost linkages are developed.  Also, firms tend to 
go where there are relatively many firms and workers demanding their output, and workers 
tend to migrate to where more firms demand their labor.  Therefore demand linkages evolve.  
Cost and demand linkages create externalities that tend to cause firms and workers to 
agglomerate.  Puga (1996) develops a model that tracks the shift from spread-out to 
agglomerated industry as a function of transport costs.   
 Interestingly, he finds that the point at which agglomeration is triggered is different 
depending upon whether or not workers can move across regions and boundaries.  More 
relevant to the focus of this research, he finds that the evolution of industrial location and 
wages is different if workers are more willing to migrate.  The agglomeration of industry tends 
to raise local wages in locations with relatively many firms.  If higher wages lead workers to 
relocate towards more industrialized regions, agglomeration intensifies, and wage differentials 
decline.  If on the other hand, workers cannot move across regions or boundaries, wage 
differentials persist, and firms become increasingly sensitive to wage differentials as 
transportation costs decline.  In this case industry will tend to spread out.  
What is predicted by his analysis that is pertinent to this paper is a tendency for 
inequalities to decline between some countries but to increase within all countries as global 
networks increase the efficiency of the movement of goods.  The analysis suggests in the 
aggregate, some peripheral nations will converge with the developed core, but others will keep 
falling behind.  Chapter Two presents data that confirm this. 
Furthermore, it does not bode well for the lower classes of any nation, but particularly 
the poor of the developed nations, for whom, without a social policy of redistribution that 
preserves the globally competitive nature of the markets for capital and labor, the change is 
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most stark.  Finally, his dynamic analysis suggests that during intermediate stages of integration, 
wage disparities will increase even for regions and nations that will later improve. 
Conclusion 
This section has developed an analysis in which the dissatisfaction of the poor is integral 
to the stability of relationships with a nation and among nations.  If development occurs such 
that poverty and the size of the gap between rich and poor increase, then at some point in time, 
the nation will experience crisis.  Furthermore, we have shown that the tendency for global 
development to allow for increased capital mobility and for increased mobility of the inputs and 
outputs of production, in most cases, brings the crisis point closer to the present.  We have also 
shown that responding to increasing social unrest with increased guard labor is not a sustainable 
solution in the long-run.  We have also briefly outlined how redistribution schemes, although 
potentially able to cure the problem, are also vulnerable to the effects of freely mobile 
resources and may even be counterproductive in the case of taxes on capital.  In fact, "a source 
of potentially serious problems for the international trade regime is the growing inability of 
governments at home to sustain their part of the social compact on which postwar international 
liberalization has hinged" (Ruggie, 1994, qtd. in Rodrik, 1997).  
 We have seen that, placed within the framework of growth and inequality developed 
above, developed nations, it would appear, will experience a stronger negative effect on civil 
stability as the middle and lower classes begin to compete with global labor willing to relocate 
into industrial concentration zones; the rise of a sort of migrant industrial labor force following 
capital and production into the zones of highest return.   As noted above, a tax on capital will 
not work to solve the problem.  Perhaps higher income taxes would solve the problem, but that 
schema would require that the elite agree to a much more skewed progressiveness in the tax 
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framework and a willingness to take on a national, even an international, morality regarding 
accumulation in the face of poverty.    
Given the obvious rise in zealotry on the world stage, we need to concern ourselves with 
understanding the hurdle we face.  But, as Lummis (1991, p.58) suggests, "Development does 
not bring people freedom from want; rather it operates to keep people in a state of perpetual 
domination by want."  So the long-run socially stable solution may be considerably more radical 
than laws limiting capital mobility or taxing income.  If democracy is the rational outcome in this 
section’s model (that is, the rich know that the next period, given no change in guard labor, will 
transgress the revolution constraint, and thus they know that a democratically determined 
redistribution is the only alternative), then perhaps the supra-rational outcome is found in the 
problem of reconciling the actual and desired levels of consumption.  Without a black hole utility 
function driving an ever-expanding frontier of the per capita demand (and thus creating 
perpetual dissatisfaction), a concept of common wealth (to replace wealth) could transform 
social progress from the history we know (cycles of warfare and détente) to one of trust.  If we 
are to leap the hurdle, we must change the foundations the system.  
As we have seen, the assumptions that lead to a stable outcome include the possibility 
of revolt, the possibility of military dictatorship, or the possibility of convergence into a 
commonwealth either with democracy or without.  The path that becomes our history may be a 
blend of all of the above.   
In the next chapter of this work the heart of this chapter’s gloom (unequal per capita 
consumption growth) will be shown to be an inevitable outcome of growth under free-market 





CHAPTER TWO  
MODERN GROWTH THEORY: A CLOSE LOOK AT THE THE DETAILS AND THE LONG-RUN 
PREDICTIONS – CLASSIC VIEWS EXPLORED AND MODIFIED WITH NON-TRADITIONAL TWISTS 
  
“Well it’s a matter of continuity.  Most people’s lives have ups and downs that are 
gradual, a sinuous curve with first derivatives at every point.  They’re the ones who never 
get struck by lightning.  No real idea of cataclysm at all.  But the ones who do get hit 
experience a singular point, a discontinuity in the curve of life – do you know what the 
time rate of change is at the cusp?  Infinity, that’s what!  And right across the point it’s 
minus infinity!  How’s that for sudden change, eh?”  (Pynchon, 1973, p. 664)). 
 
Maxwell’s demon, Smoluchowski’s demon, Gödel’s demon, and Ehrenfest’s demon all do 
not work.  They are each blocked by a censor.  Further demons and their corresponding 
censors deserve to be uncovered.  For to recognize and understand limitations is even 
more important that to be completely free of them”  (Rössler, 1998, p. 53)).   
 
Introduction
The history of economic thought and, in particular, the history of modern growth theory 
is a dynamic process.  For a long time a regime exists, and the world is supposed to run that way 
while great effort is made to explain the unexplained contradictions.  Then the discipline is 
advanced, and what was once a contradiction becomes a normal and expected outcome.  We 
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engage in research because we fully expect that what is today a mystery will be tomorrow just 
another expected outcome.  Of course, the reality we want to understand is a moving target 
with a complex process at the core generating fundamental change.  We, at the frontier, try to 
get a grip on something stable, even as our efforts to get a grip and the knowledge we acquire 
change the core and make certainty a myth.  But, as this work posits, there is a certainty in the 
very-long-run: there will be an end to growth. 
The quest to understand economic growth has focused great minds; the path of 
understanding that leads us to today’s wisdom provides great insight into the embedded 
assumptions that mask the fallacy of endless growth.  Endless growth will end.  This chapter will 
show how, within modern growth theories, hiding even from those that have developed the 
theory are the hidden harbingers of that end.  
The simplest way to envision the core of the problem is to look at exponential growth.  
If we assume a constant growth rate of about 3% per year going forward, the chart below with 
data and a forecast for England suggests that we can expect to be very well off in real terms by 
the end of this century:  
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Figure 19. Real income per capita 1200-2100 (Clark, 2007). 
Of course we cannot be sure that we will have continuous 3% per year growth for the 
next century or so.  But we can be certain in saying that in the current economic paradigm, if 
growth were to go to zero (or below!) for an extended time, we would expect exceedingly 
difficult times.  Without any need for further evidence (there is much below), we can see that 
continuous growth is necessary for the dominant world system to remain healthy.  “Healthy” is 
a term that in the previous sentence is determined from within a framework that is sustaining 
the core assumptions of accumulation.  Healthy from within this framework, as we will see, 
requires a positive return on investment. . .period! 
But can that framework be sustained?  The typical argument for the limits to growth is 
based on the ecological constraints that are presented by a finite carrying capacity of the planet 
(Daly, Meadows, and others).  And indeed at the heart of this chapter’s thesis is the expectation 
that exponential growth will lead to carrying capacity constraints in terms of an absolute limit to 
the number of people that can exist on the planet.  In other words, population growth must 
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concerns have begun to be perceived as serious future issues (although not in the terms that his 
chapter will describe). 
 
Figure 20.  Population of Japan (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 
2006). 
 The sources of economic growth, as we have seen in the previous chapter, are simply 
population growth and the growth of productivity.   If population growth reaches a limit, then 
the only source of growth will be productivity growth.  Although more rigorously shown in the 
section in this chapter discussing the Solow model, we can, in words also, illustrate the fallacy of 
endless productivity growth.  If we assume a stable population and continuous productivity 
growth, the implications are for ever-increasing per capita income (just as we have now as 
illustrated in Figure 19).  However, even if we assume that the carrying capacity of the planet is 
not violated in terms of resource needs and waste accumulation (more on this below as these 
concerns are indeed limiting), the implications are for the accumulation and consumption of 
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more and more goods and services per capita (doubling every 36 years at a 2% annual rate of 
growth).  At some point a limit to real per capita consumption is reached.  So just as population 
growth will stabilize, per capita consumption will also stabilize.  At that point, as productivity 
growth continues, the average person will have to work less and less (or fewer people will work 
the same amount) to produce the demanded goods and services.  At the limit, everyone works 
one second a day, or only one person works!   
 The long-run will yield an equilibrium at which the sources of growth balance the stable 
demand of a stable population: the production of goods and services will be essentially the 
same every period, and the world will be in a zero growth regime.  This thesis will be proven 
with increasing rigor as this chapter progresses. 
 Most of this chapter will explore the implications of this outcome through the lens of 
modern economic theory.  We will take a tour that begins with Solow (1956), then explores the 
evolution of successive theoretical models that takes us to current thought.  At each step we will 
ask basic questions regarding assumptions of the models.  Where appropriate we will extend 
the models to show the long-run implications that are there but are ignored by a growth 
addicted system. 
The limits to growth literature is well established, but the underlying concerns are 
founded on ecological constraints.  What is different about this work is that it stays within the 
confines of economic theory, showing that even without the constraints of resource depletion, 
waste accumulation, and accelerated change that the path forward will converge to zero 
growth.   
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A Closer Look at Accumulation, Production, and Innovation 
 What is the core of the capitalist system?  In three words: return on investment.  The 
energy that drives the economic engine is the quest for profits.  All the models discussed in this 
chapter are linked to the core metrics that define the success or failure of economic activity.  
 The measure of the return on investment, a ratio typically interpreted as an interest rate 
(or a marginal product of capital), shows how well capital has been employed in the production 
of goods and services and, most importantly, the creation of more capital.  The expectation of a 
larger demand in the future provides an incentive to invest in the expansion of the means of 
production and in the improvement in the skills and efficiency of human and physical capital.  In 
all cases below, the return on investment, over the long-run, equates to the long-run growth 
rate of the aggregate output of the products of production.  And, although apparently obvious, 
revenues must be greater than costs for the system to work.  But, as we will see, this seemingly 
simple prescript has deep implications. 
 Growth theory, as we will see below, has evolved along a path that has, for the most 
part, been defined by a quest to explain the empirical record.  The view can take several 
perspectives.  In a closed system what are the determinates of growth (and thus a sustained 
expectation for a positive return on investment)?   In an open system what are the dynamics 
that define the changes in relative well-being between countries, in terms of per capita’s share 
in the economy, over time? 
 The patterns of the observed historical measures of economic activity (usually centered 
around GDP per capita and the growth of that metric) are the motivation for seeking an 
explanation to the past and for seeking insights into what the future will bring and, perhaps, 
how to influence that future in positive ways.  Of course, “positive ways” implies growth. 
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 All of the models share some similarities.  There are people who provide labor and own 
assets (including firms that produce).  These people earn income and choose to consume and 
save some ratio of that income.  There are firms that employ labor and capital to produce goods 
for sale to the people and to other firms.  Some technology is used to transform the inputs to 
outputs.  Finally, the consumers and producers meet in a market in which the supply and 
demand for outputs determines the relative value (prices) of the goods and inputs.  In some 
cases the models discussed in detail below use utility maximizing representative agents and in 
other cases they abstract to generations of agents acting in aggregate.  The vector by which the 
choices are made does not impact overarching insights of this chapter. 
 The transformation of inputs into goods in the economic models relies on production 
functions.  But the use of the aggregate production function in growth theory (and in all 
economic theory for that matter) is not without controversy.  The long history of production 
functions, beginning with ??????????????????????????????? and chronicled up to the present, is 
nicely presented by Mishra (2007).  Some of the issues that were argued by, for example 
Robinson and Sraffa in the 1950’s and carried into this millennium, will be revisited in some of 
the sections below.  But it is worth noting as a preview that Joan Robinson wrote in 1953 that 
“… the production function has been a powerful instrument of miseducation (p. 81)”.    
More formally, there is a fundamental inconsistency between the Inada conditions that 
underpin all of the modern analyses of growth and the algebraic formulation of the production 
function with respect to returns to scale.  This is shown in the short note by Fare and Primont 
(2002).   Their logic was extended by Baumgärtner (2004).  That extension is particularly relevant 
to the zero-growth outcome at the core of this work.  He states in the introduction: 
This paper formally explores one particular implication that the 
thermodynamic law of conservation of mass, the so-called materials-balance-
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principle, has for modeling production. It is shown that the marginal product as 
well as the average product of a material resource input will be bounded from 
above. This means that the usual Inada conditions (Inada 1963), when applied 
to material resource inputs, can be inconsistent with a basic law of nature. This 
is important since the Inada conditions are usually held to be crucial for 
establishing steady state growth under scarce exhaustible resources. While the 
advocates of a thermodynamic-limits-to-economic-growth perspective (e.g. 
Boulding 1966; Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Daly 1977/1991) usually stress the 
universal and inescapable nature of limits imposed by laws of nature, pro-
economic-growth advocates usually claim that there is plenty of scope for 
getting around particular thermodynamic limits by substitution, technical 
progress and ‘‘dematerialization’’ (e.g. Stiglitz 1997; Beckerman 1999; Smulders 
1999). The latter therefore often conclude that, on the whole, thermodynamic 
constraints are simply irrelevant for economics. (p. 308) 
Essentially a part of the argument that is relevant to the zero-growth outcomes derived 
below is that production is a function of the combination of capital, labor, and materials, and a 
fraction of the input is contained in the output.  This fraction can be reduced by technological 
progress and productivity improvement (dematerialization), but the fraction must always be 
greater than zero.  Whatever enters the process has to come out as either output or waste.  
There is therefore an upper bound to output if one acknowledges that the planet has a finite 
resource stock.  This argument is formally presented in Baumgärtner (2004). 
In the section of this chapter discussing endogenous growth models, the inconsistencies 
of the Inada assumptions will be used as a basis for deconstructing some of the most recent 
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growth models.  The path from some of the older models to the most recent ideas has been the 
quest to explain what is observed. 
The real world has exhibited some patterns that were codified as stylized facts by Kaldor 
(1963). This list, which is recounted in most growth texts,25  has motivated researchers to extend 
and complicate the economic growth models so as to fit (or refute) the predictions of the 
models to these stylized facts.  The extensions, as we will see, are based on how consumers 
optimize utility, how producers get better at production, and how we might have escaped from 
the law of diminishing returns by providing new and better goods.   
 But at the core of all of these simplified views of reality is the assumption or 
requirement that what is good is growth and what is bad is no growth.  Certainly in the world 
today the relative differences between the wealthy and poor are large.  And certainly in the 
world today, convergence in well-being per capita is the desired outcome over time.   (Or is it?  
More on that in the following pages.)  This would imply that growth for the rich would be slower 
than growth for the poor until some idealized equality of well-being is reached.   
 As was discussed in Chapter One, to achieve this outcome suggests either a change in 
the way in which policy is made or face the consequence of revolution.  Clearly, from the chart 
below (Clark, 2007)), we can see that convergence is in fact divergence, suggesting, given the 
continuous growth in inequality, that the future will not be like the past. 
                                                             
25 Kaldor’s facts are as follows: 1. per capita output grows over time, and its growth rate does not tend to 
diminish; 2. physical capital per worker grows over time; 3. the rate of return to capital is nearly constant; 
4. the ration of physical capital to output is nearly constant; 5. the shares of labor and physical capital in 




Figure 21.   Long view of per capita income (from data in Clark, 2007). 
Interestingly, the predictions of convergence in modern growth theory can easily be discarded 
using a modern extension of the simplest (and arguably seminal) theory of economic growth: 
the Solow-Swan model.  Indeed, the predictions of continuous endless growth can also be seen 
to be fallacious within that framework as well.  That discussion is next. 
The Solow-Swan Model and Extensions 
It is not within the scope of this work to work through the details of the derivations and 
proofs of the historical models.  The reader can find any number of texts that provide the 
details.26   This section and the sections that follow will review the key components and insights 
and focus on those parameters that drive the growth predictions in the models. 
                                                             
26 See Economic Growth by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for a comprehensive review and proofs of the 
details of these historical models.
Per Capita Income by Rich and Poor Sectors 
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The model developed by Solow and Swan (1956) excludes markets and firms.  This is the 
basic Robinson Crusoe scenario in which the owner of the inputs transforms these into outputs.  
As such there are only two inputs to production: physical capital, K(t) and labor, L(t).  As yet, the 
technology for transforming capital and labor into output is not explicit and is assumed fixed at 
a point in time.   (This will be augmented later in this section.)   Consistent with our view of 
capitalism as an engine of accumulation, the output in the Solow model is a good that can be 
consumed, C(t) or invested, I(t) to make new units of physical capital.27  There is no other 
economy, so this system is closed. 
 The production of goods is simply 
 ?(?) = ?[?(?),?(?), ?]  . (2.1) 
 The fraction of goods that are not consumed are saved.  This fraction is the savings rate, ?(?).  In 
this model, the savings rate is exogenous and positive but less than one.  The model also 
assumes that capital depreciates at a constant rate ? > 0.  There is also an assumed production 
function; typically of the Cobb-Douglas form, ? = ????1?? where 0 <?< 1 and  ? > 0. 
 The economy’s capital thus changes according to 
 ?? = ? ? ?? = ? ? ?(?, ?, ?)? ??  . (2.2) 
 In some of the models reviewed later the growth of population will be explicitly 
modeled along the lines discussed in Chapter One, but in the Solow-Swan model, population 
growth is exogenous and positive.  Thus labor also grows over time.   To simplify the model, the 
growth rate of the population, ?? ?? = ? > 0, is normalized so that at time zero there is 1 person 
                                                             
27 The prototypical example is farm animals.  They can either be eaten or “invested” to make more animals.
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and that person’s work intensity is also 1 and fixed (the intensity will be augmented below with 
a productivity parameter).  The population (and labor force) at time ? are described by 
 ?(?) = ???   . (2.3) 
The Solow-Sway model is reduced to per capita terms (i.e., ratios of output and capital 
to labor where, for example, ? ? ? ??  , which implies that ? ?? ? ? = ?(?)).  Thus the key 
equation of the model is 
 ?? = ? ? ?(?)? (? + ?) ? ?   (2.4) 
The implications of the model are well known.  Within the constraints of the model’s 
assumptions no matter a given level of technology, savings rate, population growth rate, and 
depreciation rate, the steady state growth rates of per capita output, capital, and consumption 
are all zero.   (This is a major shortcoming of this simple model as it does not explain growth in 
per capita consumption, etc.  The model does, however, predict constant absolute growth as 
the population grows.)  It is also easy to derive the “golden rule” savings rate.  That is, the 
savings rate that maximizes consumption.  Consumption in the steady state is ?? = (1? ?) ?
?([??(?)].  Since steady state is where ? ? ?(??) = (? + ?) ? ?? , then 
 ??(?) = ?[??(?)] ? (? + ?) ? ??(? ).  (2.5) 
And to maximize 2.5 for consumption, we set the derivative equal to zero and find that  
 ???????? ? = ? + ?  . (2.6) 
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Figure 22.  The golden rule of Solow-Swan. 
The implication for settling on the golden rule level of consumption is that consumers 
are willing to care for future generations.  The dynamics of the situation in which savings are 
below the golden rule, ?1 in the illustration above, requires that consumers experience a lower 
level of per capita consumption in the transition to the golden rule level.  The movement from 
?1 to ?????  requires a trade off that may or may not be consistent with observed trends in the 
savings rates of world (see chart below).  Note that if savings are above the golden rule level, ?2 
in the illustration, then a reduction in savings both increases current consumption and increases 
the steady state consumption per capita, a natural path that does not require altruistic 
tendencies. 
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The Ramsey model, reviewed in the next section, will look more closely at how 
generations care about the future.  One might wonder, however, if current observed trends in 
the savings rates of the developed nations vis-à-vis the developing nations carries a message?   
 
Figure 23.  Savings rates (International Monetary Fund, 2007). 
 Letting the issue of low savings and the implications for future generations sit for a bit 
(not long), let’s follow the evolution of the model so that we can understand the role of 
technological progress in the production function.  The unrealistic (and anti-historical since the 
industrial revolution as shown in the first chapter) short-run predictions of the model above in 
terms of constant per capita variables are resolved by augmenting the inherent diminishing 
returns to inputs of the production function with a labor augmenting technological progress 
parameter.  The general characteristics of the model are very similar to that already shown 
except that equation 2.4 is now 














with the assumption that ??(?) ? 0.  Noting that effective labor is labor times its efficiency, then 
?? = ? ?(?)? = ?[? ? ?(?)], and, noting that ?(?) grows at the rate ? (where ? is the rate of 
technological change or productivity improvement), we can plot the relationship between the 
exogenous “growth” parameters and the investment relationship.  The chart below shows that 
the growth rate of capital per effective worker is proportional to the distance between the 
investment relationship and the “growth” parameters (sometimes referred to as the effective 
depreciation parameters) which, in addition to the population growth rate and depreciation, 
now include the growth rate of technological progress.   
 
 
Figure 24.  Solow-Swan steady state. 
With labor augmenting technological progress, in steady state, ?? is constantly increasing, and 
the per capita variables, ?, ?, and ? all grow at the exogenous rate of technological progress.   
 The long-run implications of this model are a reminder of the issues in the core thesis of 
this research: endless growth driven by population growth and technological progress 
(productivity improvement).  As long as the population growth rate and the technological 
progress growth rate have a positive value, the world will experience increasing consumption 
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per capita.  (Note that the rate of convergence to the steady state is not constant but is a 
function of the distance between the two curves in the chart above.  This outcome of the model 
is typically used to explain how the developed world and less developed world will eventually 
converge to similar per capita values. Later in this section in which we extend the Solow-Swan 
model we will investigate convergence more closely.)  We can also see that for a given set of 
exogenous parameters, the golden rule consumption rate steadily increases over time at the 
rate of technological progress.  The model explicitly shows that technological progress is the 
driver of per capita growth, but this implicitly requires that population growth remain constant.  
If the population growth rate falls, the per capita rates increase proportionally.   
 Are there limits to growth in this model (notwithstanding issues of resource 
constraints)?  Suppose population growth falls to zero, as it must at some point in the future.  As 
long as productivity growth is positive, per capita output, consumption, and capital stock 
increase.  Is there a limit to per capita consumption in real terms?  If population is constant, 
then, at the limit, each person would have to consume an infinite quantity of goods (see the 
graphical representation of this in Figure 26).  Simple logic says that there is a limit.  How then 
would a world described by this model be altered?  If there is some asymptotic limit to per 
capita consumption, then there is also a limit to output and capital stock per capita.  In other 
words, there are limits to growth strictly in economic terms as long as we accept limits to 
population levels. 
Also, although not explicit in the typical presentation of this model, there is an implied 
interest rate for investment that is a function of the “growth” parameters if return on 
investment (ROI) is defined as the ratio of money or capital gained or lost on an investment 
relative to the amount of money or capital invested then in the zero growth condition, ROI is 
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zero since there is no net increase in capital stock, output, or consumption in absolute terms 
(capital letter versions of the parameters).   
 These conditions can be illustrated with a numerical example.  If we normalize ? to an 
initial condition of 1, ? = ? ??   to 4, ? to 1, and assume that capital’s share in the production 
function, ?, is .33 (using a Cobb-Douglas form of the production function) we can see what 
happens to per capita consumption and output over time.  First let’s look at the base case, in 
which we assume that the key parameters of the model generally represent current real-world 
aggregate conditions.  That is, we will assume that  ? = .02, ? = .01, ? = .05, and savings =.1.   
We can see in the chart below that real output and consumption per worker rise 
exponentially: 
 
Figure 25. Numerical example of growth in output and consumption.





















Figure 26.  Numerical example of growth in output and consumption (zero population growth). 
Now suppose that at levels of per capita consumption almost 60 times higher than the 
initial condition, there begins a diminishing payoff to continued sustained growth in 
technological progress at  ? = .02.  Although arbitrarily picked for this example, as noted above 
that at the limit consumers would have to consume an infinite number of goods, there is some 
multiple of current per capita consumption at which satiation is reached.  That is, if we believe 
that diminishing marginal utility in our model of consumer choice is rational, then we must 
assume that diminishing marginal utility to increasing per capita consumption is rational.  In the 
Solow-Swan model, the reaction to a diminishing demand (which is not explicit at all in this 
model) would be that either fewer of the fixed population works ( every member of the 



















labor intensity is fixed to provide full employment.  In this example, we will use the latter case 
which, in this simple model means that the rate of growth of technological progress declines.28 
For simplicity, let us have the growth rate of technological progress jump to zero.  If the 
new time units begin at the jump, we see the following: 
 
Figure 27.  Numerical example of growth in output and consumption (convergence to zero 
growth). 
The Solow-Swan model predicts, in the long-run, a convergence to a zero growth regime 
if we simply allow consumer choice to vary with time and thus have demand follow.  
Furthermore, if the depreciation rate is higher or the savings rate is lower, the long-run absolute 
level of consumption per worker is smaller.  Eventually the savings rate will equal the 
depreciation rate.29   
                                                            
28 In the first or second cases, the limits will never be reached since they are absurd (one person left 
working or everyone working one second per day!).  So even in those cases, there is some bound within the 
production function that will stabilize output to match demand (measured as per capita consumption which 
cannot reach infinity due to decreasing marginal utility of per capita consumption).
29 This can be seen by setting the growth rate of per capita capital to zero and solving the equation



















But the serious consequences of this outcome strike right at the heart of capitalism.  The 
net change in capital investment, as shown in the chart below, converges to the depreciation 
rate (barely above zero).  But the return on investment, shown on the second chart below, goes 
rapidly to zero.   
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Figure 29.  Numerical example of growth in output and consumption (ROI). 
The so-called AK model is another method of eliminating diminishing returns, doing so 
without the need for technological progress.  The key outcome of the simplest form of the 
model is  
 ?? = ?? ? (? + ? + ?) (2.8) 
 where ?? is the per capita growth rate of capital.  Even if ? and ? are zero, as long as savings are 
greater than depreciation, there will be positive growth in per capita capital and thus output 
(noting that the production function in the “AK” model is ? = ??).  But, as above, the economic 
limits to growth assert themselves via the absurdity of infinite consumption per capita which 
drives the savings rate to equal the depreciation rate: thus, zero growth. 
Several extensions of the basic AK model actually predict zero growth explicitly under 















1961) one can derive an outcome in which the growth rate of per capita capital is negative for 
all levels of per capita capital all the way to a zero growth rate.  As above, this outcome depends 
on the savings rate being less than the depreciation rate (plus the population growth rate in the 
normal exposition of this outcome).  The sensitivity of the model to changes in that inequality 
depends on the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital:  the more inelastic, the 
more dramatic that transition. 
Perhaps the most interesting (and very recent) extension of the Solow-Swan model 
involves using concepts of thermodynamics and entropy.  This extension recognizes that with 
two dimensional factors interacting (labor and capital, or rich and poor), that the form of 
mathematics that would be most appropriate is calculus in two dimensions.  This is common in 
thermodynamics but not in economics.     
In economic terms, imagine that the sum of production and consumption (and thus 
savings) is path dependent.  For example, in an economy are different types of laborers with 
different skills, and in a given year they will produce capital that will differ for each group 
depending on the number of laborers and the productivity of each group.  If they are shifted 
into differing areas from their specialty, there will be different outcomes.  A simple two-good 
basic microeconomic production possibilities frontier captures the essence of this premise.  
What is different in the following are the mathematics to capture this concept and the use of 
entropy as the source of economic growth. 
Solow-Swan and a Thermodynamic View of Economic Activity 
Based on material in Mimkes (2006, 2007) we will present the Solow-Swan model in a 
way that will provide valuable insight into the building of the simulation that is the cornerstone 
of chapter three.  The foundation of the following logic was developed by Jürgen Mimkes but 
many of the insights and the numerical simulation have been developed for this research.  To 
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follow the template of Solow-Swan, we will develop a production function based on capital and 
labor, using the excess of output minus consumption (savings) to create time dynamics. 
One of the basic concepts in thermodynamics is entropy and the cyclic nature of work.  
The first and second laws of work relate energy input to the mean energy per particle 
(temperature).  In economics we can transform this relationship into the law of economic 
production:  in economic terms, work is now production, energy input is now capital produced 
by labor, and mean energy per particle is analogous to mean capital per worker (or the standard 
of living).  In the physics and economic cases an entropy parameter pressures the system to lose 
energy or have capital dissipate (or, in per capita terms, to have the standard of living degrade).  
Only an input of energy (labor making new goods and capital) can prevent the system from 
“cooling off.”  So in this view of production, output (new capital) is a function of the change in 
existing capital (which is produced by labor as shown below) and depleted by entropy.  More 
formally (and following thermodynamic theory), 
 ? = ? ? ?? (2.9) 
where Y is output (or income), K is capital, P is the standard of living in terms of the mean share 
of capital per worker, and ? is the entropy parameter.  Entropy is determined by a probability 
that is a function of how labor is allocated (more on entropy and labor below).  In any given time 
cycle, unless capital is replenished, if the standard of living increases then output will fall. 
Capital is produced by labor.  If there are ? types of laborers and sectors producing ? in 
a given period, then 
 ? = ????? = ?(?? ?? )??  (2.10) 
where ki  is the productivity of the workers in the ???  sector. 
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The entropy parameter is a function of the possibilities for the putting ? people to work 
in ? different sectors of production.  The number of possibilities is  ? = ?!?1!?2!…?? !.    Using 
Sterling’s approximation,30 entropy is thus 
? = ??? = ??? ??? ln?(
??
? ) . (2.11) 
For simplicity, let  ?? = ???   and  ??? = 1.  Thus, plugging into equation 2.9, production is 
?(?, ?) = ?[????? ? ? ??? ??(??)].  (2.12) 
In the plot of this function below we see that for a given  ?, ?? , and ?, as the production entropy 
parameter ?? increases, the growth rate of production decreases.  This is analogous to the 
predictions of the Solow-Swan model’s production function, telling a story of efficiency gains 
from seeking an optimal division of labor and specialization.   
 
Figure 30.  Plot of production versus production factor x. 
                                                            












However, if we allow this economy to subdivide into an even larger number of sectors we see 
that production eventually declines in absolute terms.   
 
Figure 31.  Plot of production versus production factor x beyond the optimal x. 
There is clearly an optimal number of laborers for each of the production sectors.  The 
production function can be maximized on the production factor to derive a solution: 
??




A well developed market economy should be near the optimal labor allocations for production 
sectors (a sort of “golden rule” in this framework).  The more primitive the economy, the more 
fragmented and inefficient is production.  To the right of the optimal area in Figure 31 the 
production system suffers from inefficiency due to too many workers allocated into production 
sectors. 



















In the Solow-Swan model, production is only part of the story.  The Solow-Swan story 
also requires that production leads to some level of savings in order to invest in capital and 
engender economic growth.  Economic systems in general must gain more than they expend 
(costs and consumption) to grow.  That is, ? ? ? = ? > 0.  To again relate physics to economics, 
a business collects a high amount of capital (energy) from labor.  The business then pays out a 
lower amount of capital (energy) in the form of costs.  The difference is profits which are 
invested.  This is a cycle that is driven by the differential between the prices for the capitalist 
and the prices for labor (that is prices versus costs/wages).   
This is analogous to the Carnot cycle model of a heat engine.   A thermodynamic cycle 
occurs when a system is taken through a series of different states and finally returned to its 
initial state. In the process of going through this cycle, the system performs work on its 
surroundings.  This is a description of a heat engine. 
A heat engine acts by transferring energy from a warm region to a cool region of space 
and, in the process, converting some of that energy to mechanical work.  Using this model to 
describe an economy, the cycle reduces entropy with the production process (and inputs of 
labor) and increases entropy with the consumption/cost process.  The “mechanical work” is the 
profits that produce savings and growth.  As noted above, what drives this capitalist engine is 
not a temperature differential but a price differential.  The capitalist engine draws capital and 
income, initially from the environment, and at each layer of the system captures profits. 
The diagram below is straight from the Carnot cycle for a heat engine with modifications 
to relate to an economic concept of the first and second laws of thermodynamics.  The red 
section is the base level of capital.  As we have shown, over time this will increase, and therefore 
over time both ?2  and ?1, a measure of the mean prices around which the cycle runs, will 
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increase.  The mean prices, ?2  and ?1, plotted against the entropy of goods and money, also 
measure capital intensity and the standard of living. 
 
Figure 32.  The economic cycle in thermodynamic terms. 
Figure 32 is similar to the circular flow diagram so often seen in a principals of 
economics course but viewed through the lens of the first and second laws of thermodynamics.  
Note that thermodynamic efficiency is defined as the ratio of the work done by a heat engine to 
the total heat supplied by the heat source.  Here, profits and accumulation are the results of 
economic “efficiency.”  As we will see later, this “efficiency” is necessary for capitalism to 
function.  The inner clockwise flow shows how production lowers entropy:  (1) to (2) adds value; 
(2) to (3) puts the goods into the market, where they are used and depleted raising entropy, (3) 
to (4); and finally the cycle begins again with the retained surplus that is invested into 
production.  The outer counterclockwise flow shows how from (4) to (3) the entropy of money 
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distribution is lowered (concentrated), and industry earns ?2  times the change in entropy.  From 
(2) to (1) some of those earnings are distributed (dispersed), and the labor earns ?1 times the 
change in entropy.   The “work” generated is the accumulation of capital and the accumulation 
of profits.   
Whereas Solow-Swan have aggregate savings fixed (this is relaxed in the next section), 
here we are interested in the accumulation or profits of one entity vis-à-vis the profits of a 
counterparty.  This relationship is embodied in the difference in the aggregate incomes to the 
producer and labor.  That is, the share of savings (the income distribution) that each party 
receives drives the dynamics of growth in this model.  This concept can be generalized beyond 
the firm level to the relationship between capital and labor, or even more generally into the 
relationship between the developed world and the less developed world.  All that is necessary is 
the differential between prices and costs, ?2  and ?1 in Figure 32. 
If we consider the costs, ?, to be the income of the third world and the production, ?, as 
the income of the developed world, then we can simulate several scenarios in which the shares 
of the of the net profits are reinvested for growth.  (We could also think of this relationship as 
that between the rich and the working class within a country, or between owners and workers 
within a firm.) 
Using equation (2.12) and generalizing the production and costs, the functions for 
income and costs are identical in this conception except in the intensity of capital, ?, the 
efficiency of capital, ?, and the efficiency of labor allocation, ?.  The producer’s  ?2  is higher than 
the worker’s ?1 , and capital and money are more concentrated.  The efficiency of capital and of 
the labor allocation will be assumed to be such that the rich (developed world), ?, are more 
efficient than the poor (third world), ?: 
 ?(?, ?) = ?[??????? ? ?2 ??? ln?(???)] (2.15) 
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 ?(?, ?) = ????????? ? ?1 ??? ln?(???)? (2.16) 
Aggregate profits ? (savings) are simply the difference between ? and ?. 
Now suppose that the poor (the third world or the workers) get a share of the aggregate 
profits, ? , and the rich (the developed world or the employers) get a share (1? ?).  (How these 
profits are divided, that is, the value of  ?, was a subject of Chapter One’s discussion of the 
scenarios available for growth.)  If each group reinvests the excess  ?(? ? ?) and  (1 ? ?)(? ?
?) , then each group will experience an increase in their standard of living over time.  That is, 
 ??(?) = ?(? ? ?)?? (2.17) 
 ??(?) = (1? ?)(? ? ?)??. (2.18) 
In other words, we have an interdependent dynamic system in which each group’s growth is 
determined by the how the two groups share in the output of the economic engine.  Also 
important are the efficient uses of capital and labor.  The transmission of knowledge and its 
effect on relative growth is the subject of a later section in this chapter. 
 Solving the system of differential equations (2.17) and (2.18) yields 
 ?(?) = ?0+?(?0??0)(? (1?2?)??1)1?2?  (2.19) 
 ?(?) = ?0+(1??)(?0??0)(? (1?2?)??1)1?2?  (2.20) 
for ? ? 0.5. 
For ? = 0.5 the solution is 
 ?(?) = ?0 + 12 (?0 ? ?0)? (2.21) 
 ?(?) = ?0 + 12 (?0 ? ?0)?. (2.22) 
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Thus for a given set of efficiency parameters that determine the initial conditions, ?0  and ?0, we 
can explore potential growth paths.  Later in this chapter, after exploring the more complex 
mainstream growth models, we will extend this model to allow the production efficiency and 
capital efficiency parameters in the two groups to change with time also. 
 If we assume that ???  is near optimal and ???  is .33 (the same as ? in the Cobb-Douglas 
form in Figure 25 through Figure 29) and assume lower values for the parameters for the less 
developed counterparty, we can set ? such that the rich begin with an income/output of 2 and 
the poor begin with an income/output of 1 (?2 = 4.95 and ?1 = 2.98).  The difference in the 
standard of living (i.e., the incomes per capita) powers the economic engine.  Over time, as the 
shares of the profits are reinvested, we would expect to see growth.  As such, both ?2  and ?1 
should grow, and the standards of living for both counterparties should improve.  As we will see 
in the scenarios below, this is not necessarily true. 
 We will first look at how this model predicts growth using the actual division of world 
GDP and of world GDP/capita.  The share of the aggregate output to the rich world is 65%.31  
This suggests the following: 
                                                             
31 This is the share of world GDP to North America and Europe versus Asia, Africa, and South America in 
2006  (IMF, April, 2007). 
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Figure 33.  Growth of rich and poor with 65% to the rich. 
Both rich and poor share exponential growth, but the rich continue to grow at a higher 
exponential rate.  This suggests that as long as this general income distribution persists, 
divergence rather than convergence will describe the income paths of the developed and less 
developed nations.   
 However, the paths may be more divergent than that.  Based on the United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2006, GDP per capita (at $PPP) for the top 1/3 of countries is 
$24,806; for the middle 1/3 it is $4,269, and for the poorest 1/3 it is $1,184.  The rich world has 
a per capita GDP that is 20 times greater than that of the poor world.  Giving the rich a 95% 
















Figure 34.  Growth of rich and poor with 95% to the rich. 
Over the same period, both rich and poor do better in absolute terms (the poor reach a 
GDP per capita of 2.78 in this scenario versus 1.81 in the previous scenario).  However, the rich 
are more than 10 times better off whereas the poor are about 50% better off.  The poor do 
benefit from the interaction with a rapidly growing rich world, but they also see that the gap 
between their well-being and the well-being of the rich world grows.  As Chapter 1 showed, this 
trend will lead to violent outcomes. 
 Figure 21 at the beginning of this section shows that poor nations have not grown in 
absolute terms in recent history (since the industrial revolution and the colonization of the third 
world).  If our model is set to have the rich exploit the poor (that is, the poor side has only 
















Figure 35.  Growth of rich and poor with 125% to the rich. 
Figure 36 below shows the actual data for GDP per capita from 1920 to 2003.  The US growth 
has been exponential (note R2 and fit equation in the chart).  China has only recently joined the 
exponential growth path.  Africa as a continent (data from 57 countries) has remained flat.  
However, culling data from the poorest countries, we can see a pattern in Figure 37 that is 















Figure 36.  Actual GDP per capita – US, Europe, China, Africa (from Maddison, 2007). 
Figure 37.  Actual GDP per capita – poorest nations (from IMF, 2007). 
There is a variety of reasons for the failing growth of per capita GDP in the poor African 
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value added to the output of the country.  Exploitation, within country or between countries, 
benefits some and harms many. 
This entropic form of the Solow-Swan model also shows the implications of endless 
exponential growth.  In this form of the model, what will support endless growth is the 
sustained differential between the value created in the economic engine and the costs of that 
creation.  That is, as long as ?2 > ?1 or as long as ? > ?, growth will continue.  Yet several 
unsustainable outcomes arise.  As discussed above in this section, at some point, satiation of 
real per capita consumption will create an asymptotic convergence on a long-run limit to the per 
capita standard of living.   
But more likely to occur before that long-run constraint is, as we demonstrated in 
Chapter One, that the continued divergence of standards of living becomes unsustainable: social 
unrest, terrorism, and revolution will change the divergent exponential paths at some point with 
a new regime in which the allocations of the value added are distributed differently.  This same 
model that developed the paths in Figures 33 through 34 can provide insight into those 
potential time paths. 
Suppose that there are significant changes in how the poor are allocated a share of the 
aggregate output such that now, instead of the poor getting 35% as in Figure 33, they get the 
65% share that the developed world was getting, while the developed world gets 35%.  Figure 
38 below shows the example in which starting with an allocation of 1 to the poor and 2 to the 




Figure 38.  Growth of rich and poor with 35% to the rich. 
The dynamics behind this convergence do not require any satiation of real per capita 
consumption but occur within the framework of the thermodynamic model.  Using the heat 
engine example, if there is no difference between the energy in a cold reservoir and a hot 
reservoir (in this case hot and cold are not appropriate terms since both are the same!) then the 
engine cannot produce work.  In our economic system, if there is no difference in the standards 
of living between rich and poor (again they are the same, so there is no distinction between rich 
and poor) then the economic engine cannot produce an excess accumulation of capital.  Simply 
stated, if income and costs are the same, there is no profit, and there is nothing to reinvest.  At 
the convergence point, the only required economic activity is the replenishment of capital 
depleted by entropy (depreciation). 
The real return on investment (ROI) provides an interesting insight into what might 















likely against the wishes of the poor counterparty with the use of, as shown in Chapter One, 
police and armies).   
The real growth rate of the economy determines the real rate of return on capital 
investment in the long-run.32  Short-run fluctuations in a real economy will raise and lower both 
the real and expected return on investment as is witnessed daily in the world’s stock exchanges.  
But over time, the geometric mean long-run real rate of return on capital investment will equal 
the geometric mean long-run real growth rate of the economy.  In our thermodynamic 
economic model, the interplay between the rich and poor allow long-run (but ultimately 
unsustainable) differences between the growth rates of the two counterparties.   
The return on investment in this scenario is based on the efficiency calculation in 
thermodynamics.   The theoretical calculation for the efficiency of a heat engine is ? = ?W?QH  
where ?W is the work done by the system (in economic terms, the accumulation of capital) and 
?QH  is the heat or energy entering the system (the capital invested into the system).  The 
equation for the efficiency of the heat engine equates to the return on investment in our model, 
which is a function of the difference in standards of living and thus revenue and costs.  
Rearranging the efficiency equation, ? = ?W?QH =
TH?TC
TH  , we can see that efficiency is increased 
more by lowering the cool temperature than by increasing the high temperature by the same 
amount.   
The efficiency of our economic model is measured in a similar way, and the resulting 
ratio measures the return on investment.  Thus ????? = ???? =
(?????)
??????1  where ?? is the net 
invested capital.  Note that since ROI is a function of Y and C, then ROI is also a function of the 
differential between Y and C.  As in the thermodynamic example, the return on investment (or 
                                                             
32This is a well established empirical fact and is established in Faugere and Erlach (2003, 2006) and Liu, et 
al. (2005).
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the growth rate of the rich) would increase more by lowering the standard of living of the poor 
(lowering C) than by increasing the standard of living for the rich (raising Y) by the same amount.  
Although not explicitly modeled in the examples so far in these simulations (we have held the 
internal parameters of the production function constant), we will illustrate the effects by 
showing the short and long-run effects of first lowering the poor’s standard of living and holding 
the rich’s fixed, and then doing the opposite by the same amount.   
However, in the first chart below we look at the prediction using a 65/35 rich/poor 
allocation with ?2  and ?1 at the base values  ?2 = 4.95 and ?1 = 2.98 and the other parameters 
also held constant. 
 
Figure 39.  Real return on investment – rich get 65%. 
In this case, the real rate of return on investment declines to a floor.   The prospect of 













counterparties (if possible33) in a way that would change that dynamics in favor of the richer 
(and most likely more powerful) counterparty.  In our model this is easily accomplished by 
increasing the share of aggregate output to the rich.   We can see the effect of this by changing 
the share of the rich from 65% to 95% (as we did in Figure 34).  The figure below shows the 
results. 
 
Figure 40.  Real return on investment – rich get 95%. 
The outcome of an increased share not only increases current ROI but also provides an 
expectation of a rising return on investment in the future.    
Suppose there are also mechanisms that influence the standards of living independent 
of altering the share of aggregate income.  For example, the rich could have a well managed 
monetary policy whereas the poor could be exposed to an erosion of purchasing power in the 
33 We have not discussed the strategies that have allowed the employer/worker or rich nation/poor nation to 
gain or lose advantage in a historical sense.  In the conclusion to this work we will discuss potential 
strategies for paths forward.  At this point in the discussion we are simply looking at the implications of 














home currency due to high inflation.  If a social planner were to have a choice of either raising 
the standard of living of the rich or lowering the standard of living of the poor by the same 
amounts and the objective were to maximize the current rate of return, the planner would 
choose to lower the standard of living of the poor.  As noted above in thermodynamic terms, it 
is better to make the cold reservoir colder than to make the hot reservoir hotter by the same 
amount.   
In Figure 40 the rich have a 95% share of the aggregate accumulated profits and have an 
initial ROI of 8.31% and a ceiling over time of 12.53%.  In the two cases in the charts below 
(these cases assume a onetime shift at time zero), we hold the share at 95%, first raising the 





Figure 41.  Real return on investment – changes in the initial standard of living. 
The case in which the rich’s standard of living increases (top chart) results in an increase 
in the initial rate of return from 8.3% to 11.5%, an increase of 3.2%.  The case in which the 
poor’s standard of living is lowered by the same amount that the rich’s was raised (bottom 
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terminal value of one dollar invested after ten years is $3.04 if the poor are less well off and is 
$2.80 if the rich are better off.     
The key point is that convergence in standards of living is counter to a strategy of 
maximizing return on investment.  This point is further illustrated by looking at the time path of 
the rate of return for the case shown in Figure 38.  If somehow the allocation of the aggregate 
output were 35% to the rich and 65% to the poor, as Figure 38 shows, the world converges to a 
per capita ceiling: identical standards of living and zero growth.  The ROI time path is as shown 
below: 
 
Figure 42.  Return on investment – rich get 35%. 
Over a ten year horizon, the ROI drops to 0.18%.  At 30 years it is 0.0005%.   Eventually it 
is zero. 
The fundamental fuel of capitalism is the growth in capital.  If there is zero growth and 
zero return on investment, what is that economic system called?   That question will remain 
unexplored for now as there are other models to explore before we have a more complete 














Thus far, we have shown that the Solow-Swan framework (both in the traditional model 
and in the thermodynamic version), while missing components of economic thinking such as 
utility maximization, the spread and growth of knowledge, and innovation,34 predicts endless 
growth under the assumption that per capita consumption has no upper limit.  In the traditional 
model there is a golden rule level of investment and savings that yields an optimal capital to 
labor ratio, maximizes consumption forever, and supports endless growth.  In the more modern 
presentation of the Solow-Swan framework, the golden rule still exists within the production 
function in determining the optimal capital to labor ratio, but, since there are two 
counterparties between which a profit dynamic exists that drives the growth of consumption 
per capita, the golden rule is perverted into excluding the counterparty.  That is: “Do unto 
others (our future generations) as long as they are in our group; otherwise, exploit forever as 
much as possible.”  Data since 1960 seems to suggest that our scenario for the rich taking a 
steadily increasing share of the aggregate output and its effects on standard of living is 
plausible.  The first chart below shows the relationship between the mean and the median GDP 
of 140 countries since 196035. 
                                                             
34 Utility maximization based models of growth will be explored in the next section.  Growth models that 
incorporate the diffusion of knowledge will also be looked at in a later section.  But perhaps the most 
interesting dissection of growth models will come when looking at how innovation is modeled.  One can 
foresee an argument that says that innovation will prevent an end to growth as the creation of new products 
will insure an endless sustained growth in per capita demand.  We will take a very close look at how 
models of innovation forecast the very long run and will show that, barring an innovation that allows us to 
expand beyond the earth is such a way that moving goods to the next planet is like putting freight on a ship, 
the economic limits to growth will still bring a future of zero growth and a real return on investment that is 
zero.
35 IMF, 2007, data from 140 countries with data from 1960: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoro Islands, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Haïti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
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Figure 43.  GDP of 140 countries – mean and median (from IMF  data, 2007). 
The divergence between the mean and median shows that the distribution of world 
income is becoming increasingly skewed to the rich tail.  In fact, Figure 43 looks very similar to 
Figure 34 (the 95% to the rich scenario).  And, as the simulation predicts, the divergence is 
exponential (shown by the dotted line, the fit equation, and the R-squared statistic). 
The requirement for a strong and constant or growing return on investment that yields 
the growth imperative supporting capitalism also, as noted above, would be supported by a 
lowering of the standard of living for the poor or an increase in the standard of living for the rich 
(or both).   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Reunion, Romania, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 















The chart below shows the poorest 20th percentile nations’ per capita GDP as a 
percentage of the total of the poorest and richest 20th percentile per capita GDP. 
 
Figure 44.  GDP per capita – poor 20th percentile versus rich 20th percentile (from IMF data, 
2007) 
The standard of living of the poorest quintile relative to the richest quintile has, as the 
simulation suggests, diverged.  
In the version of the Solow-Swan view of growth developed in this essay, the engine of 
capitalism applies a production function to poorly paid workers or nations and sells the output 
for a significant multiple of that cost to the relatively rich customers or nations.  Since the world 
economic system needs growth to operate and growth is optimized in this model by a sustained 
spread between rich and poor standards of living, the motivation is to avoid convergence.  A 
convergence to a common steady state, with or without endless growth (original Solow-Swan 
versus the version developed in this section) would pull the rug from under the system as the 
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general addiction model, the system has a disconnection between long-run well-being and 
short- run satisfaction.  This conclusion refutes most of the mainstream interpretations of this 
early growth model (see Barro and Sali-i-Martin, 1991) but is not refuted by the data. 
Perhaps this extreme conclusion will be mitigated by more advanced models.  In our 
thermodynamic model, we held the capital labor ratio fixed.  In both the traditional and the 
entropic models consumption per capita was explicitly used as a metric for optimization and did 
not have savings (or forgone current consumption) influence current choices.  In the next 
section we will explore the mainstream theoretical approach to broadening the basis for 
optimization from consumption to utility.  In a later section we will look at how knowledge 
diffuses from those with high human capital to those with low human capital so that technology 
improves and labor is more productive.  We will also see if innovation can save the future from 
entering into an economic system that does not provide a return on investment. 
But as a starting point, from either the 1950’s perspective of Solow and Swan or from 
the current perspective of the economic system as a physical entropic process, this framework 
provides a benchmark for reference.  The insights of the traditional model lead to a conclusion 
of endless growth unless the savings rate declines to the depreciation rate.  The insights of the 
second model lead to a conclusion that the fundamental motivations of capitalism will extract 
from the poor into the rich.  Both models break down in the long-run through satiation of real 
per capita consumption or from the divergence of rich and poor.  And as was shown in Chapter 
One, such a sustained and growing divergence portends a sustained and growing support for 
violent remedies.   
Growth with Consumer Optimization – Ramsey and Beyond 
The models described in the last section have several shortcomings.  One of these is the 
failure to recognize the forward-looking nature of current decisions in terms of consumption 
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and competition.  As a result, the savings rates and thus the investment in capital formation 
were detached from expectations of what the future will bring.   
In this section we will investigate classic growth models that describe a consumption 
path determined by optimizing households that do not make choices in isolation from the 
producers.  Beginning with Ramsey (1928) and advanced by others, the central concept that 
drives this section is utility maximizing households (infinitely lived or multi-generational) that 
face not only a current period budget constraint but also consider future income as well.  This 
framework was the foundation of the story told in Chapter One about the transition from the 
Malthusian trap to the era of continuous growth in per capita income.   
The ability to accumulate assets and pass on an endowment to the next generation is at 
the heart of this section’s architecture.  In the previous section population growth was 
exogenous.  At this point in the discussion, the growth rate of the family is also exogenous and 
grows at the rate ? (unlike in the model in Part Two of Chapter One).  Endogenous population 
growth will be revisited later in this section. 
If the population begins at unity, then at time ? the size of the family is 
 ?(?) = ??? . (2.23) 
Also, if consumption per adult at time ? is ?(?) = ?(?)/?(?) , then we can set up a utility 
function that each household will maximize: 
 ? = ??[?(?)] ? ??? ? ???? ??. (2.24) 
Equation (2.24) says that utility is maximized based on the flow of consumption per person 
added up by all of the family members and that there is a time preference, as long as ? > 0, for 
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consumption sooner than later.  Although this specification is simplistic,36 particularly when 
contrasted to the model developed in Chapter One, it is important to look at this model to 
understand the evolution of growth models.  In fact, some of the assumptions and predictions of 
this model, as we will see, are embedded into the development of thought on economic growth. 
 The households earn by working and by receiving a return on accumulated assets.  
Households deplete per capita assets with consumption and with growth in the size of their 
population.  That is, the flow of earnings (assets per capita, ?(?)) is described by 
 ?? = ? + ?? ? ? ? ?? , (2.25) 
where w is the wages per unit of labor and  r is the interest rate.   (Note that the time subscripts 
are omitted for simplicity.)   
The Ramsey model requires a condition to eliminate a Ponzi scheme.  That is, if 
households borrow (the assets can be loaned so that some households have negative assets) 
they can continuously roll over increasingly larger loans forever.  Household debt rises at the 
interest rate with no limit.  The condition prevents the debt per capita (negative values of ?) 
from rising as fast at the interest rate.  This is a typical restriction and we will take a closer look 
at the implications of this condition vis-à-vis the time path of interest rates in a numerical 
simulation later in this section. 
The utility function, (2.24), is maximized subject to the budget constraint (2.25) and the 
condition preventing the Ponzi scheme.  As in the previous section, we will not detail the 
derivation of the key points.  After a present value Hamiltonian is set up and the first order 
conditions for maximizing utility and a transversality condition are derived, the first outcome 
that is of interest is as follows: 
                                                             
36 For example, the discount parameter must be greater than the growth rate of the family.  Also, the 
discount rate for the current generation is identical to that of future generations; more on that assumption 
follows.
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? . (2.26) 
This says that households choose some level of consumption that is a function of the rate of 
time preference plus the marginal utility of consumption times the rate of growth in per capita 
consumption so that the sum of these rates equal the interest rate on assets.  The term in 
parenthesis on the right side of (2.26) is the consumption elasticity of utility.  This shows the 
sensitivity of the household’s desire for current compensation, ?, to the time preference, ?.  
That is, it determines the premium of the interest rate over the time preference for a given 
growth rate in consumption. 
Note that if (??/?) = 0, that is, per capita consumption growth is zero, then the rate of 
return on savings equals the rate of return on consumption.  
The typical presentation of the Ramsey model also specifies  ?(?) = ? (1??)?1(1??)  so as to 
insure that there is a constant elasticity in the steady state.  ? is greater than zero; thus the 
elasticity of marginal utility is –?.   Using that specification, (2.26) simplifies to 
 ?? ?? = ?1 ?? ? ? (? ? ?). (2.27) 
So growth in consumption can be positive, zero, or negative, depending on the 
relationship between the return on assets and the time preference parameter.  If the parents 
are very selfish, a high ?, or the return on assets is very small, then growth in per capita 
consumption could be negative.  The larger ? (which means a lower willingness to substitute 
intertemporally), the slower the response of the per capita consumption rate to a change in the 
discount parameters, or the more that households wish to smooth consumption over time. 
Since the actors in this model are concerned about both current and future 
consumption, the consumption function must look forward to time ?.  Whereas equation (2.27) 
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determines the growth rate of consumption, to determine the level of ? requires the use of the 
flow of income described in (2.25).  The present value of consumption is the sum of current 
assets, ?(0), (wealth)  and the present value of wage income, ?(0) = ? ?(?)??[??(?)??]????0 , 
where ??(?) is the average interest rate from the present to time ?.  Consumption is thus 
 ?(?) = ?(0) ? ??1??[??(?)??]?  . (2.28) 
The consumption function is especially sensitive to changes in the expected average 
interest rate; this will be demonstrated in the numerical simulation later.  Also important is the 
value of ?(0).  Initial consumption is a function of the propensity to consume, ?(0), and on the 
sum of current wealth and the present value of wage income.  With a bit of manipulation, it can 
be shown that 
 1/?(0) = ? ????(?)??
1??
?  ? 
?
?+???????0 . (2.29) 
This says that if the average interest rate were to increase, then two offsetting effects 
would follow.  The positive effect occurs as an income effect.  That is, if the average interest rate 
rises, consumption is increased for all time.  The negative effect occurs as a substitution effect.  
That is, if the average interest rate rises then there is a higher penalty for current consumption 
versus future consumption.  In other words, the altruistic parent would prefer to save a larger 
proportion of assets that will become wealth for future generations.  Whether the propensity to 
consume rises or falls depends on which of these effects dominate.  This depends on ?, the 
parameter that determines the willingness of the consumer to smooth their consumption over 
time.  If 0 < ? < 1 , then the substation effect wins: the households do not smooth 
consumption, so shifting consumption to the future is easy.  If ? > 1 , then ?(0) rises with r?(t).  
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As noted by equation (2.27), another way to view this is as the effect of a gap between the 
market valuation of time and the consumer’s valuation of time or, ?(?)? ? = ? ???. 
 When we review the assumptions of this model, look at some empirical data, and look 
at some simulations, we will see how the zero growth outcome arises from this model and 
specifically from the specifications we have just reviewed.  But before we can do that 
investigation, we need to complete the model by describing the production side. 
 The specification for the firms is not unlike that of the Solow-Swan model.  Firms 
produce goods, they pay wages for labor, and they incur a cost of capital.37  Technological 
progress is considered exogenous in this model.  Some presentations of the Ramsey model bury 
that assumption into the effective labor rate.  For this presentation we will specify that 
?? = ? ? ?(?) where the growth rate is constant at ? ? 0, or ?(?) = ??? .  So output is 
 ? = ?(?,??). (2.30) 
Using notation similar to the Solow-Swan presentation, we will define quantities per effective 
unit of labor, ? = ?/?? and ?? = ?/?? so that the production function is now 
 ? = ?(??) . (2.31) 
In this closed system, the cost of capital (which also equals the return on assets) is ? (the 
marginal product of capital), and the value of capital depreciates at ?, so that ? = ? ? ? or 
? = ? + ?.  Thus profits are 
 ? = ???????? ? (? + ?) ? ?? ? ????? ? . (2.32) 
                                                             
37 Firms must pay for the use of capital from the households that own the capital. 
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 The combination of the households and firms brings competitive market equilibrium.  
Since ? = ? and therefore ?? = ?????  , we can derive this system of differential equations: 
 ??? = ??? ??????1 ? (? + ? + ??)? (2.33) 
 k?? = k?? ? c? ? (n + x + ?)k? . (2.34) 
As before in the Solow-Swan model, the variables with hats are constant in the steady state, the 
per capita variables, ?, ?,?, grow at the rate ?, and the stock variables, ?,?,?, grow at the rate 
of population growth plus the rate of technological progress.  The steady state is 
 k?? = ? ??+?+???
?
??? (2.35) 
 ??? = (???)? ? (? + ? + ?)?? . (2.36) 
 Figure 45 shows the phase diagram with the transitional dynamics to the steady state values of 
the per capita consumption and capital variables.  Notice also that ??? is to the left of the golden 
rule level from the Solow-Swan model.  This is because savings are determined by households 
who are somewhat impatient so that they shift consumption to the present and save less.  This 
is often called the golden rule of utility maximization.   
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Figure 45.  Ramsey golden rule. 
Note also that the transitional dynamics of the model suggest that if the economy starts at ??0  
and if the initial savings rate it too high (??0" ) or too low (??0? ), then eventually the economy will 
reach the point where the ??? = 0 locus crosses the horizontal axis, and undersavings 
(overconsumption) will drive the capital per effective unit of labor to zero or the economy 
moves to the c?  axis, where output must be zero!  As is shown mathematically in Novales et al. 
(p.72-78, 2007), the system explodes if the economic actors or the social planner  violate the 
optimality conditions of this model.   
 But, as noted above, one of the conditions of the model is no Ponzi scheme (that is, that 
debt cannot grow faster than the real interest rate net of population growth).  Yet in the short-
run, the real economy can deviate from the stable manifold if savings rates are, for example, too 
low.  But just how long is the short-run, and at what point must debt per capita grow slower 
than the real interest rate net of the population growth rate?  In the numerical simulation below 
we will see what happens, but first let us look at some actual data for the US: 
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Figure 46.  US Savings Rate (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008). 
Figure 46 shows the US savings rate with a fitted polynomial function. Below we use that 
smoothed savings rate to compute a measure of the change in debt by taking the difference of 
the average rate over the last 25 years and each year’s savings rate.38  This is compared to the 
real interest rate net of population growth (using Dept. of Health and Human Services data for 
the fertility rate and the immigration rates for the US from 1983 to the present). 
                                                            
38 This measure is relative to the savings rate.  This measure also picks 1983 due to data in Galbraith et al. 
(2007) on FED policy regimes.  The data in the Galbraith essay shows that the policy regime has been 
consistent since 1983.  Thus the assumption, based on that work, is that the natural real interest rate will be 
near the average of that period.  The average 10-year bond rate minus the CPI (which works out to 4.94%) 
is used as the benchmark.  





















































































Figure 47.  Ramsey ponzi violation (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008, & Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, 2008). 
Figure 47 suggests that since 2000 the US has violated the constraints of the Ramsey 
model.  Clearly, the choice of the benchmark real interest rate matters as to the exact point of 
intersection.  But no benchmark that is sensible results in a non-violation.  It is also true that in 
an open economy it is possible for foreign savings to provide short run sustenance to an 
undersaving home economy.  That supplementary effect (not in the Ramsey model) would be 
captured in a measure of the net worth verses the savings of the private sector adjusted by 
disposable income.  If foreign borrowings are sufficient then, at least locally, the economy will 
remain on the Ramsey stable path since the growth in net worth adjusted for after tax income 
would offset the low domestic savings.  Figure 48 shows the relationship between the ratio of 
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Figure 48. US net worth and savings relative to disposable income (BEA, 2008).
Does the higher net worth measure offset the drop in savings?  Figure 49 shows a fitted line 
between the net worth ratio and the savings rate ratio:   
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In order for the 2007 data point to be on the regression line, current savings would have 
to be 4.6 times higher than they are.  The orange square shows the projected relationship if 
current trends were continued.  So by this measure also the US economy is not abiding by the 
constraints of the Ramsey model.   It also suggests that in order to return to the stable path, 
there will be overshoot (more on this in the simulation below). 
 So does that mean that the concept of a saddle path, while mathematically appealing, 
does not actually have real power in the real economy?  And therefore are the growth 
predictions of this model invalid?  To try to answer these questions, we will submit a Ramsey39 
economy to a simulation, but we will also allow a stochastic component into the simulation in 
order to view the effects of surges in technological innovation.   
 The numerical model follows from the solution shown in equations (2.35) and (2.36).  (It 
is important to review the mathematics used to set up the simulation in order to understand the 
embedded assumptions.)   
The steps taken to derive the numerical outputs for the simulation are based on the 
following mathematics.  The steady state levels of capital stock and consumption can be easily 
derived if a Cobb-Douglas production function and a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function are assumed. (These are the first two assumptions.)  For now, assuming that ? = 1 and 
adding the risk aversion parameter, ?40, equations (2.35) and (2.36), with, as before, time 





? ???(1??)??  ?
? ? (? + ? + ?)? (2.37) 
                                                             
39 There are many variants to the original Ramsey model.  For example, Caselli and Ventura (2000) allow 
for household heterogeneity and Barro (1999) allows for non-constant time preference rates. The outcomes 
are essentially identical to the model as presented so far. We will add government to the simulation in the 
following pages, but that will not materially alter the model’s dynamics.
40 Using the constant relative risk aversion form ?(??) = ??
1??
1?? ,? > 0.
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?  ??  ??
?? = ??(1??)??  ?
? ? ?ln ?? ln ?? ? (? + ?). (2.38) 







? = ? 0 ???? 0 ??? ????
?
? ln ?? ? ln ????ln?? ? ln ?????  (2.39) 
where ? = (1??)(?+?)+??   and  ? =
1??
? (? + ? + ??) are both greater than zero.  The matrix, D, 
has a determinant –?? < 0 so the system is saddle path stable to the steady state.  The 
eigenvalues of the transition matrix are 
 ?1, ?2 = ?±??
2+4??
2  , (2.40) 
 so that ?1 > ? > 0 and ?2 < 0.  This system can be rewritten where ?? = (ln ?? ? ln ???? , ln ?? ?
ln ????) so that ??? ? ???  or 
 ?? ? ????? .   (2.41) 
  In order to simulate the transition to the steady state and investigate the implications 
for long-run growth, we need to derive from (2.41) an explicit system that can run in a standard 
software package (we use Excel but Matlab would work also).  The goal is to find a specification 
that is a linear combination of the deviations from the steady state values of both consumption 
and capital.  Not only can we then see the response to one-time changes in key parameters, but 
also, as noted above, we can overlay stochastic characteristics and watch the outcomes of 
persistent deviations from the saddle path.  As long as the stability conditions driving the 
dynamics are not violated, there should be pressure to return to the stable path.  As we will 
show, given those conditions and given some positive rate of the combination of population 
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growth and technology (productivity) growth, we will have the same exponential path in the 
growth of all key measures of the economy:  in other words, endless growth.   
Appendix B contains a summary of the logic used to form the numerical simulation.  The 
outcome of that exercise is that the solution can be shown to be 
 ln ?? ? ln ???? = e?2t(ln c0? ln c?ss ) (2.42) 
 ln ?? ? ln ???? = e?2t(ln c0? ln c?ss ). (2.43) 
The path of output is derived from the production function.  Given a level of technology, then 
? = ??? ? ln?? = ln ??? .  Thus the stock of capital and per capita income are proportional at every 
point in time and in steady state.  Therefore 
 ln ? = (1 ? e?2t) ln yss + e?2t ln y0, recalling that ?2 < 0. (2.44) 
This says that distance to steady state for income shrinks at a rate ?2.  The convergence speed, 
?2  will increase with the value of ?? where ? = (1??)(?+?)+??   and  ? =
1??
? (? + ? + ??).   
The growth rate of income per capita depends on the distance from steady state.  That 
is, if the economy begins at a point below the steady state, ?0 < ??? , then the farther away 
from the steady state, the higher the growth in income.  The speed of convergence is increased 
with larger values of ?, ?,? (population growth rate, the social discount parameter or the utility 
of future consumption, and depreciation).  The speed of convergence is decreased with larger 
values of ?,? (the share of capital and the level of risk aversion in the utility function).   
Therefore if two economies share the same set of structural parameters, they will 
converge to the same steady state but at speeds inversely related to their initial income/output, 
thus the well known expectation for poor countries to grow more rapidly than rich countries.  
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However, if the assumption of identical structural parameters is dropped, there can be no 
conclusion about relative speed or the steady states.   
We now have a basis upon which to engage the Ramsey model in simulation and to 
observe what will happen to several economies.   But before comparing the outcomes between 
a developed and developing country, let us first observe the predictions of the model in terms of 
long-run growth.  Or, more to the point of this research, does this model also foretell endless 
growth? 
The standard presentation shows the steady state prediction for income per capita for a 
given set of structural parameters.  In this case we will set technology, ? = 1, the growth in 
technology, ? = 0, the rate of time preference (the discount rate on future utility), ? = .1, 
capital share, ? = .33, population growth, ? = 0.0, the depreciation rate, ? = .05, the risk 
aversion parameter ? = 2.0, and consumption smoothing, ? = .5.   
It will also be useful to observe the half-life for convergence of the capital stock per 




.  If the half-life is 
longer, then the economy benefits from the change for a longer period.  As we will see, based 
on empirical estimates of the key structural parameters (see, for example, Easterly, 1999, and 
Afaro et al., 2005) the poor economy will have a much shorter half-life. 
This simulation also includes an exogenous stochastic element.  This element is 
actualized as exogenous randomly sized innovation shocks that, on impulse, influence the short-
term steady-state per capita levels of income and capital stock (as well as consumption and 
investment).  (We will look at models of endogenous technology growth in the next section of 
this paper.)  In the first simulation below, technology over the long-run does not change, and 
the long-run growth rate of the economy is zero.  Thus we can see in Figure 50 below how 
income (and thus the other endogenous variable) may take persistent excursions away from the 
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steady state but will always, in the long-run, return to the steady state.  One can think of these 
excursions as economic cycles.  The simulation covers 150 time periods with each period 
calibrated to be about ¼ of a year (three months) for a total of almost 40 years. 
 
Figure 50.  The Ramsey model benchmark with zero population growth and zero technology 
improvement. 
Population growth, given a fixed level of technology, actually lowers the steady state 
level of per capita income.  We can consider population growth like a depreciation of physical 
capital so that without an improvement in productivity, given higher population growth rate, the 
economy will tend to a lower level of per capita income.  If population growth increases from 
zero to 1% per period (4% per year), then the steady state level in income per capita drops to 
0.187 (from 0.196) in this simulation.  But more important to the discussion below regarding 
growth rates of rich and poor economies, the half-life for capital stock to return to steady state 
falls from 6.86 periods with zero population growth to 4.92 periods with 4.0%/year population 
















Steady State = 0.1957
171
influence of a non-persistent technology innovation.  The dramatic negative effects of higher 
population growth (and other differences between rich and poor) are illustrated below. 
The model becomes more interesting when growth from technology improvement is 
included (that is, the innovation shocks lead to persistent technology improvement and thus 
continuously increasing steady state values).  As we found in the discussion of the Solow model, 
if we expect to have continuous growth in per capita income, we must face the reality of 
continuous compound growth.   
 
Figure 51. Ramsey model with technology growth at 2% per year.
Figure 51 shows the time path under the assumption of a constant growth rate in 
technology of 0.5% per period (or 2% per year).  In order to highlight the exponential growth 


















Figure 52. Ramsey model with technology growth at 8% per year.
In this time accelerated version, real consumption per capita grows from about 0.194 to 
14.3 in about 40 years.  That is 73 times higher than today’s in less than half a century.  What 
exactly does this mean in words that we today can comprehend?  Quite simply, we will have the 
equivalent of 73 times more stuff per year!  Although it will certainly take longer to get to that 
level (with productivity growth certainly less than 8% per year41), this model predicts a 
remarkable future.  So once again, as in the previous section, we have to ask ourselves if there is 
some limit to the per capita level of consumption, and, perhaps easier to consider in the context 
of the ecological perspective, is there a limit to the stock of capital?  There can be no argument 
concluding that infinity is attainable.  But to keep the analysis within the boundaries of 
economic theory, the next section will provide a rigorous proof demonstration that this is not 
possible even if knowledge (human capital) is allowed into the equation.   
41 However, the work of Kurzweil (2001) suggests that the world is indeed experiencing an increasing rate 
of innovation that effectively is yielding an increasing rate of technological change.  His conclusion leads 






















For now, in the context of this model, suppose that the parameter for risk aversion is 
not fixed over time.  Furthermore, does a fixed labor intensity in the production function make 
sense when there is hypercapital per capita?   That is, does 1 ??  remain constant as 
/Y Y ??? ?  If capital intensity were to vary in that world, it would increase as labor inputs 
became less important.  As capital intensity increases, the speed of convergence, ?? , decreases.  
These longer and more persistent fluctuations cause households to become more risk averse, 
causing ?  to increase at an increasing rate that further slows the rate of convergence.  Now 
suppose that this is happening on an excursion below the steady state, and households engaged 
in consumption habits that mirror those shown in the data above.  If ?  were to go below zero 
(that is, no consumption were postponed, or there were no savings), the systems would 
implode.  That is, ?? would go below zero.  What does this mean in a social context?  We 
explore that just ahead, simulating a system that can lead to chaos (in both the mathematical 
and social senses).  As in the previous section, we have a glimpse of the unsustainability of 
endless growth.   
For the moment excluding the chaotic potential of the model, let us explore a few more 
of the assumptions that lead to a convergent future.  If the rich country is to have such a 
marvelous future to look forward to (that is, exponential growth in per capita consumption), 
what about the poor country?  The usual convergence story assumes that ultimately both 
countries will have identical structural parameters and therefore will converge to the same 
steady state; the farther apart, the more rapid the growth of the poor country.   (See Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, p. 111-118, 2004, for a summary of the Ramsey model’s predictions under those 
assumptions.)  As we noted in the previous section, the data is not consistent with that 
expectation for many countries.  In the output that follows, we start the rich country with a 
higher level of technology (A=2) and also alter some of the structural parameters.   For example, 
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it has been shown (Ogaki & Atkeson, 1997) that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
lower for poorer countries.   (This simulation uses 0.30 for the poor and 0.65 for the rich.)   This 
essentially says that the wealthy are willing to postpone a higher proportion of consumption 
until the future.  We also set the social discount factor higher for the poor country (0.10 versus 
0.05 poor to rich based on Easterly, 1999).  In other words, the poor country is relatively is less 
concerned about future generations.  The risk aversion parameter, which measures the how 
much a consumer dislikes facing uncertainty, is higher in poorer countries (a higher ? means a 
higher dislike of uncertainty).  This is sensible since poor countries tend to have poorly 
developed credit and insurance markets (Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2007).  In this simulation the risk 
aversion parameter for the rich country is 0.5 and is 1.0 for the poor country.  The population 
growth rates are also different (.02 for rich and .05 for poor).  Although the absolute values of 
parameters can be argued, the relative values are fully consistent with the literature.  In the 
simulation we let both the rich and poor countries experience identical (and random) 
technology shocks.  Capital intensity is also identical for both countries.   (We will take a closer 
look at this below.) 
 Based on these parameters, Figure 53 below shows the difference in the persistence of 
an identical technology shock for both the rich and the poor economies.   
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Figure 53. Ramsey model response to a technology shock.
As can be clearly seen, the rich economy harvests greater and longer lasting benefits from an 
identical one-period non-persistent technology shock.   These magnitude and persistence 
characteristics, when coupled with an accumulation of technology, yield extremely different 
growth rates.  The time paths for output/income per capita illustrate not convergence but 
divergence as Figure 54 below shows: 
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Figure 54.  Ramsey model time paths for rich and poor economies. 
The Ramsey model (as specified so far) does not recognize the effects of international capital 
flows or any variation over time of capital intensity.   We will investigate a few extensions of the 
Ramsey model below in which attempts are made to extend the model into an open economy 
framework.  However, within the framework already established, let us look at the effect of an 
exogenous change in capital intensity. 
 There are no direct connections in this model between the rich and the poor (as there 
will be in a look at an extension of the model below), but we can compare the effects of an 
identical change in capital intensity to both rich and poor and conjecture about the motivations 
of the more powerful party as a result.  If both rich and poor experience a one-time identical 
increase in capital intensity, we see the following outcomes for consumption.   (Note that the 
starting stocks of each has been adjusted so that the graph shows the relative change from an 

















Figure 55.  Capital intensity change for rich and poor. 
We see that for a given increase in the intensity of capital in production, the rich’s benefit is 
sustained at a greater level in all three measures.  In other words, given the differences in 
structural parameters described above, convergence will not happen unless either the poor 
have a more rapid shift from labor to capital in production or the poor adopt structural 
parameters for risk aversion, social discounting, etc. that are stronger in terms of growth 
opportunity than those of the rich.  Note that the transition to the new steady state requires 
that initially consumption falls in order to fund the large increase in investment.  Production 
increases as the stock of physical capital increases.  As the marginal product of capital gradually 
decreases, investment also converges to its new steady state.  The savings rates also adjust.  
Figure 56 shows the relative responses.  This gap will be important as the analysis continues a 
Time




few paragraphs down since, in the context of Figure 48, this requirement of the model is not 
matched in the measured reality of the US.   
 
Figure 56. Capital intensity change effect on savings for rich and poor.
Although this model does not describe a relationship between rich and poor (that is, in 
the context of an open economy) as did our thermodynamic model, we might conjecture as to 
how this relationship might evolve as growth trends toward zero.  As further support for our 
contention regarding zero growth as posited and used in the discussion of the Solow-Swan 
model, we draw upon the literature on population growth dynamics which clearly recognizes 
the unsustainablity of endless population growth (see, for example, Cushing, 2001, 2002) and in 
many cases uses the Beverton-Holt equation42 as the foundation for ecological models of 
population dynamics.  The Beverton-Holt relationship results in a time path as shown in Figure 
                                                            
42 This difference equation for population growth is ??+1 = ? 11+(??1)???
?? , which has very strong ecological 
implications.  In this representation  ? > 1 represents the inherent growth rate of population determined by 
demographic properties such as birth rates, survivorship rates, etc.  ? > 0 is the “carrying capacity” 
characteristic of the environment typically associated with the availability of finite versus sustainable 
resources and waste by-products.
Time




57 below.   This growth path is essentially the same as those shown in several parts in Figures 25 
and 27. 
 
Figure 57. Beverton-Holt model of population growth. 
As can be seen, the population converges to a steady state (zero growth).  As is clear by now, 
this paper’s work extends this expectation to a more generalized zero economic growth 
(contrasted with zero population growth).   
In what follows, rather than show again that continuous growth in per capita 
consumption cannot be permanent (i.e., at some high level of real per capita consumption the 
aggregate consumer will reach satiation), we will show that, using the Ramsey model as a 
foundation, as the savings rates of the rich and poor diverge (or as the relative capital intensities 
diverge) and as population growth converges on a steady state, the time path for capital 
accumulation can exhibit chaotic characteristics.  That is, in socio-economic terms, there is the 
potential for anarchy.  The contention that chaotic outcomes in an economic model are 




 Chaotic systems are determined by processes “that appear to proceed according to 
chance events though their behavior is in fact determined by precise laws” (Lorenz, 1994, p.4) or 
more succinctly, the systems exhibit “unruly behavior governed entirely by rules” (Stewart, 
2001, p. 174).  Although there are rigorous mathematical descriptions for these general 
statements, we will use the working definition proposed by Cushing et. al. (2003):  “A trajectory 
is chaotic if it is bounded in magnitude, is neither periodic nor approaches a periodic state, and 
is sensitive to initial conditions (p. 6).”  
It has been clearly demonstrated that macrodynamic theoretical models can exhibit 
chaotic outcomes (Rosser, 2000); but is the possibility of chaos only a laboratory experiment 
undertaken by “theorists bearing free parameters undisciplined by empirical studies?” (Quoted 
in Rosser, 2000, p. 195).   The answers to Woodford’s criticism have ranged from agreement to 
disagreement.   (See Rosser, 2000, for a review).  The idea that a deterministic system can 
produce fluctuations that look just like random patterns is a bridge between opposite ends of 
the deterministic/probabilistic views of how the world works.  In essence, does it matter 
whether or not research has been able to rigorously distinguish something that looks random 
but is not from something that is truly random?  As will be shown in the model below, in spite of 
the ambiguity of mathematical proofs seeking to sift the “noise” from the signal of economic 
time series, computer simulations using parameters that are realistic (particularly in the context 
of zero growth) do lead to chaotic results.  Furthermore, adding stochastic elements to a 
deterministic specification that can lead to seemingly unpredictable outcomes, as will be done 
in Chapter Three, only heightens the urgency concerning the movement of key parameters 
toward setting the system into chaos.   
The implications captured in the last part of Cushing’s definition above regarding 
sensitivity to initial conditions has been understood since Poincaré wrote (1890):  “A very small 
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cause which escapes our notice determines a considerable effect that we cannot fail to see, and 
then we say that the effect is due to chance.  It may happen that small differences in the initial 
conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena.  A small error in the former will 
produce an enormous error in the latter.  Prediction becomes impossible (2001, p.404).”  Taking 
these words written in the 1890s and looking at how that general description would apply to the 
social systems that depend on continuity in economic growth and continuity in the expectations 
for the returns on investment, is it then not the essence of anarchy when the policy choices of 
government become irrelevant and the comfort of a known tomorrow evaporates?  The simple 
fact that responses are not necessarily proportional to disturbances and, in fact, might be 
unexpected and nonintuitive (both in magnitude and in temporal dynamics) does not comfort 
those that wish that the future is determined, with a mean reverting random property, by 
today.  There is no mathematical argument that refutes this possibility.   
We depart now from the traditional macroeconomic analysis in which there is an 
assumption of linearity in relationships that are intrinsically nonlinear (wherein around the 
steady state the equilibrium points and the path outcomes of stable node, unstable node, and 
saddle-point equilibria are “forced” on the system).  Taking a “global” view and applying 
nonlinear dynamical techniques (Medio & Lines, 2001; Lines, 2005), we open the door to the 
possibility of observing cyclical behavior with regular or irregular periodicity.  As we will see, 
multiple and different results are the result of very small changes in parameter values: chaos 
and, in a broader context, anarchy!43 
                                                             
43 As alluded to above, the literature testing for chaos in economic time series is fairly large but 
inconclusive.  See, for example, Barnett and Chen (1988); Serletis and Shintani (2006); and Barnett (2006), 
who says “It is my belief that the economics profession, to date, has no dependable empirical evidence of 
whether or not the economy itself produces chaos, and I do not expect to see any such results in the near 
future.  The methodological obstacles in mathematics, numerical analysis, and statics are formidable” (p. 
255).  But in general there is a consensus that, as in any complex system in nature or society, the nonlinear 
relations will lead to strange dynamics.  
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The time dynamics in this extension of the Ramsey model are motivated from two 
sources: the Beverton-Holt equation, which forces the growth characteristics to rely on capital 
intensity and productivity, and a modification of the Ramsey model in which the production 
function is 
 ?? = ?(?? , ??) = ????(1+?)??(1??)(1+?) (2.45) 
where ? ? 0, ? > 0, 0 < ? < 1, 0 < ? < 1.44  Note that if ? = 0 , then the function is the 
standard Cobb-Douglas type.  Capital accumulation is according to 
 ??+1 = ?(?? , ??)? ?? + (1? ?)??   (2.46) 
with the depreciation rate ? > 0. 
Also, the utility function is expanded to include not only consumption but also leisure.  
Thus  
 ?(?? , ??) = ??(??) +? ? ln?(1? ??) (2.47) 
where ? > 0.  We have ??  as per capita consumption and ??  as the time per capita spent 
working.  With the time endowment normalized to one, 1? ??  is the per capita share of leisure.  
The parameter ? provides weight to leisure versus consumption in the utility function.  As we 
have noted above, the dynamics of continued growth with constant productivity improvement 
provide for less per capita labor and more per capita consumption.   
                                                             
44 The Ramsey model, as we have seen, absent an external shock, will only have a single outcome in terms 
of long-run stability (for a given set of parameters).  However, if the production function is not specified 
for constant returns to scale, then endogenous cycles are possible.  In particular, following Gomes (2006), 
the production function includes a mutually shared benefit (the economy’s average capital and labor 
inputs).  (2.45) is derived by specifying ?? = ?(?????1??)??????1?? and assuming a symmetric distribution so 
that Kt = kt and Lt = lt. This approach bypasses some of the typical criticism of nonlinear models leading 
to chaos in which the model relies upon unreasonably high levels of externalities.
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The economic interpretation of the modifications in (2.45) and (2.47) are derived from 
the effect that ? has on output.  As specified, ? is an externality.  In the framework of this 
analysis, and recalling the discussion in Chapter One regarding the increased use of guard labor 
to counter the increased propensity for social unrest, the externality is, in fact, the diversion of 
productive resources from output to the mitigation of social unrest.  This parameter is driven, as 
in the Chapter One model, by the gap between the per capita consumption of the rich versus 
the poor and is amplified by the continued improvement in communication technology.  Thus, 
as (??? ? ??? ) increases, ? increases.  So, according to (2.45), as ? increases (and concurrently as 
leisure for the rich versus poor increases), more resources are required to offset the growing 
unrest.  At some point, a saturation point is reached at which no output is generated.   However, 
on the path to that saturation point, as is shown below, the economy unravels unless, as is also 
shown below, the gap between rich and poor is closed.  If the endpoint is somehow reached, the 
world is at a zero growth state. 
This two-equation system can be reduced to the following difference equations in two 
dimensions (see Appendix B for the proof and definitions of the new parameters): 




? ?? + 
(1 ? ?)??  (2.48) 
 ??+1 = ?2?±?(??2?)
2?4?1??3?
2?1?   . (2.49) 
These equations are the foundation of the following numerical simulation.  The per capita values 
for the key parameters will respond to the population growth dynamics shown in Figure 57. 
 Since effects of diverging consumption rates (contained in the guard labor parameter ? 
that drains the productive capabilities of the economy) and the elasticity of substitution ? are 
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relevant to both the Chapter One story and to the analysis of what happens to this version of 
the Ramsey model over time, those are two of the parameters that we will explore.  As we will 
see, it is also important to consider labor’s share in production, ??, and the consumption/leisure 
weighting, ?. 
 Initiating the model with reasonable parameters based on the work of Guo and Lansing 
(2002),45 we first see that with growth productivity stable, ? = 0 and the elasticity of 
substitution set at .2 (a low capital intensity), we have a stable outcome in the long run (the 
initial 10,000 iterations of this simulation are excluded from the graph to allow the system to 
reach a zero growth state) for consumption and capital per capita.   
 
Figure 58.  Ramsey model – long-run stability under traditional assumptions. 
However, if we set ? > 0 (in this case to 4.8), we have a different long-run outcome. 
                                                             
45 ?0 = 0.75, ?0 = 0.5, ? = 0.962, ? = 0.067,? = .38, ?? = 0.4.
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Figure 59.  Ramsey model – long-run instability with a high level of guard labor. 
The system, although without any stochastic elements, exhibits seemingly random 
fluctuations in capital intensity.  In fact, the system exhibits classic chaotic symptoms. Plotting in 
the space of capital and consumption, we can see what is typically called a strange attractor.46  
That is, a system that exhibits none of the three outcomes of classic analysis (stable, unstable, 
saddle-path) but is bounded within the state space.  We see in Figure 61 below the attractor of 
this model (with the first 100,000 iterations excluded and the second 100,000 iterations shown). 
                                                             
46 An attractor is informally described as strange if it has non-integer dimension or if the dynamics on it are 
chaotic. The term was coined by Ruelle and Takens, 1971.
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Figure 60.  Ramsay Model – attractor of the guard labor externality model with ? set to 4.8. 
The attractor also shows a discontinuous (instantaneous) movement from one regime to 
the other.  This is confirmed by observing the map as it is being drawn.   It is also interesting to 
see how the system evolves into this state by observing the relationship between consumption 
and changes in the guard labor externality and capital intensity.    
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Figure 61.  Ramsey model – bifurcation diagram on the guard labor parameter. 
Figure 61 shows the bifurcation diagram of the model on changes in the guard labor 
parameter (and the other parameters fixed as shown in the footnote above).  As can be seen, 
the area in which the model was plotted for the attractor is an area of relative “stability” in that 
after following a stable path in the early stages of the increase in guard labor, consumption 
quickly enters a period doubling zone and then explodes into indeterminacy.  This essentially 
suggests that as guard labor increases, there comes a point at which the regime must jump to a 
much higher level or face true uncertainty.   (There are parameter combinations that retain 
single outcome paths as will be seen below.)   This leads to what may seem a paradoxical 
conclusion: because this model is fully deterministic, forecasting is possible!  Clearly the 
sensitivity to initial conditions of a chaotic system makes long term forecasts highly inaccurate, 
but there is valuable information in the system’s attractor.  In this case, the ruling regime will 
know that only a leap in the proportion of guard labor to output will provide some bounded 
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certainty.  Of course, they should also know that reducing the consumption gap and thus 
mitigating the need for guard labor will assure that they remain on a fixed point outcome. 
 With ? set to zero or less than the point of the first bifurcation, the model is single 
outcome stable for any reasonable values of ? or ??.  However, setting ? = 4.5 , we see that 
capital intensity, ?, is also a critical contributor to a loss of predictability.   
 
Figure 62.  Ramsey model – bifurcation diagram on alpha. 
 Figure 62 shows that the economy can in fact make the transition from low to high ? 
without passing thru the zone of complete indeterminacy shown in Figure 61.  This is 
accomplished if capital intensity is very low (in this specification, less than about 0.0817).  This 
condition is sensible in the context of a world in which a growing majority of the people are 
excluded from the growth in per capita consumption.  At least if most are laboring (thus low 
capital intensity), they are less likely to be restive.  The rich sector may understand this and 
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might maintain a lower capital intensity and a high guard labor in order to avoid mathematical 
and social chaos.   
Figure 6347  below shows the bifurcation diagram in eta and alpha space (that is, 
allowing both parameters to vary and thus showing a “three dimensional” view based on the 
colors in which red “bricks” are single outcome space, white is indeterminate space, and the 
other shades represent increasing periodicity, to black which is greater than cycles of period 25).  
This diagram maps out the levels of capital intensity and guard labor that identify the single 
outcome space (red “bricks”) in which the ruling regime would prefer to reside.  Note that as 
capital intensity increases (and thus labor is displaced), a higher level of guard labor is required 
to remain in non-chaotic space.  This outcome was simulated with ?? = 0.6.     
 
 
Figure 63.  Ramsey model – bifurcation diagram in alpha and eta space. 
                                                             
47 This simulation and the others following each takes about 3.5 hours on a powerful desktop PC!
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  Somewhat less of a policy choice is the level of the average share of labor in production, 
??.  As the model is specified, this parameter is exogenous; however, this parameter would be 
expected to decrease as the economy moves to a zero growth state.  Given a low initial value for 
the guard labor parameter (0.5) and a capital intensity of 0.3, we see in Figure 64 that the 
system is stable in the traditional sense as long as labor’s share is at least greater about 0.2575. 
 
Figure 64.  Ramsey model – labor’s share with a low guard labor. 
Setting guard labor to 1.2 and simulating in l? and ? space, we see in Figure 65 below 
that the system is stable for a variety of combinations of the parameters.  Note that as labor’s 
share falls and/or capital intensity increases, the system’s area of stability shrinks.  Although not 
shown, if the guard labor parameter is increased, lower levels of l? and ? can be attained, but 
there is still a limit at which the system rapidly shifts into a regime of greater than cycles of 25.  
In the context of what we are investigating in this paper, this version of the Ramsey model 
suggests that as the economy approaches (or is at) zero growth, the effects of mitigating social 
unrest overwhelm the internal feedback loops of a traditional capitalist system of production 
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and consumption, and, if the direction and characteristics of the systems dynamics are not 
altered radically, anarchy ensues even if it is not in the form of revolution.  
 In fact, drawing upon Chapter One’s insights, revolution might provide a stop gap on 
the path to chaos. 
 
Figure 65.  Ramsey Model – labor’s share versus capital intensity with guard labor at 1.2. 
Figure 66 below shows that with a high labor share, there are a number of parameter 
combinations that will yield stability.  Note, however, that there is still a limit to which guard 
labor can prevent anarchy.  As capital intensity increases and thus labor input is lowered, there 
is an interesting pattern that evolves with guard labor and the boundary to anarchy.  This 
pattern suggests that the effectiveness of the armies, police, militias, etc. in preventing chaos 
(from both mathematical and social perspectives) declines if capital intensity rises too high and 
capital does not expropriate enough of the fruits of production (that is, allowing ?? to be too 
large).   What is informative from this simulation is the fact that there are stable zero growth 
outcomes if and only if the value of ?, the need for guard labor to cordon off the rich pockets, 
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moves toward zero.  That means that the consumption gap between rich and poor must also 
move to zero. 
 
 
Figure 66.  Ramsey model – guard labor versus capital intensity with labor’s share high (0.8). 
In the context of the zero growth story, once population stabilizes (which in all of these 
simulations it already has) then as long as technology is improving, labor per capita will fall, and 
leisure per capita will increase.  This would mean a shift in the parameter ? in the utility 
function (2.47).   
Figure 67 below shows that the outcome for the simulation that a shift in the choice 
between consumption and leisure and the need for guard labor (with labor’s share, ??, set at 0.6 
and capital intensity, ?, set at 0.4) yields a limit to the effectiveness of guard labor.  As the 
preference for maximizing utility shifts toward leisure from consumption, at about 0.357 guard 
labor becomes necessary to prevent entering the chaotic zone.  However, unlike several of the 
simulations above, the effectiveness is limited to a value of about 1.9 for ?.  A lower capital 
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intensity, ? = 0.2, and a higher labor share, ?? = 0.9, allows guard labor to be effective to about 
3.1.   No set of parameters is stable in the traditional sense if ? > 0.6.  The message for the 
ruling class is to consume and let the poor work in order to maximally delay the end of order. 
 
Figure 67.  Ramsey model – guard labor versus leisure choice with labor’s share at 0.6. 
As we have seen, the Ramsey model has some interesting implications for a zero growth 
world.  The model as first explored predicts a persistent divergence between the rich and the 
poor, showing that even allowing for shocks to technology, the magnitude and persistence of 
the effects are more favorable to the rich.  The exploration of the Ramsey framework within a 
nonlinear difference equation setting shows that the persistent divergence of rich and poor 
drives the economic (and social!) system to chaos.   
We have seen that small and economically reasonable changes in the specification of 
the traditional Ramsey model can lead to the possibility of unpredictable irregular long-run 
outcomes for important economic measures.   It is important to note that saying that chaos can 
be enticed does not imply that chaos is everywhere.  As noted above, a large combination of 
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parameter values confined to a space that is typical for solving growth models yields typical 
results (stability, instability, or saddle point stable).  But in this section we have shown that 
cycles and chaos in economic theory are possible using reasonable parameter values.  This is not 
simply an exercise in math and logic.  There is information that can inform policy makers and 
perhaps even guide decisions with a long-run goal of economic and social stability.  At the very 
least, it should inspire thought (and imagination) into a realm of possibilities in which everything 
is possible at once.  That is, of course, an undesirable outcome, so, perhaps, given the possibility 
of that impossibility, the path taken will go to a steady state that works for everyone.   
In the next section we will expand the possibilities.  We will look at endogenous growth 
models with human capital.  As we have done so far, we will build upon the traditional 
framework and explore zero growth outcomes. 
Current Endogenous Growth Models: Knowledge, Education, Diffusion, Innovation, and the 
Proliferation of Goods 
 “The presence of human capital may relax the constraint of diminishing returns to a 
broad concept of capital and can lead thereby to a long-term per capita growth in the absence 
of exogenous technological progress” (Barro, 2004, p. 240).   As has been demonstrated to this 
point, without some assumptions regarding how value is created by labor and capital in such a 
way as to yield an endless increase in per capita measures of well being, growth models cannot 
support endless growth.  The consequences of the transitional dynamics under those 
assumptions were explored above and the forecasts suggest a difficult future.  Some of the 
symptoms and by-products of this troubling forecast are already manifesting in the present as 
was shown also above.  But thus far several critical components of the real world have been 
missing from the models.   
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In this section we will explore extensions of growth theory that are quite recent.  We 
will briefly review some of the theory regarding the concept of human capital.  However, even 
when we allow a fixed number of workers (zero population growth) but provide for an 
increasing quality of the labor function, diminishing per capita returns will eventually manifest 
themselves.  The solution to that problem has been the most recent extensions in growth theory 
in which continuing advances in methods of production and the types and quantities of products 
open the escape door from long-run diminishing returns.  In fact, it is this solution that is 
currently being played out in the world system.  As Figure 6848 shows, the estimated stock of 
trademarks is increasing exponentially.  The fitted time series forecast shows that by 2020 the 
stock of active trademarks will be more 3 times greater than in 2000. This suggests an 
exponentially increasing array of goods that has helped support the growth of the general 
economy.   But can that pattern carry into long-run?  That is what this section will investigate.  
                                                             
48 For period 1891 to 1970 the data on registered trademarks is taken from Historical Statistics 
of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Series W 107 and W 108), US Census Bureau. 
These series are updated using data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, US 
Department of Commerce, Annual Reports. The stock of trademarks is computed based on 
methodology used by Greenwood and Uysal (2005). Let the time t stock be denoted by St. The 
stock of trademarks is assumed to evolve in line with St+1  ??? St  + [It + Rt], where It represents 
new registrations at time t, Rt ???????????????????????????????????????????????? trademarks. 
Trademarks need to be renewed roughly every 20 years, but most are not. The mean of Rt /( Rt-20  
+ It-20) measures the survival rate on trademarks. The depreciation factor on trademarks is 




Figure 68.  The stock of trademarks 1871-2000. (See Footnote 44 for sources.) 
Arthur C. Clarke’s third law of technology, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic” (based on his work from 1972, p. 189) is, as it turns out, prophetic 
with respect to how growth theory has used technology to provide for unending growth in per 
capita measures of well being.  But in order to substantiate that statement, we must first review 
the current state of growth theory. 
Uzawa-Lucas-Rebelo: Human Capital in Production
The model that we will begin with is based on the Uzawa-Lucas framework with an 
extension by Rebelo (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991).  Rather than recreate their work, 
we will summarize the conclusions of the model.  The model is based on Cobb-Douglas 
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where Y is the output of consumables and gross investment in physical capital; , 0A B ? are 
technological parameters; H is human capital; H?  and K?  are the change in human and physical 
capital based on some investments KI  and HI , and a depreciation rate, ? .  , (0 1)? ?? ?  and 
, (0 1)? ?? ?  are the shares of physical capital inputs in each sector, and , (0 1)v v? ?  and 
, (0 1)u u? ?  are the fractions of physical and human capital respectively used in production.  
Obviously the fractions of physical and human capital used to generate human capital through 
education are 1 v?  and 1 u? .  The implication is that human capital is generated from a 
technology different from physical capital.  In fact, if ? ?? , then the model says that education 
is more intensive in the use of human capital than the production of physical capital.  This is an 
important consideration that we will explore later when looking at the prospects for stability if 
the opposite is true.  The model displays constant returns to scale due to the constraint that 
1 2 1? ?? ?  (where in the case of constant returns to scale 2 11? ?? ? ).  That will be relaxed 
farther down.  The model also requires that there be a constraint on non-negative gross 
investment so that once an investment is made into physical or human capital, it cannot be 
reversed. 
 Following the typical use of the household’s utility function (and using the form 
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it can be shown that the first-order conditions lead to 
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 (1 )/ (1/ ) [ ( / )]C C A vK uH ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? . (2.52) 
That is, the growth rate of consumption depends on the elasticity of substitution, 1/? , the net 
marginal product of physical capital in the production of goods (the rate of return), 
(1 )( / )r A vK uH ?? ?? ?? ? ? , and the rate of intertemporal substitution, ? .   A characteristic of 
the model is that the rates of return for physical capital, regardless to which sector it is 
allocated, must be the same.  This is also true of human capital.  That says then that  
 





? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? .
 (2.53) 
So for a given set of ?  and ?  an increase in the production of goods is the result of an increase 
in the fractions of the two inputs, K  and H , that are allocated to the goods sector. 
 We can express the shadow price of human capital in units of goods by taking the ratios 
of the Lagrange multipliers, /Hp ? ?? .  Using (2.51) and (2.53) and some manipulation yields 
the following: 
 1/ ( / ) ( / ) [(1 ) / (1 )] ( / )Hp A B vK uH
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? . (2.54) 
This is a differential equation on Hp  , which is stable only if [ ( / ) / ] 0p p p? ? ??  , which is only 
true if ? ?? .  That is, the relative intensity of physical capital must be greater than the relative 
intensity of human capital.  This ratio of the marginal product of H  in the physical goods sector 
(the wage rate) to the marginal product of H  in the education sector shows that price is based 
on the ratio of physical capital employed in the production of goods to human capital employed 
in the production of goods or /K H? ? .  The instability that arises if the relationship ? ??  
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switches would either drive wages (and thus consumption) to infinity or zero in one or the other 
sector.  Farther down we will see what happens if that relationship switches. 
 The stable version of the system can be shown to lead to several conclusions about 
endogenous growth (see Uzawa, 1965, and Lucas, 1988).  The key insight is that the growth rate 
of output will rise or fall if human capital is relatively abundant or scarce.  In straightforward 
words, if an economy is below its steady state growth rate due to a catastrophe, the economy 
will move to a steady state growth rate more rapidly if human capital is preserved.  This 
conclusion is supported in the analysis in Chapter One, in which education leads to growth in per 
capita income.   
 However, suppose that this model is subjected to a breakdown in the assumptions 
about growth within the assumption in the Cobb-Douglas production function regarding returns 
to scale.  (Recall that these issues were raised in the introduction to this chapter.)  The 
inconsistency that was referenced in the opening section of this chapter between the Inada 
conditions that support the algebraic formulation of the production function and assumptions 
on returns to scale that are also essential to the stability of endogenous growth model suggests 
that one must be forced to choose one or the other when studying growth.49  In fact, Shephard 
(1969) shows that since the production function is essentially a technological relationship that 
combines inputs one must accept that it is bounded or expel the notion of diminishing or 
constant returns to scale.  He shows that the Cobb-Douglas form violates the premise of a 
bounded set on technology and thus output.  As Fare (2002) showed, the Inada conditions 
reinforce this inconsistency. 
                                                             
49 The Inada conditions relevant to this discussion regard the marginal product of capital or labor at the 
limit if capital or labor goes to infinity and, at the limit, the effects of capital and labor on output.  The 
outcomes imply that that labor is essential and capital is essential.  
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What follows is inspired by their work.  We will show that the commonly used 
foundation for endogenous growth models can lead to zero growth by a simple change in the 
production function.  (By the way, this is the counter to the standard outcome of these models, 
which lead to endless exponential growth; we have already looked at in the Solow and Ramsey 
frameworks as impossible for a number of reasons.) The change from constant returns is 
accomplished by allowing the possibility of the sum of the parameters 1?  and 2?  to not equal 
one.  For example, if 1 2 1? ?? ?  then the system exhibits diminishing returns to physical capital 
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With this change we can find a condition that will guarantee endogenous positive growth.  We 
first divide the second part of (2.55) by H , take the logarithms of the terms, and differentiate 
with respect to time.  This yields 
 * *1 2( 1) 0K Y? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  (2.56) 
where *?  is the steady state growth rate of physical, human capital, or consumption, depending 
on the subscript.  Dividing the first part of (2.55) by K and performing the same set of 
calculations we get 
 * * * *1 2*
/ ( ) ( 1)
/ C K K HK
C K
C K
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? .
 (2.57) 
*
K?  must equal *C?  since if * *C K? ??  , then (2.55) says that the growth rate of capital will go to 
?? .  Also if * *C K? ??  , then at the limit / 0C K ? .  Thus (2.57) simplifies to  
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 * *1 2( 1) 0K H? ? ? ?? ? ? ? . (2.58) 
Equations (2.56) and (2.58) can be put into a system of two linear equations with two 
unknowns, *K?  and * .H?   Only if the determinant of the characteristic matrix of the coefficients 
is not zero does the system have a solution that provides for endogenous positive growth  (so 
that we do not get the outcome * * 0H K? ?? ? , the dreaded zero growth conclusion).  That 
requires the parameters satisfy 
 2 1 2 1(1 ) (1 ) 0? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? . (2.59) 
Clearly constant returns to both sectors work out ( 1 2 1? ?? ?  and 1 2 1? ?? ? ).  In fact, this is 
the only set of parameters that provides for endless positive endogenous growth.  The outcome 
of constant returns to scale says that * * * *K H Y C? ? ? ?? ? ?  or that K, C, H, and Y must all grow at 
the same rate in steady state.  Looking at other parameter combinations, 1 0? ?  and 2 0? ?  
make no sense (that would say that physical capital has no place in production, and/or human 
capital has no place in education).  2 0? ?  and 1 0? ?  can make sense if, for the first, human 
capital has no purpose in production, and, for the second, physical capital has no purpose in 
education.  The first alludes to a world of only machine workers, and the second is 
counterfactual and not possible in a developed civilization.  Some of the other combinations in 
which the parameters sum to more or less than one (but where if 1 2 1? ?? ?  then 1 2 1? ?? ?  
or the converse) yield outcomes in which K  and H  grow at different rates and thus /K H  
rises or falls forever.  That outcome also makes no sense since at the limit the world is all 
machines or is an idiocracy50.  Two long-run predictions of this endogenous growth model are as 
                                                             
50 See the movie by the same name for a good laugh and glimpse of that future.
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follows: 1. endless balanced growth with ever-increasing consumption per capita;  or (if both 
sectors exhibit diminishing returns to scale as Shephard showed to be a necessary deduction 
from the logic and algebra of production functions) 2. something that is not acceptable in our 
vision of the future: eventual zero growth.  That is, if both 1 2 1? ?? ?  and 1 2 1? ?? ? , then the 
growth rates of both K  and C  fall to the asymptote of zero, and the world approaches a new 
steady state in which * * * * 0.K H Y C? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  
Recall that all of this is also based on the assumption that the output elasticity of 
physical capital must be greater than the output elasticity of human capital, 
1 2 1 2? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? .  This is easy to understand in non-mathematical terms in that it says 
that as long the goods sector’s share of physical capital is greater than the knowledge sector’s 
share of physical capital, then output and consumption will not experience negative growth in 
the long-run.  If the factor intensities are reversed  (that is, the education sector becomes 
relatively intensive in physical capital), then (2.54) is unstable, and any departure from the 
saddle path would lead to an outcome that caused the time path of the key variables to depart 
from the steady state growth rates at a rate that grows over time.  This would be manifested by 
the part of (2.54), in which the ratio ( / )vK uH ? ??  would have an opposite effect from the 
marginal product of physical capital than expected.  Perhaps we can imagine a future that 
becomes more and more a world that trades in knowledge rather than physical goods.  The logic 
of this model suggests that, given these “unstable” parameters, over time in that world the 
fraction of human capital used in production will approach zero.   
In other words, just as posited earlier in this chapter, either everyone works one second 
a day, or only one person works.   The logic also then says that consumption will approach zero.  
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And striking right at the heart of capitalism (and rigorously supporting the thesis of this 
research), the logic also says that the return on investment (1 )( / )r A vK uH ?? ?? ?? ? ?  
will approach the depreciation rate. 
 Most treatments of this model exclude the conclusions in the last few paragraphs 
regarding zero growth by saying that using parameter combinations that lead to unimaginable 
outcomes are therefore implausible parameters.  But is it implausible to imagine a future in 
which human capital becomes the primary stock of capital and physical capital exists to simply 
replace depreciated physical assets and food?  If not then, at least in the context of the 
endogenous model we have just explored, we can imagine a zero growth world. 
 We are not quite finished, however, with this systematic deconstruction of growth 
models.  The extensions of the endogenous growth model we have just reviewed have modified 
the standard conclusion regarding balanced growth at constant growth rates.  In particular, the 
declining rate of return that we just identified is a troubling outcome that arises if one 
recognizes that 1? ?? ?  is not possible in the long-run.  That is, the continual accumulation of 
capital (both physical and human) cannot sustain long-run growth.  This has motivated an 
exploration for logic that could modify the rate of technological progress by, among others, 
Romer (1990, 1994), Judd (1992), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Aghion et al. (2002) to find an 
escape from the long-run diminishing returns trap. 
For the rest of this chapter we will consider models that incorporate technological 
change both in the form of an expanding variety of products and also in the form of better 
quality products replacing older products.   
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Endogenous Growth through Innovation and Diffusion 
The foundation for the model in which there is a variety of products (that is, new 
products are added to the menu for the households to choose from) are producers, inventors, 
and consumers.  The models differ in their treatment of patent duration and the cost of 
innovation (cost in terms of goods or labor) but in general have similar conclusions to the AK 
type models we have already looked at.  What follows is a summary of those models.   
Using a typical formulation, the quantity of output for the ith firm (producer) is described 
by 
 1 1( )i i iY AL NX N
? ? ?? ?? ? ?  (2.60) 
where ?  plays its traditional role in the production function, L  is labor input, X  is an 
intermediate good to production, N  is the number of varieties of goods, and A  is the overall 
measure of productivity.  This function, however, leads to diminishing returns as, if iNX  
increases, the benefits of X  are spread thinner.  The way out of that is to see that the term 
1N ?? , by spreading intermediates over a more final goods, performs a sort of technological 
progress role.  As long as N  increases for a given X , diminishing returns are avoided, and 
endogenous growth in engendered.   
 The inventors have to assess that the net present value of the profits of an invention 
justifies the cost of the invention.  They also have to find the optimal price for the new goods 
that they will sell to the producers of final output.  The cost of invention is, in this model, ?  
units of output Y .  This suggests a potential problem for long-term growth in this context.  If we 
think of the ability to invent new ideas becoming more difficult as the world proliferates with 
goods, then ( )N?  (that is, the cost of invention is a function of the number of goods) would 
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suggest that ( ) 0N?? ? .  If the net present value of the profits is denoted at ( )V t  , then at 
some point if ( )V t ??  (which says that since the net present value is less than the cost), no 
resources would be devoted to inventing.   From that point forward, the number of goods, N  
would remain constant.  This would lead to diminishing returns and eventually zero growth.  The 
typical presentation of this model has a statement that excludes this outcome with a non-
mathematical disclaimer in which only the outcome with positive R&D is considered (see, for 
example, Barro and Martin, 2004, p. 294).  Perhaps this is also true because if ( ) 0N?? ? , then 
the interest rate, ( ) ( / )r t ? ?? , also goes to zero, and this is anathema to the endless growth 
assumption.   
 The third party in this model is the households who maximize utility over an infinite 










?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? . (2.61) 
Population growth is assumed to be zero.  Since the growth rate of consumption is 
 / (1/ ) ( )C C r? ?? ? ?? ,  (2.62) 
  
then if interest rates go to zero, the growth rate of consumption also goes to zero.  By the way, 
as interest rates fall, then, although not explicitly modeled in the math, we can imagine that the 
household preference parameters ?  and ?  would increase as households save less; this would 
accelerate the transition to zero growth.  This effect and the effect of an increasing ?  can be 
seen in the solution for the growth rate: 
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1/(1 ) 2/(1 )1(1/ ) ( / )L A ? ??? ? ? ? ??
? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? .
 (2.63) 
Extensions of this model by Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (1998), and  Jones (1999)allow 
for ( ) 0N?? ? .  The solutions yield a saddle-path stability trajectory that yields only long-run 
growth if L  grows at the rate of population growth.  These extensions find that non-zero long- 
run per capita output growth requires endless population growth, and that is impossible.  The 
only way out of a zero growth outcome is if the cost of invention declines forever.  Romer (1990) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991) followed this path by assuming that the cost of invention 
declined over time as more ideas were accumulated.  Data from the United States does not bear 
this out as shown below.51   
 
Figure 69.  Real total R&D expenditures in the US (National Science Foundation, 2007). 
Figure 68 (NSF, 2007) shows that total R&D spending, in real dollars, has been increasing 
at a steady rate.  If Romer’s assumption is correct, productivity should be rising at a faster rate.  
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But as the chart below (NSF, 2007 and Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008) shows, there appears to 
be no increasing return to R&D investment. 
 
Figure 70.  Change in R&D spending and net total multifactor productivity (NSF, 2007, and BLS, 
2008). 
Ha and Howitt (2007) confirm that there is no upward trend in productivity growth 
against a variety of measures of R&D investment.  It would appear that the pessimistic forecast 
for zero growth has been excluded from this growth model framework’s long-run by nothing 
other than psychological denial. 
 Some researchers understood this and found that rather than seeing a future with an 
inevitable finite number of goods , they would envision and model a future in which the quality 
of existing goods were continuously improved upon (beginning with Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  
In this framework there is a process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1934) by which, 





































































This contrasts with the previous model’s discussion in that the inventors of improved things now 
will eliminate the perpetual profits of the inventors of old things (that were a part of the 
production of an endless accumulation of goods in the previous model).  As in the last model, 
there are three sectors: producers, inventors (R&D firms), and consumers.   
Inventors invest resources to engage in research to develop improvements in quality.  
They essentially face a world in which the number of unique goods has reached a growth limit 
and are now only concerned with making “new” goods by replacing old goods with better 
versions.  We have taken a look at some data on trademarks and a short term projection of the 
growth in trademarks in Figure 68.  The series that identifies “renewed” trademarks is flat versus 
the total stock series, suggesting that the current system is supported to a great degree by 
creative destruction.  But there is also a continued proliferation of what might be called quality 
differentiated goods.   (There is certainly a connection here to consumerism, but that is another 
story.)   However, as will be argued below, there is a consideration regarding both the degree of 
differentiation and quality leap of the relative “improvement.”  
Inventors do not know how long they will have monopoly rights on their ideas so that 
the calculation of the net present value of the returns on their investments has uncertainty.  The 
details of deriving the model that will be used as a foundation for discussion can be reviewed in 
Aghion and Hewitt (1992).   
The assumptions used on the path to finding the model’s predictions that are relevant 
to this discussion concern how the uncertainty is assumed to play out and the degree to which 
an improvement changes quality.  Both of these considerations appear in the equation for 
expected net present value of the return on the inventor’s investment: 
 
/(1 )[ ( )] / [ ( )]jj jE V g q r p
? ? ?? ??? ? ?  (2.64) 
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where 1/(1 ) 2/(1 )
1g A L? ?? ??
? ??? ?? ? ?? ?? ?  , 







? ? ? ?
?
? ?? , ?  plays its usual role 
as a determinate of factor intensity, j?  is the R&D firm in sector j , and q  is the improvement 
in quality.  ( )jp ?  is the probability per unit of time that there will be a successful innovation 
(better than what exists) by the inventor in sector j .  Note that g  says that there is some flow 
of value that is constant with a given population L  (that is when there is no innovation).  
( ) ( ) ( )j j jP q Z k? ? ? ?  where P  is the same across all sectors and is a function of quality, and 
( )jZ k  is the cost (defined more fully below) of innovation.   As generally modeled, the duration 
of the monopoly profits is based on the probability of a successful research effort; that is 
assumed to be generated from a Poisson process.  (Of course, for a sufficiently large number of 
occurrences the Poisson distribution becomes a normal distribution.)  The random process is a 
function of R&D effort in the particular sector j .  To avoid diminishing returns in that process, it 
is assumed that the probability of success is proportional to the investment in R&D and is not 
negatively related to the level of quality.   (That is, there is a linear reward for investment even 
as quality improves that is symmetrical around the probability distribution.)   There are two 
fallacies embedded in that assumption.   
 First, recent data suggests that the cost of innovation is increasing, and second, the 
distribution is not normal.  The following charts52 with data from a cross section of 14 key US 
sectors illustrate the first problem with the assumptions.  Figure 71 below shows the aggregate 
ratio of R&D spending to output (both in real 2004 dollars and normalized to an index) with a 
                                                             
52 Data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis/National Science Foundation 2007 Research and Development 
Satellite Account, Tables 5.2 and 7.1a, Sept. 28, 2007.  Industries selected are from North American Industry 
Classification System codes 325, 3254, 3251-53, 3255-56, 3259,334, 3341, 3342, 3344, 3343, 3346, 336, 3361-63, 
3364, 3365-66, 3369, 5112, 5415, and 5417. 
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simple ARIMA time-series forecast 10 years forward (1987 is indexed to 1.0 or 100 in the 
following charts).   
 
Figure 71.  Ratio of R&D to output.  (See Footnote 48 for sources.) 
Since many of the foundations of Schumpeterian growth models were developed in the 
1990’s, one can see how the data for the US supports a linear relationship assumption.  But 
there is break point (confirmed with a Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test) in 1996.  Looking at a 
few specific sectors in Figure 72 below, the divergence is clearly illustrated.   Chemical 
manufacturing is near the median, communications is the maximum extreme, and software is at 
the minimum extreme.   Note that the median sector in Figure 72 below, in 2004, invested 
almost 6 times in real dollars in research (compared to 1987) for an output that was about 
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Figure 72.  R&D and output for three specific sectors.   (See Footnote 48 for sources.) 
The data suggests that the assumption of a one-to-one relationship is incorrect since the 
breakpoint in 1996.   
The following charts, which show data for the R&D to output ratios overlaid with a best 
fit probability distribution (based on the minimum Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic tested on a full 
menu of probability distributions), test the assumption of normality in the random 
characteristics of ( )jp ? , the probability of a successful innovation.  If the assumption is correct, 
















Figure 73.  Probability distribution of R&D to output data – 1987 to 1996.  (See Footnote 48 for 
sources.) 
Figure 73 shows that the decade to 1996 had a normal distribution, and the mean and median 
are close. Skewness is very small.   Of more interest is the proportion of ratios that are less than 
one.  80.0% of the data showed a net positive relationship between the growth of R&D and the 
growth of output (that is, a given growth in R&D generated a larger growth in output, a ratio of 
less than one). 
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Figure 74.   Probability distribution of R&D to output data – 1997 to 2004.  (See Footnote 48 for 
sources.) 
Figure 74, showing the data since the breakpoint, however, shows that the distribution is 
anything but normal.53  The data since the breakpoint suggests that there is an increased risk to 
the payoff of an investment with an almost exactly reversed (totally coincidental!) proportion of 
ratios now showing a net negative relationship between the change in R&D and output.   (That 
is, a greater change in R&D is needed for a given change in output, a ratio greater than one).   
The large skewness illustrates the increased need to pump R&D into the production function to 
keep output growing.  The typical role for standard deviation in financial applications is as a 
measure of risk.  In this case, the uncertainty of a positive result has increased by about 8 times.  
                                                            
53 The best fit is a type V Pearson distribution with a density function of .
This density function best fits data with a large skewness.
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This increased risk, along with the other contradictions outlined above, in the context of an R&D 
investment choice based on (2.64), has consequences. 
 Clearly the probability of success for an innovator is related to the R&D expenditure.  So 
what happens in endogenous growth models that relay on innovation if the risk of innovation is 
increasing over time and the marginal benefit is decreasing?   In other words, suppose that an 
increasing expenditure in R&D is required to maintain a constant growth rate.  And suppose that 
that condition is overlaid with a market in which the required rate of return for increasing risk 
should be increasing.    
Following the typical evolution of this model class (but with variations based on the 
insights above), if the aggregate flow of resources in sector j  by a potential inventor for the 
purpose of increasing the quality, q  of a good from j?  to 1j? ?  is denoted by ( )jZ ?  , then 
the probability of success for the inventor would be 










? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?
  is the cost is a function that embodies the relationship 
between the level of quality for that good in that sector and the cost of innovation, and ?  is a 
measure of the variance in success as quality increases.  0 1?? ?  scales the cost effect.  Since 
both terms in ( )j? ?  are decreasing with improvements in quality over time, the only way that 
( )jp ?  can remain constant or increase is for ( )jZ ?  to grow at an increasing rate (just as we 
have seen in the data above).  But as q  increases, ( ) 0j? ? ?  , and thus  ( ) 0jp ? ? .  The 
marginal increase in quality, ?  , becomes insufficient to support profits.   That is, the price 
increase is insufficient to offset the cost increase, i.e., / 0q?? ? ? , and diminishing returns set 
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in.  The economy will have no escape from the diminishing returns to scale modeled in prior 
models.  As the probability of success falls, a feedback loop accelerates the convergence to zero.  
So rather than an asymptotical convergence, this extension of the model suggests a crash to 






? ? ? ?
?
? ?? .  By simply 
discarding the assumptions that mandate positive growth forever and injecting currently 
observed reality into the model, we have again thrust a death blow to the heart of capitalism 
with profits and interest rates crashing to zero in the long-run.   
This can be illustrated by a derivation of the system’s dynamics which shows aggregate 
quality and consumption growth rates loci, /Q Q?   /C C? .  Since consumption growth and 
overall growth are the same, this analysis shows the growth rate of the economy.  Following the 
usual mathematics (and using the specification for the households’ consumption smoothing 
used earlier in this chapter), we can see that / (1/ ) ( )C C r? ?? ? ??  (at zero population 
growth).  Aggregate quality is the sum of all of the sector’s q ’s and is thus 
/(1 )( ) ( 1)QE p k q
Q
? ??? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
?
.  Solving for the intercepts and slopes yields the following: 
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Figure 75.  CC and QQ locus for endogenous growth with innovation. 
As q  increases, the slope of the /Q Q?  locus gets more negative.  In the story told by this model 
in the literature, the increase in the intercept is at least large enough that the growth rate (and 
interest rate) does not decline from the decreasing slope.  This is assured by the assumption 
that the marginal return on investment in innovation is greater than one and that profits do not 
fall.  But as we have just shown, if those assumptions are altered to allow the model to reflect 
an increasing cost to maintain growth, then as q  increases, 0? ? , and both the slope and 
intercept in figure 75 take the equilibrium growth rate of the economy to zero. 
 We have almost concluded our deconstruction of growth models.  The rest of the 
extensions in the literature focus not on the determinates of fundamental growth but on the 
ways in which the benefits of invention diffuse or labor migrates.  Starting with Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) to Krugman (1979) and extending more detailed investigations of assumptions in 
Aghion, et al. (2001) and Acemoglu et. al. (2004), the general outcomes of the foundational 
models are not challenged vis-à-vis long-run optimism for continued growth (and also 
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convergence between leading and following economies toward a flat world, a conclusion that 
we have refuted earlier in this chapter as counter to the underlying motivations of capitalism’s 
quest to maximize return on investment).  The details of the diffusion models, such as 
agglomeration, intellectual property, communication, supply chain integration, fertility choice, 
government intervention, and labor/leisure choice only change the conclusions about 
convergence.  Still lurking at the foundations of these investigations are the assumptions that 
lead to endless growth.  Therefore, we will not review the details of these models. 
  Certainly there is a large and credible literature advocating for limits to growth, but that 
literature typically relies on ecological arguments (which to this writer make exceptionally good 
sense).  But, as we have shown with increasing rigor, the mainstream economics literature, 
when it sees a potential pathway to zero growth, assumes parameters or specifications that 
exclude that possibility.  Some of the more recent literature (see Ponzi, Yasutom,and Kaneko, 
2003, and Gomes, 2006, for examples) find pathways to instability and chaos from within the 
mainstream models.  But they, like this chapter, have removed the blinders that have hidden 
the scary stories that, if told, will reveal the Ponzi pyramid that props up capitalism. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed growth theory from the simple models that relied on 
exogenous parameters developed more than a half a century ago to the most recent 
endogenous growth models.  Interestingly, all of the models, including the endogenous models, 
use parameters that have assumed (and usually fixed) roles to play.  In the pages above we have  
focused on how assumptions that are made in the name of making models supposedly 
congruent with the so-called stylized facts of economic growth (and also mathematically stable) 
are often very much ad-hoc or, worse, fly in the face of recent data. 
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 We have demonstrated from a common sense perspective the fallacy of endless growth 
by extending the logic of the diminishing marginal utility to increasing consumption per capita to 
its limit.  We have also shown theoretically that the underlying “engine” of capitalism contains 
contradictions with respect to convergence and have demonstrated that the data reveals trends 
that support our analysis.  This troubling prediction connects with Chapter One’s story regarding 
the dangers of unequal growth and also connects with our extension in this chapter of the 
growth models in such a way as to test for chaotic outcomes.   But we have also rolled up our 
sleeves and shown that the mathematics, when decoupled from the restrictions of parameter 
and model specification assumptions that have no grounding in empirical trends, yield outcomes 
that prove our thesis for a future of zero growth.   
 That conclusion cannot be avoided.  If our developed civilization can survive every 
challenge that it faces,54  the challenge that will be left will be the transition from capitalism into 
some post-capitalistic world.  What that world will look like and the full story of that transition 
will be part of the subject of the work that will extend this project into a fuller exploration of the 
futures that lie ahead and how to get there.  But that work is not a part of this paper.  What is a 
part of this paper is the material in Chapter Three that will provide clues for the navigational 
challenges ahead.   
 This last part of this document uses the models and the relationships that have been 
worked out so far to construct a computer simulation.  That simulation will show how the 
current path has no happy ending unless critical assumptions that we now regard as axiomatic 
are altered.  But in no way will the future be what we think it will be.
                                                             
54 This is a huge “if,” considering the ecological by-products of global development, the competition for 
finite primary inputs, the propensity for violence at a scale that has the potential to distort the future into 
something we cannot imagine, the general growth in complexity in every system we can define that has 





WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, HOW WE GOT HERE, AND WHERE WE MIGHT GO 
“There is no bound to the prolific nature of plants or animals but what is made by their 
crowding and interfering with each other’s means of subsistence”  Thomas Malthus, An 
Essay on the Principles of Population, 1798, p. 152. 
 
“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”  Yogi Berra. 
 
“Linearity is a trap.  The behavior of linear equations – like that of choirboys – is far from 
typical.  But if you decide that only linear equations are worth thinking about, self-
censorship sets in.  Your textbooks fill with triumphs of linear analysis, its failure buried 
so deep that the graves go unmarked and the existence of the graves goes unremarked.  
As the 18th century believed in a clockwork world, so did the 20th in a linear one”  
(Steward, 1989, p. 83). 
 
“And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things.  Because the innovator has for enemies all those 
who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may 
do well under the new.  This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have 
the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who not readily believe in 
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new things until have had a long experience of them.  Thus it happens that whenever 
those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack, they do it like a partisan, whist the 
others defend lukewarmly” (Machiavelli, 1515, p. 27).  
Introduction 
Can we keep doing what we are doing and keep getting what we got?  The answer 
depends on whom you ask.   
The limits-to-growth literature shows how the human footprint is squashing the 
ecosystem.   “Finitude, entropy, and complex ecological interdependence… combine to provide 
the biophysical limits to growth” (Daly, 1991, p 114).  Finite resources have combined with the 
second law of thermodynamics, and thus depletion and pollution are disordering the natural 
feedback loops that have sustained this planet until now.  From that literature and its simulation 
modeling we can see that if we keep doing what we have done, the future will definitely not be 
what we want it to be.  The relationships between the economy and the world environment in 
models such as the seminal World Model developed by Meadows and other simulation models 
that followed55  explicitly tell a story in which the economy, in conjunction with natural resource 
limits and energy constraints, crashes. 
Much of the mainstream economics literature, as we have shown, is strangely devoid of 
concerns regarding limits to growth.  In general, logic that leads to uncomfortable conclusions 
regarding the future is shunted or is nudged back onto a nice saddle path to a well defined 
outcome that fits into the paradigm of endless growth.   
                                                             
55 See Meadows, 2004, for the most recent update to the 1972 World Model. Also see Nordhaus, 1991; 
Fiddaman, 1996, 1997, 1998; Gerhagh and van de Zwaan, 2003; Manne and Richels, 2004; Warr and 
Ayers, 2002, 2006; and Ayers and Warr, 2005.
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We have shown in a progression of models in the previous chapter that limits do exist if 
the logic is liberated from the axioms that permeate the foundations of thought.  We also 
showed in Chapter One that the logical outcomes of unequal growth can introduce destabilizing 
feedbacks.  This was incorporated into a growth model in Chapter Two, and chaos followed.  But 
all of the models and simulations that have preceded this chapter have more or less stood in 
isolation to each other.  Furthermore, the forecasts were based on exogenously modifying key 
parameters such as the rate of technological progress, the factor intensities, or shares of the 
rich and poor as time passed.  
This chapter will unify what we have discovered into a single simulation in which there 
are no exogenous inputs.  The model that follows builds upon the complex systems models 
noted in the footnote above.  In particular, we use the variation on the neoclassical production 
function that Reiner Kummel pioneered.56  The integration of the components of neoclassical 
theory, the insight from the thermodynamic interpretation of economic activity, the non-
productive demand for guard labor, and natural constraint of the limits to labor (population) are 
at the heart of what follows.   Although the model needs to explicitly consider energy use (and 
waste) in the production function, we decouple ourselves from any limits to energy sources or 
concerns with ecological imbalances.  The purpose of this research is to look forward into the 
world that would be ours if there were no ecological constraints–a world, if we could keep doing 
what we have done, with endless growth. 
The experiments that follow the description of the simulation will evaluate the 
prospects for our future.  After the end of endless growth perhaps there is one. 
                                                             
56 See Kummel, 1989, and Lindenberger and Kummel, 2002.
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The Background for the Model 
At the heart of the model is output.  That is, after all, what we do.  We combine 
materials, knowledge, labor, and energy to make stuff.  The stuff is “worth” more than the sum 
of the cost of the individual parts; thus we have capitalism.  As we have seen, along with 
capitalism has come, in the aggregate, a dramatic increase in the standards of living.  How to 
explain this within a simulation requires that we first can credibly replicate empirical data before 
we can credibly forecast the future.   
 Therefore we need to specify a core set of relationships that explain the inputs to 
output so that simply normalizing the beginning of time to one we can generate a history that 
matches what really happened.  The real challenge is to avoid any assumptions in the 
production relationship or to rely on macroeconomic time series data to drive the model.  Of 
course empirical data needs to be used to calibrate the model, but, in the end, the model must 
generate history without assumptions.  We use data from the US since it is fairly complete and 
accurate back to 1900.   
 The choice of a production function specification can be limiting or liberating.  As we 
reviewed in Chapter Two, liberation has not been typical in the development of growth theory.  
Indeed, combining capital and labor have long been seen as the source of growth.  Ever since 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, the notion of equilibrium and markets clearing has guided thought.  
Since Walras’s competitive equilibrium postulate was proven by Arrow and Debreu (1954), 
mainstream theory has assumed that the real economy is at or near equilibrium.   But even prior 
to the 1950s, that assumption underpinned the mathematics.  The Harrod model (1939), which 
gave capital a premier role in development and was influential in policy in the post-World War II 
era, did not withstand empirical scrutiny.  Then Solow and Swan, whose model we have looked 
at carefully in Chapter Two, introduced the aggregate production function which relies on 
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capital stock to combine with labor and create output.  There was still a problem with matching 
the data on per capita growth to the theory, and the substantial Solow residual became 
technological progress.    
 The explanation of technological progress is the goal of the theory that we 
deconstructed in the second half of Chapter Two.  However, “the so-called Solow residual 
(technological progress) remains to be explained.  The neo-classical paradigm as articulated by 
Solow and others does not allow for ‘real’ material flows.  Production and consumption are 
abstractions, linked only by money flows, payments for labor, payments for products and 
service, savings and investment.  These abstract flows are governed only by equilibrium-seeking 
market forces (the invisible hand).  There is not a deep fundamental connection between the 
physical world and the economy” (Ayres and Warr, 2002, p. 3).  Even incorporating knowledge in 
the form of human capital, there is still the problem of explaining economic growth from a 
quantifiable measure of what that means.  As we saw in Chapter Two, R&D fails.   
The search for a production function specification for this simulation model needs to go 
outside of the limits of Cobb-Douglas forms and the linear assumptions that facilitate 
mathematical optimization.  These conventions are convenient for Hamiltonian systems 
modeled on classical dynamics but are not reflective of the growing understanding of the 
complex nonlinear world in which we operate. 
 If one looks at the history of growth, a potential candidate for a key role in explaining 
growth is the increasing energy flows used to achieve the substitution of machines for animals 
and people (machines that consume fossil fuel, we should note).  However, it is also important 
to account for the actual services that are performed by the energy.  That is, how efficiently is 
energy converted to useful work?  As we will see, that is the heart of technological progress.   
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The quantity used and the efficiency of the conversion of natural resources into output 
has changed over time.  This suggests a further shortcoming in the use of a production function 
with fixed factor intensities.  Although impossible to solve mathematically, time varying factor 
intensities can be built into a numerical simulation model.   
The empirical view of the data is in part based on a dataset developed by Ayres et.al. 
(2003). They compiled historical data on capital, labor, and total energy production and use 
from a variety of sources.  That dataset has been updated from where they left off (1998) to the 
present for this research.57  The data is in Appendix C.  The quantification of the energy 
produced and used in the economy allows us to work out the efficiency of the conversion to 
actual output (and also the waste produced in the process).  The increase in efficiency and 
decrease in waste per capita, it turns out, do a very good job of quantifying the mysterious 
technological progress part of explaining the history (and therefore the future) of growth.  In 
fact, it turns out that the problems of understanding the proliferation of goods, such as the 
endogenous growth models reviewed in Chapter Two, show as a foundation for sustained 
growth, are subsumed into the relationship between capital, labor, and resource flows if the 
functional form of the relationship is liberated from the Cobb-Douglas form and is instead 
determined from the data with no a priori assumptions.  In our quest to unmask the distortions 
that underlie the assumptions that create our expectations for the future, an entirely 
endogenously determined model is a good thing. 
To connect energy efficiency to technological progress requires some discussion.  It is 
straightforward to state that technological progress arises from improvement and invention.  
                                                             
57 See the appendix of Ayres et. al, 2003 and 2005, for details on the sources and methods.  In brief, the 
first step is to allocate energy inputs among various types of work.  For example, the uses of coal for 
locomotives and steam engines in the early part of the 20th century and then for electricity production and 
coke production, domestic heat, etc., must be allocated.  Then the conversion efficiencies for each source of 
energy over time are used to find work outputs. The aggregate of inputs to work outputs yields an aggregate 
thermodynamic efficiency of the conversion of natural resources (for example, oil) into useful work (for 
example, electricity).
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And it is uncontroversial to state that human capital is at the core of the process that leads to 
improvement and invention.   The motive for improvement and invention is the potential for a 
fall in unit cost and therefore an economic gain.  Investment is the cost of finding or sustaining a 
way to transform material, energy, and knowledge into forms that are closer to a goal of 
minimum cost.  The knowledge that is gained does have a cumulative effect, but, since 
knowledge is not homogenous (i.e., different sectors may require entirely different knowledge), 
technologies will have limits.  Some will expire as new technologies arise.  If minimizing unit cost 
is the goal and raw material costs are somewhat independent of knowledge (and in fact may rise 
with scarcity) the objective is to minimize the cost of adding value.  This means an efficient use 
of energy.  In other words, the economy is a system that converts materials and energy into 
output.  How energy is consumed is both a consequence of growth and a driver of growth, and, 
just as human and physical capital accumulates, so does the ability to convert natural resources 
into useful work in the production of economic activity.58   
“Technology can be considered as knowledge combined with the appropriate means to 
transform materials, carriers of energy, or types of information from less to more desirable 
forms” (Ayres, 1994, p. 6).  If we are to liberate ourselves from an exogenous assumption on the 
growth of productivity, technological progress needs to be measured directly rather than be 
derived as a residual.  We can measure by using the ratio of the useful work delivered divided by 
the primary natural resource supplies of energy.   
F. G Tyron (1927) noted that, “Anything as important in industrial life as power deserves 
more attention than it has yet received from economists.  The industrial position of a nation 
                                                             
58 The useful work is the service provided from the use of energy. The value of energy services is derived 
from a thermodynamic perspective.  It is the amount of actual work done in contrast to the potential work.  
The calculation is done using data on the consumption of coal, crude oil, natural gas, nuclear, wood, and 
other forms of energy versus the consumption by the end users of the refined energy, typically via 
combustion, into heat, electricity, and motive power.  The difference is waste created by inefficiency.  
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may be gauged by its use of power.  The great advance in material standards of life in the last 
century was made possible by an enormous increase in the consumption of energy, and the 
prospect of repeating the achievement in the next century turns perhaps more than on anything 
else on making energy cheaper and more abundant.  A theory of production that will really 
explain how wealth is produced must analyze the contribution of this element of energy 
(p.271).”  As we will see, he was correct.  Technological advances in the past century can be 
proxied (and therefore measured) by the improvements in the conversion of primary energy 
resources to output.   
Naturally one assumes that output is derived from capital and labor.  But if we are to 
use energy as an input to the production function (or more precisely, the work derived from the 
conversion of raw energy), are we able to assume that changes in energy consumption cause 
changes in economic growth?  Perhaps energy consumption is a consequence of economic 
growth.   Most of the literature is inconclusive.  For example, regarding the US, Kraft and Kraft 
(1978) responding to the oil shocks found evidence of unidirectional causality running from GDP 
growth to energy consumption.  But Stern (2000) found evidence running in the opposite 
direction.  Soytas and Sari (2006), in a study of the G-7 testing of the efficacy of pollution 
reduction through energy efficiency, found that it depended on the country. 
For this research, the data on GDP, capital, labor, and the value of useful work delivered 
(energy services) was subjected to a Granger causality test.  (A unit root test on the log 
transformed first differenced data found that the variables are order of integration one, I(1).) 
 
The Granger causality test output is as follows: 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
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Sample: 1900 2008  
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 ENERGY does not Granger Cause CAPITAL  107  5.93594* 0.0036 
 CAPITAL does not Granger Cause ENERGY  0.74273 0.4784 
 GDP does not Granger Cause CAPITAL  107  5.33551* 0.0063 
 CAPITAL does not Granger Cause GDP  1.03241 0.3598 
 LABOR does not Granger Cause CAPITAL  107  2.53352 0.0844 
 CAPITAL does not Granger Cause LABOR  3.29249 0.0411 
 GDP does not Granger Cause ENERGY  107  1.98053 0.1433 
 ENERGY does not Granger Cause GDP  5.37699* 0.0080 
 LABOR does not Granger Cause ENERGY  107  2.82483 0.0640 
 ENERGY does not Granger Cause LABOR  2.24293 0.1114 
 LABOR does not Granger Cause GDP  107  1.59234 0.2085 
 GDP does not Granger Cause LABOR  2.14926 0.1218 
 
The results are convincing for energy Granger-causing GDP and capital, and GDP 
Granger-causing capital.  (The null is rejected at  >99% in those cases.)  Labor is bi-directional 
with capital and energy services.  Therefore, the use of energy services as an input to the 
production function (and GDP for capital formation) appears valid. 
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The relationship between the values of end use energy to the raw energy put into the 
economy (that is, the efficiency of converting raw resources to useful work) is shown below with 
the actual data and a fitted line.  
 
Figure 76.  Technological efficiency of energy conversion to work. 
The chart shows that since 1900 the US has seen energy service per unit of raw input 
improved from 4.0% to 23.6% in 2007.  Less waste (higher efficiency) has led to the decline in 
the price of power delivered to the user, which has been the prime motivator for the 
substitution of machines for people and animals.  This feeds back to the cost of goods in general 
and the consumption of new products that rely on low cost power.  The chart also would appear 
to suggest that the bounty that has been derived from this technological progress is beginning 
to plateau.  This will be considered in more detail when experimenting with the simulation.  But 
it is worth noting that even if raw energy sources are unlimited, the technological efficiency of 

































































Technological Efficiency of Energy Conversion to Work
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conversion in the aggregate has limits.  The next chart shows the energy59 intensity of output 
(GDP) and shows the efficiency trend.  We have clearly become more efficient at creating output 
from a given amount of energy. 
 
 
Figure 77.   Energy Intensity of output. 
The Model’s Underpinning 
Following the logic above, we can envision a production process that combines capital 
and labor in the traditional sense but also consumes energy to produce the measured output of 
the economy.  As the calibrated simulation will show, the history of the past 100+ years is 
simulated accurately using these three inputs (actually four, as will be shown below).  The data  
                                                            
59 In thermodynamics, the “exergy” of a system is the maximum work possible during a process that brings 
the system into equilibrium.  Exergy is then the energy that is available to be used.  After the system and 
surroundings reach equilibrium, the exergy is zero.  In general, it is more correct to use this term when 
referring to the amount of energy that actually does work.  The term has become somewhat common in the 
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used in the simulation is based on the calculated aggregate energy services (in exajoules), labor 
(man-hours employed), and capital (accumulated investment less depreciation).60   
The production function is of the typical implicit form: ( , , )Y f K L U?  where Y  is 
output (GDP in $), K  is capital (the value of the stock of capital in $), and U  is the value of 
useful energy employed (energy services in exajoules). Normalizing each variable to the starting 
year of the time series so that 0/y Y Y?  etc., and differentiating the production function with 
respect to time, yields 
 
dy y dk y dl y du y
dt k dt l dt u dt t
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? .
 (3.1) 
Dividing by y  yields 
 
lnd y dk dl du
dt dt dt dt
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 (3.3) 
The marginal productivities (output elasticities) are functions of the log derivatives of their 
arguments.  Following a solution to this system by Kummell et. al. (2008), we can note that since 
capital, labor, and energy services (which are a result of technological improvement) represent 
                                                             
60 Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA tables, Economic Report of the President.
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all of the factors of production, then 1? ? ?? ? ? .  Since this is true, we can eliminate one of 
the three elasticities.  Eliminating ? , we have the partial differential equation 
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) 0k k l l u u? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  (the equation for ?  has the same structure).  
The coupling equation is ( / ) ( / )l k k k? ?? ? ? ? ? .  The solution of this system of partial 
differential equations requires knowledge of the boundary conditions for ?  and ?  in , ,k l u  
space.  The simplest solution that is non-constant can be found by assuming an asymptotic limit 
that is meaningful in reality.  The outcome derived in the 2008 paper referenced above was 











?? ?? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? .
 (3.4) 
The parameter a  weights the degree to which the ratios of labor to capital and technological 
progress to capital contribute to the productive power of capital.  The parameter b  scales the 
technological improvement that displaces labor.  Note that 0? ?  as u  and k  get large.  
Inserting (3.4) into (3.2) yields our production function: 
 exp 2 l u ly u a ab l
k u
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
 (3.5) 
This production function has only two parameters, which can be estimated from normalized 
empirical data using constrained optimization.   
 The role of communications (and thus information transfer) is also important to the 
growth of output.  The proportion of capital invested in information and communications 
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technology (ICT) has increased rapidly in the last half century.  The data contained in Jorgenson 
and Stiroh (2000) from 1959 to 1998 provided a basis for estimating the fraction of ICT versus 
total capital from 1900 to 2007.  The chart below shows this time series with the actual data in 
middle and the fitted line supplementing the data at each end.   
 
Figure 78. ICT as a fraction of total capital (using data from Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000).
The production function was calibrated without this input, and then the production 
function was modified to use this fourth factor of production.  The fit to the historical GDP was 
significantly improved for the later part of the last century by including this factor.  The factor is 




.  Inserting into (3.2) and solving the 
system we now have the production function 
 exp 2
ICTkc
kl l u ly u a ab l
u k u
? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? .
 (3.6) 





































































Information and Communication Technology as a Fraction of Total Capital
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Using this production function, we model the output of the economy as a materials 
production system, adding value from physical capital, ICT capital, labor, and the technological 
proxy, energy services.  The growth rate of ICT investment is also derived from the data.  
Calibration of the simulation also includes provisions for structural breakpoints. Those 
breakpoints and the other parameters are derived from a constrained nonlinear optimization 
process for fitting the historical data to (3.6).  There are a number of parameters that are 
estimated other than those for the production function with respect to the fitting the time 
series for labor, capital and energy.  All of these will be shown below. 
After the model is calibrated satisfactorily and we explore the base case, we will add the 
effects of a diverging rich and poor and the effects of social unrest. 
The Simulation Model 
The model is built with a systems dynamics approach using Vensim Professional.61  A 
very general schematic of the model’s structure is shown below.  Not shown in the schematic 
are the feedback loops from GDP growth to investment decisions and energy demand.  Those 
will be shown in more detail below. 




Figure 79.  Schematic of simulation model structure. 
The simulation model has three key input modules and one module containing the 
production function.  The three input modules determine physical capital, labor, and work from 
energy.  The determination of ICT capital is based on the growth rate estimated from historical 
data and is determined in the module that combines the three inputs.  All of the modules are 
interconnected.  The schematics for each of the modules follow as well as discussion of the 
optimized parameters and the fit between the empirical data and the simulated values.  In the 
schematics, the boxes are stocks or levels, the double arrows are flows, the single arrows move 
information or quantities, the words are variables, and the little clouds are the boundaries of 
the model (that is, the sources and sinks for the flows are assumed to be unbounded).  The 
terms in brackets are inputs from the other modules.  Wherever arrows originate or terminate, 
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there are mathematical relationships defined that combine the information, quantities, and 
parameters.  Some of the more trivial relationships are hidden. 
 
Figure 80.  Capital module. 
Capital 
The growth of physical capital is a proportion of the GDP determined by the savings 
rate, minus depreciation.  In fitting the data to the simulation, the simulated time series for net 
capital was optimized to the historical series by including a structural shift in both the savings 
rate and the depreciation rate.  (Note that all of the optimizations were done on the complete 
model, not just on each module independently.  Therefore all of the parameters in all modules 
were included in each optimization run.)  The optimization was tested with up to 5 breaks for 
savings and depreciation, and there was no significant improvement in the fit for more than one 
break.  SR1 is 1970 and DR1 is 1930.  The net savings rates are 8.096% before 1970 and 7.419% 
after.  The depreciation rates are 5.903% before 1930 and 10.644% after.  This model does not 
distinguish the source of the savings.  In order to fit the data, net savings (including perhaps net 




Figure 81.  Simulation versus empirical data for capital. 
As the figure above shows, the calibrated simulation for more than 100 years has a very 
good fit between the data (MacroEnergyData) and the simulation (Calibration).  The mean 
absolute percentage error (MAPE) is 3.59%. 
Labor 
The labor supply is pretty straightforward.  Later feedback will added to have the stock 
of labor stabilize.  This simple specification needs to have the parameters change several times 
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Time (Year)
Capital : MacroEnergyData6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 82.   Labor module. 
The growth rates of labor hours employed switched two times from the starting value of 
12.47% to 13.653% and then to 14.897% in 1965 and 2002.5 respectively.  The decay rates 
changed from the starting value of 10.886% to 10.967% and then to 12.297% in 1913.5 and 1940 































1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Labor  : CalibrationGDP4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Labor : MacroEnergyData2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Figure 83.  Simulation versus empirical data for labor. 
Energy Services 
The specification for the consumption of energy for work (energy service) is quite a bit 
more complex than that for capital and labor.  The general decline in intensity (that is, the more 
efficient use of energy resources) has been punctuated by several structural events.  The charts 
that follow show this history as a relationship between primary energy and capital, and primary 
energy and output. 
 














































































Primary Energy Intensity of Capital




Figure 85.   Primary energy intensity of output. 
There are several steps in the simulation of the production of useful work from primary 
energy resources.  The central goal of this module is both to fit the data on the proxy measure 
of the stock of technological knowledge and to model the growth of the stock of knowledge 
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Figure 86.  Schematic of energy module. 
The primary demand for energy is based on GDP.  The intensity by which that is applied 
to the production of energy has shown a steady decline, so the first portion of the module 
models that relationship.  The following chart shows the actual and simulated values for the 




Figure 87.  Simulation versus empirical data for energy intensity of output. 
The parameters that the constrained optimization determined will be reviewed after the full 
module is discussed.  This section of the model is as follows: 
 
Figure 88.  Production section of energy service module. 
The efficiency by which primary resources are converted to useful services depends on 
innovation.  The module models innovation as a process of invention and obsolescence.  
Technological improvements have continued to advance the efficiency of conversion, but as 
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1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Primary Energy Intensity of Output : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Primary Energy Intensity of Output : MacroEnergyData6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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efficiencies begin to move toward asymptotic limits, the marginal increase in the stock of 
conversion knowledge (incremental technology improvements) declines.  The intensity measure 
can never go beyond unity.   (Beyond unity would say that more useful work is derived from 
primary energy than it contains.)   Eventually, the technology for conversion will reach a steady 
state asymptotic to the limits of efficiency.   (As we will see, this comes into play for our future.)   
The fit between the actual data and simulated data has been optimized with the choice 
of the functional forms for the growth and decay rates of the stock of knowledge and the 
parameters within those forms that best calibrated the model to the historical data.  After some 
experimentation–and guidance from Arrow (1962), Felipe and Fisher (2003), and Kummell et. al. 
(2008)–the growth rate of the stock of knowledge is modeled as follows: 
11
exp( ( 1))invention indexgrowth T
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
.  The parameter inventiongrowth  is determined in the 
optimization and the technology index, indexT  is endogenously determined.  The technology 
index is the ratio of the current efficiency to the maximum efficiency (unity).  The “forgetting” 
(see Benkard, 2000) of the stock of knowledge is based on an exponential function on the 
technology index with three parameters, BindexA C T? ? .  The final specification was the result of 
experimentation to fit the growth history of efficiency to the simulated series.   
The motive for the specification is to replicate the growth of the stock of knowledge in 
terms of its value in the conversion of raw materials into useful work.  Thus, although the model 
uses energy as the measured variable, the model is really creating the value of the Solow 
residual endogenously.   
The results of the simulation compared to the actual data that are shown in the next 
chart suggest a far amount of success in modeling the growth of efficiency vis-à-vis energy.  A 
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few pages hence the value of the input of useful work into the production function is 
demonstrated. 
 
Figure 89.  Simulation versus empirical data for efficiency of energy conversion. 
The MAPE is 3.72%. The module design for this section is as follows: 
 
Figure 90.  Innovation section of the energy service module. 































1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion : MacroEnergyData6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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 The final part of the energy services module combines the efficiency of conversion with 
the production of primary energy to derive the delivered energy services.  The calibrated 
simulation values and the actual values for energy service are shown in the following chart. 
 
Figure 91.  Simulation versus empirical data for energy services. 































Energy Services : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 92.  Simulation versus empirical data for energy service intensity of output. 
The chart above shows a sort of energy services Kuznets curve based on the efficiency of 
the use of energy services to produce output.  The economy reached a turning point between 
1970 and 1980.  The first energy shock matches well with the turning point.  This relationship 
differs from that in Figure 87 (the primary energy intensity of output) because the economy is 
shifting from manufacturing to service industries.  The primary intensity fell steadily as more 
efficient manufacturing processes and prime movers were invented.  But that in turn caused 
industrialization to grow and that effect, in the first 3/4 of the century was more positive than 
the increase in efficiency was negative.  However, since the mid-1970s the value added in the US 
has been shifting from manufacturing to service (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2003).  That is, from 
capital that is highly energy intensive to capital that is less energy intensive. 
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1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Energy Service Intensity of Output : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Energy Service Intensity of Output : MacroEnergyData6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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The parameters for the energy services module are Loss Parameter A, -0.0203, Loss 
Parameter B, 3.01, Loss Parameter C, 23.9848, Decay Rate Past, 0.012, and Growth Past, 12.0.  
The full module is as follows: 
 
Figure 93.  Energy services module. 
The Production Function 
The final part of the model is for providing the inputs that have been derived above into the 





Figure 94. The production function module. 
 


























1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyData6 2 2 2 2 2 2
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The output of the model results in a mean absolute percentage error of 4.19%.  The 
primary sources of error are from the Great Depression through the WWII period.  The model is 
also accurate in simulating the monetary value of GDP in actual dollars (1992$).   
 
Figure 96.  Monetary value of output. 
 The Vensim code and the normalized economic data used in the simulation are in 
Appendix C. 
Simulating the Future 
 With the simulation well calibrated, we now look into the future.  The first simulation is 
“doing what you did gets you what you got.”  That is, there are no changes to the model other 
than to see where we will be in 2050 if nothing changes.  The simulation outputs still show the 
empirical data up to 2007. 
























1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Time (Year)
Monetary Value of Output : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 97.  Doing what we did until 2050 – GDP. 
We see that our old friend exponential growth is with us.  Recall that both measures 
were normalized to unity in 1900.  The GDP index rises from 27.36 in 2007 to 105.62 in 2050.  
That is nearly four times larger.  The labor hour index increases from 3.64 to 10.71.  The output 
per labor hour index increases from 7.52 to 9.86, reflecting the increased efficiency of 
converting capital and energy inputs to output.  Another way to view this is to look at labor 
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureNoChange 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 98.  Doing what you did to 2050 – labor intensity of output. 
The model shows a period of plateau that is a function of the last set of parameters 
used to work out the stock of labor.  The simulation does not capture the volatility of the Great 
Depression and the WW II rebound.  However, the curve fitted to the simulation rates shows 
that the overall effect is accurate.  But it is also clear that the final value for net labor growth 
may not reflect the future trend.   
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040
Time (Year)
Labor  Intensity of Output : FutureNoChange 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Labor  Intensity of Output : MacroEnergyData5 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Figure 99. Net labor growth rates.
Allowing the growth rate to vary randomly (normal distribution around the long term trend) 
beginning in 2002, we can see that labor intensity declines more or less monotonically. 
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This is a problem.  Labor intensity cannot go to zero or we have the condition that was 
discussed in Chapter Two: productivity increases to the point to where labor hours converge on 
zero.  As noted in Chapter Two, this leaves us with the absurd conclusion that either everyone 
works one second a day or only one person works (and that is just before labor intensity goes to 
zero).  And based on this simulation, we see this coming sooner than later.   
The model predicts several impossible outcomes if allowed to proceed to the point at 
which the system explodes (nearly infinite GDP).  Recall that this is the “doing what you did” 
scenario.  That is, we remain on the path that has carried us to today for the last 107 years.  If 
we do that, in 2080 very strange things happen.  Given that the growth rate of labor is stable, 
the labor intensity of output goes to 0.0034 (not much labor needed), and the exponential 
growth of normalized output takes it to 2,487 (from 26.71 in 2007).  Consumption per labor 
hour goes from 7.526 (that is 7.5 times higher than in 1900) in 2007 to 289.39; a 38.45-fold 
increase.  So whereas we have seen an increase in our standard of living by a factor of about 7.5 
in the last 107 years, we can expect to see about 5 times that (38.45 fold increase) in the next 70 




Figure 101.  Doing what you did until 2080 – energy services intensity of output. 
Perhaps most incredible is the energy service “Kuznets” curve shown above.  In effect, 
this says that infinite output is possible due to infinite efficiency.  It is obvious that this scenario 
cannot happen.  Sometime between 2083 and 2084 the model crashes.  For the simulation there 
are not enough decimal points in the floating point processor.   For reality, there is the 
impossibility of creating output with nearly zero energy services inputs. 
But, even though this analysis is not going to focus on carrying capacity problems, it is 
relevant to show that there is a problem with energy.  Though efficiency is extremely high in 
2083 (so that output can be made with infinitesimal energy services inputs) the exponential GDP 
growth curve is primary energy hungry as the growth rate of the economy is a few steps ahead 
of efficiency growth.  Note in the chart below that the scale is exponential. 





















1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 2038 2061 2084
Time (Year)
Energy Service Intensity of Output : FutureLaborTrend 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Energy Service Intensity of Output : MacroEnergyData6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Figure 102.  Doing what you did to 2080 – primary energy demand. 
In 2007 the US used 6.95 times more primary energy than in 1900.  In 2080 it will 
require 283.16 times more than in 1900.  That is a 40.74 times increase from 2007.  The usual 
limits-to-growth analysis would impose a finite limit on energy production as well as consider 
other by-products of growth to tell a story about exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet.  
A part of that story is about waste.  In our model so far, waste is created but, in this scenario, 
efficiency is increasing so that at the limit (2083 or so), there is no waste!  We again see that if 
the future is to be what is assumed in both economic theory and in the minds of business and 
political decision makers, there are outcomes that violate possibility. 
Suppose that there is a slower growth in technological improvement.  As the charts 
below show, a decline in the growth rate of technology brings challenging times.  If the labor 










































































primary energy conversion to energy services, then the economy enters a prolonged 
contraction.  The charts that follow show this scenario. 
 
Figure 103.   Future with lower technology growth but labor growing – conversion efficiency. 
 
Figure 104.  Future with lower technology growth but labor growing – GDP. 

























1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion : FutureProductivityStable 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1























1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureProductivityStable 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyData7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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 The good times erode as the labor intensity of output increases.  The growing 
population with less technological growth results in a return to a more labor intensive world. 
 
Figure 105.  Future with lower technology but labor growing – labor intensity of output. 
This scenario is a glimpse into an outcome modeled in Chapters One and Two in which 
there was growing inequality.  One can imagine the minority power elite fighting for control of 
the energy services that are increasingly scarce while the rest of the world gets increasingly 
excluded from benefits of growth (that is, as we have showed, until they revolt).  As the chart 
below shows, if the empirical data follows the forecast (and it is giving us a hint that it is), and if 
the models in Chapters One and Two regarding revolution and chaos are potentially correct, 
then as capitalism implodes, violence explodes. 




















1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Labor Intensity of Output : FutureProductivityStable 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 106.   Future with lower technology but labor growing – energy services per unit of labor. 
 In the calibrated model, the investment/depreciation rate is based on parameters that 
are derived from the historical data.  They do not vary in the future but are fixed at the levels 
that they were at the end of 2007.  In the output shown in the following charts, the model is 
altered so that the investment rate is a function of savings and that is a function of output per 
unit of labor.  Labor growth is also stabilized.62  The outcome is similar to that shown above but 
delayed (see the charts below, the first of which compares the two cases).  The stable stock of 
labor allows the growth of GDP to be more equally spread.  However, as time passes, capital 
intensity increases, and labor once again is marginalized.  Capital intensity increases because 
even though productivity growth is stable, the stock of primary energy is still growing, as is 
shown in the third chart, in a world of stable population.  
                                                             
62 For these simulations, labor hour growth trends to zero between 2008 and 2050.  The choice of when and 
how quickly labor hours change does not change the outcomes, only the timing of the outcomes. 

























1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Energy Services per Unit of Labor : FutureProductivityStable 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 107.  Future with lower technology and capital and labor stable – output per unit of labor. 
 
Figure 108.  Future with lower technology and capital and labor stable – comparing output per 
unit of labor and capital intensity. 





























1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Output per Unit of Labor : MacroEnergyData7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Output per Unit of Labor : FutureProductivityStable2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Output per Unit of Labor : FutureProductivityStable 3 3 3 3 3 3 3



































1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Years)
Output per Unit of Labor : FutureProductivityStable 1 1 1 1 1 1
Output per Unit of Labor : MacroEnergyData7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Capital Intensity of Output : FutureProductivityStable 3 3 3 3 3




Figure 109.  Future with lower technology and labor and capital stable –primary energy. 
 This scenario also results in a much deeper decline in aggregate output than that above 
in which only productivity growth slowed.  By 2100 the economy will have reached a level about 
the same as it was in 1973.   





















1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Primary Energy Aggregate Production : MacroEnergyData7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 110.  Future with lower technology and labor and capital stable – GDP. 
Output per capita does not show a very different story.  The following chart normalizes 
the actual and simulated output by the actual and predicted population.  That is, it shows output 
per capita.  The population growth in the past 100 years has been almost linear (0.9851 R-
squared), adding about 2.0878 million people per year.   That growth is carried out to about 
2050 (where labor hours stabilize in the simulations above), at which point the US population is 
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyData7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : FutureProductivityStable2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Figure 111.  Future with lower technology and labor and capital stable – GDP per capita.  
Since the key macroeconomic measures in the simulation are entirely endogenously 
determined (starting at “one” in 1900) the model shows what can be expected based on what 
has happened.  For example, as discussed earlier, the three parameters that drive the 
production function are determined from constrained optimization on the historical data.  Thus 
the production function is “hard wired” to expect that the dynamics of the production of labor, 
capital, and innovation through the improvements in energy efficiency (the key inputs to 
production) will remain, more or less, as they have been.  Based on our simulations, in which the 
key parameters of the production function are held constant, several unsettling conclusions 
arise.  In trying to avoid the impossibility of exponential growth (and the accompanying 
impossibility of perfect efficiency), it seems that no matter how the future is altered, the 
prediction is for a prolonged decline to aggregate output levels that are near or below current 
levels.  These declines would be expected to also engender increasing conflict for increasingly 
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Inequality and Social Unrest 
Continuing, for now, to use history as a guide to the future, we will explore the potential 
for social unrest.  As we showed in Chapter One, as the ability to consume is more highly 
concentrated, the likelihood of social unrest grows.  Furthermore, recall that the tipping point 
for revolution was a function of a growing gap in real consumption per capita, the amount of 
guard labor/capital, and the ability of the poor to communicate.  The improving ability to 
communicate is shown in the simulation as the fraction capital that goes into information and 
communication technology; that is a direct input into the production function.  If we assume 
that the rich will do what it takes to maintain income levels associated with the peak output per 
unit of labor, then all we need to do is add the rich’s response to growing unrest to the 
simulation in order to see what happens to the economy as the poor get poorer and rich build 
bigger fences with bigger armies.  As in Chapter Two, the use of guard capital will be input into 
the production function as a negative effect on investment’s contribution to capital growth.  
That is, a choice is being made to invest in a bigger army rather than in the machinery of 
production. The parameter a  in the production function is thus separated so that the effect can 
be isolated on capital’s role in production:  
 1 2exp 2
l u ly u a a b l
k u
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? .
 (3.7) 
As the output per unit of labor falls, the rich apply more investment into the armies.  This shows 
up in the production function as parameter 1a  which weights the degree to which the ratio of 
labor to capital contributes to the productive power of capital.  
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Using the beginning in 2015 as the high water mark, the need to sidetrack investment 
into non-productive uses grows every year as the rich attempt to maintain that level of 
consumption as the aggregate average level of consumption falls.  In the simulation, the rich are 
unwilling to take any decline in per capita income; thus the need for guard labor and capital 
grows very quickly.  As the chart below shows and as was shown in Chapter Two, the system 
eventually becomes chaotic.  In the chart below, which shows the relationship between GDP 
and the same variable one time period back, there is a period in which GDP for the next period 
is well predicted by GDP in the prior period (the dots that connect into a straight line).  This 
period is 1900 to about 2016. The effects of lost physical capital investment cause the “hook” in 
the trend as the lagged values predict a decline.   After 2031 the relationship between GDP in 
the current period and the next appears to be random.  But there are no random inputs to this 
model.   
 
Figure 112.  When guard labor/capital goes too far. 
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 Another way to show how this can occur is to isolate how the investment in capital and 
the use of guard labor and capital works inside the production function.  Capital is a function of 
investment.  Thus we can show63 that the capital formation process is 
 1 ( )t c t c t t
t
K G
K G K K
K I
? ??? ? ? ? ? ?? . (3.8) 
 This simplified version of the simulation model will not show any growth since the function is in 
steady state for “normal” levels of guard capital investment and it does not have feedback from 
any production function.  The chart below shows that for low ratios of c
G
I
 , capital from the last 
period predicts capital for the current period.   (It is a very simple map of one point.) 
                                                             
63 Let output be a generalized function of capital, the technology for conversion, and the cost of guard 
capital.   (The productive labor input is held constant at unity for simplicity, but that does not change the 
results as long as guard labor grows more rapidly than productive labor, as it will if investment in guard 
capital is increasing.)  Then ( )c
yy K G K
u
? ??? ? ?? where ? and ? are from equation (3.3).  Note that  
? and ? are dynamic under growth conditions but do not change with no growth.  1cG ? is the cost of 
guard capital, and ( )cG K? measures the negative effect of guard capital. Since the value of the effect of 




? is a function of investment  I , then we can 
write 1 ( )t c t c t t
t
K G
K G K K
K I
? ??? ? ? ? ? ?? .
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Figure 113. Capital formation with simplified production function – “normal” guard to physical 
capital ratio. 
As the ratio increases, the dynamics change.  At a ratio of 3.0 the system shows a 
dampening oscillation that still shows a predictive outcome.  The next chart shows that a 
pattern of dampening oscillations are the result of a period doubling event and that they 
converge from the initial conditions to two points as the oscillations eventually reach a constant 
amplitude. 
  












Figure 114.  Capital formation with simplified production function – higher guard to physical 
capital ratio. 
Finally, if the ratio gets beyond 3.57 in this specification, the system shows no tendency 
to converge on two, four, eight, or any specific predictable set of oscillation peaks and valleys.   
 
Figure 115.  Capital formation with simplified production function – chaos. 
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Since this simplified model does not have growth, the attractor in Figure 112 is well 
defined.  In Figure 115 the attractor shows the effects of increasingly large (but seemingly 
random) oscillations.  In fact, the scenario that produced Figure 115 explodes in the year 2234 
after one absurd excursion from a GDP of 8.520 in the year 2223 to 82,107 in the year 2224 (yes, 
in one year).  The chart of GDP for that scenario is below.  The scale is so distorted that the 
seemingly random oscillations that precede that date are mostly hidden.   
 
Figure 116.  When guard labor/capital goes too far – time series of GDP. 
 What we see therefore is that an increasingly costly diversion of investment from 
physical capital to guard capital (and therefore labor) can buy the minority rich some time.  But 
the consequences are an unavoidable, sudden, and rapid lost of stability (again, both in the 
mathematical and social meanings of the word).  We did not simulate the outcome of an 
insufficiency of guard capital (and thus certain revolution).  However, as was shown in Chapter 







1900 1937 1974 2011 2048 2085 2122 2159 2196 2233
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureGuardLabor
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyData7
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the economy as a result of the revolt.  The purpose of this scenario is to illustrate the dead-
endedness of “doing what you did.”  
Finding a Path to a Stable Future 
In this last section, we will see if there is a way forward that does not end a future in 
which we regress to output per person levels seen in the mid to early 1900s, or into chaos.  The 
tactic is straightforward.  We take the original simulation conditions that showed infinite output 
and perform constrained optimization on an idealized future path for GDP.  The result is to “re-
hardwire” the production function by altering its and other parameters with the objective of a 
sustainable future in terms of output per unit of labor.  
 The choice of an objective is entirely arbitrary.  The following chart shows the objective 
as a level of GDP about 100 times greater than in 1900 and about 3.71 times greater than in 
2008. 

















































































 Constrained optimization on the production function parameters could only fit a portion 
of the ideal path.  The following chart shows that very quickly the simulation begins an 
exponential growth pattern that leads to a floating point error in mid-century.  
 
Figure 118.  Looking for a future – the limits of the production function. 




















1900 1944 1988 2032 2076 2120 2164 2208
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureOptimizedStableGrowth 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 119.  Looking for a future – the limits of the production function again. 
Letting capital, labor, and energy intensity growth continue as they have for the past 
107 years, the inability of the production function to follow any path that is not exponential or 
crash, and the sensitivity to small changes, leads to two conclusions:  1. if capital and labor and 
energy services continue on paths as they have, the production function is invalid for a 
sustainable future; 2. stable outcomes in the future with this production function will become 
increasingly less likely.  It is as if the knife edge on the saddle path is getting thinner until there is 
no edge, and we have to fall off.   
Recall that the specification for the parameters in the production function and the other 
relationships in the model are empirically determined from the data over the past 107 years.  In 
other words, although the simulation model is built from data with no assumptions regarding a 
theoretical economic growth model, embedded in the data are the patterns that built the 20th 





















1900 1944 1988 2032 2076 2120 2164 2208
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureOptimizedStableGrowth3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyDataFuture 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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axiomatic assumptions that govern economic (and policy) decision making.  So just as in Chapter 
Two, we have discovered that expectations for the future, based on what we think is the normal 
course, are unjustified.   
Can new relationships be imposed on the model that can lead to a reasonable outcome? 
Next the optimization was extended to the investment (savings) and depreciation 
parameters, the growth and decay rates of the labor supply, and the parameters controlling 
innovation (the efficiency of the conversion of primary energy to energy services).  The 
simulation results are illustrated in the following chart. 
  
Figure 120.  Looking for a future – the limits of the model. 
The optimized capital, labor, and the growth and decay of innovation lead to a 
simulation that follows the ideal path farther along until 2096, and then it collapses.  The 
parameter changes lead to very interesting outcomes vis-à-vis the foundations of capitalism.  In 
order to ride the ideal path for another 45 years from the previous specification, the aggregate 

























1900 1944 1988 2032 2076 2120 2164 2208
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureOptimizedStableGrowth5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyDataFuture 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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then the other must fall.  Meanwhile, innovation continues unabated; that is how the economy 
continues to grow. 
 
Figure 121.  Looking for a future – innovation continues. 
 What throws the economy off the path is an increasing sensitivity to very small changes 
in the continued growth in the ability to get useful work out of primary energy.  As the chart 
below shows, the model continues to extract more and more useful work out of a given quantity 
of primary energy.  This is sensible to a point, but eventually the marginal increase in useful 
work is insufficient to power growth. The second chart shows the decline in the marginal 
productivity of energy services.64 
                                                             
64 Calculated from (3.4c) as 1 ( ) ( ) ( ))l u l la a b
k u k
? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?  .
 






















1900 1944 1988 2032 2076 2120 2164 2208
Time (Year)
Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion : FutureOptimizedStableGrowth1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 122.  Looking for a future – the limits to efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 123.  Looking for a Future – the decline in the marginal productivity of energy services. 
The solution to this simulation challenge lies in maintaining the marginal productivity of 
energy services.  So, although there are no limits to the accumulated stock of energy used (that 
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Primary Energy Intensity of Output : MacroEnergyDataFuture 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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is, no limits to growth from finite resources) in this simulation, limits on the amount of useful 
work that can be extracted from that primary energy are necessary.  By shifting the decay rate 
of primary energy intensity so that there is a higher limit to the primary energy intensity of 
output, we have the following outcome: 
 


























1900 1944 1988 2032 2076 2120 2164 2208
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : FutureOptimizedStableGrowthComplete 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




Figure 125.  Looking for a future – stable long-run growth – marginal productivity of energy 
services. 
We can also compare this scenario to Figure 111 in which output per capita peaked and 
declined.  As the chart below shows, the need for guard capital is mitigated. 
 
Figure 126.  Looking for a future – stable long-run growth – sustained per unit of labor output. 
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Output per Unit of Labor : FutureOptimizedStableGrowth5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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 This scenario (which is following an entirely arbitrarily chosen path to zero growth so 
that the timing of the transition and the magnitude of the goal could be quite different) shows 
that there is a possible way forward even using the production function specification derived 
from the 20th century.  But recall that both labor supply and the stock of physical and ICT capital 
have to reach a stable level for this to occur.  Ultimately the long-run stability around the output 
per unit of labor (which, with stable capital, implies stable consumption per person) is 
dependent upon there being limits to the intensity of energy services in output.  We can see in 
the chart below that the stable path requires a stable relationship between output and the 
amount of useful work required. 
 
Figure 127.  Looking for a future – stable long-run growth – energy services intensity of output. 
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 We asked at the beginning of the last chapter, “Can we keep doing what we are doing 
and keep getting what we got?”  The empirical model that we built in that chapter says no.  We 
have shown that the foundations upon which we the last century’s growth were based cannot 
work for another century.  And that is notwithstanding the limits to natural resources and the 
ability of the planet to process or absorb waste.  When this research began, the expectation, 
even through Chapter Two’s exposure of the flaws in economic theory, was that the ecological 
constraints that have been essentially excluded from this analysis would motivate change long 
before the endless growth issues elucidated in Chapter Two arrived.  But Chapter Three suggests 
that that future may be closer than we think.   
 The disruptions in the energy markets that are occurring as this is being written, while 
obviously a product of finite resources facing potentially infinite demand, can be directly 
connected to the simulation in Chapter Three.  First, lurking below the surface of the current oil 
shock are the uncomfortable realities of what happens as the growth curve steepens; the denial 
of the consequences of endless growth are more difficult when the price signals are so strong 
(see the second chart below).  At the production level in the simulation, the production function 
requires a level of energy services production that is a function of primary energy production 
and the efficiency of primary energy conversion.  Mess up either of those inputs, and the system 
encounters strong and persistent fluctuations.  For example, a 12% drop in primary energy 
production that lasts for two years and then returns to normal after six years looks like the chart 
below.  The second chart shows the clear price signal, in terms of the marginal productivity, with 
relative prices for energy inputs reverting to 1960s levels.   (Note that there is no empirical data 




Figure 128.  Current events – oil shock – recession. 
 





































1900 1912 1924 1936 1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008 2020
Time (Year)
Gross Domestic Product : Calibration 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gross Domestic Product : CalibrationOilShock 2 2 2 2 2 2
Gross Domestic Product : MacroEnergyData5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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Marginal Productivity of Energy Services : CalibrationOilShock 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Marginal Productivity of Energy Services : Calibration 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Chapter Three has revealed the fragility of the system that is expected to deliver a 
growing and prosperous future.  Chapter One showed that unequal growth would lead to 
revolution.  Chapter Two showed that endless growth is impossible but that the axioms that 
shape our decision making processes drive us to believe it is possible.  Chapter Two also 
demonstrated that some of the by-products of the motives for maintaining endless growth are 
disincentives for economic convergence.  The consequences of that, developed in detail in 
chapter one, were played out using endogenous growth theory in Chapter Two and in the 
Chapter Three simulation.  In both cases the consequences, at best, deny the maximization of 
return on investment, and at worst, lead to a rapid transition into a future that is unpredictable 
(and therefore uncontrollable). 
So we are left wondering how civilization can make it.  It can, but not in the way we 
think it should.  At a 1994 conference organized by the author of this paper at the University of 
New Hampshire and titled “Why is the future not what it was supposed to be?”  the focus was 
the developing world.   
In contrast, the focus here is on the world developing.  But to get there will require a 
fundamental change in how we literally do business.  Bypassing concerns for ecological 
sustainability and accepting that exponential growth in impossible to sustain, and, even more in 
the present, accepting that the paradigm that sustained the 20th century will not work going 
forward for much longer, we are faced with a need to radically overhaul the fundamental 
motives for business.  More is not going to become better for long.  And that means that 
eventually a steady state must be reached in which the return on investment is no more than 
the rate of depreciation of our steady stock of efficient and long lasting capital.  This is not only 
an overhaul of how we do business, but is also a shift in what living and working is all about. 
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It is very hard to imagine a non-capitalistic world.  Perhaps that reality will never happen 
as we try to balance on the ever-narrowing saddle path by doing what we did, or we fall into a 
police state heading for economic and social chaos, both leading to unpleasant endings.  But 
imagine it we must if we are to see a future in which there are semblances of the comforts that 
we, as civilized people, have defined as good and necessary.   
That imagining will be the next phase of this work.  Think about it, and send your 
thoughts. 
 
“Heavier than air flying machines are impossible”  (Lord Kelvin, Royal Society, 1895.) 65 
 
“There is no likelihood that man can ever tap the power of the atom. The glib 
supposition of utilizing atomic energy when our coal has run out is a completely 
unscientific Utopian dream, a childish bug-a-boo.” (Robert Millikan, Nobile Laureate, 
Physics, 1923). 
 
"There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will be 
obtainable."   (Albert Einstein, 1932)  
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Appendix A - The CC Locus 
 The economy crosses from subsistence consumption when the potential income, itz  is 
greater than the critical level, z? for all individuals, ,i a b? .  We know that for all time a bt tz z?  , 
so the crossing must happen when btz z? ? .  Thus 
{( , ) : }bt t tCC g x z z? ? ?   .    (A.1) 
Since 1( )
b b
t t tz x h g
?
??  and / (1 )z c ?? ???  , then the CC locus can be explicitly described as 
1/( ) ( / [(1 ) ( )])CC bt tx g c h g






? ?   ; thus the CC locus is upward 
sloping.  Note also that at 0tg ? , 1/(0) ( / [1 ]) 0CCx c ??? ? ??  so that the CC locus has a 
positive intercept. 
The XX Locus 
 The XX locus is all the points at which the effective resources per efficiency unit of labor, 
tx are in steady state given a level of q .  Thus the XX locus is 
1{( , ; ) : }t t t tXX g x q x x ?? ?  .     (A.2) 
From (1.39), along the XX locus, 1 1 1[(1 ) / (1 )] ( , ; )t t t t t t tx g u x x x g x q? ? ?? ? ? ? ? .  The growth 
rate of the efficiency units of labor and technological progress are equal along the XX locus:  i.e., 
( ; ) ( ; )t t tu g x q g g q? .   
 Three characteristics arise from this relationship.  
1. The XX locus is vertical in the range above the CC locus.  This follows by substituting 
(1.27) and 1.33) into (1.38) and Conclusion One and thus noting that 
( , , ) 0t tu g x q
x
? ??  for all 
1/[ / ( )]bt tx z h g
?? ? .   (The partial is greater than zero for all 
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1/[ / ( )]bt tx z h g
?? ?  .  The point at which that partial switches is the value where 
ˆ ( )tg g q? . ) 
2. Since as noted above 
( , , ) 0t tu g x q
x
? ??  for the interval ˆ[0, ( )]g q  , then 
( ; ) [ ( ; ) ( , , )] / ( ) 0
XX
t
g t g t t x t t
t
x g q g g q u g x q u g x q
g
? ? ? ?? ; that is, the XX locus has a 
positive slope when ˆ ( )tg g q? .  Also, since 1/(0,0) ( / [1 ]) 0XX nx c ??? ? ??  , then 
the vertical intercept is positive. 
3. Since . n? ? , then 1/ 1/(0,0) ( / [1 ]) (0,0) ( / [1 ])XX n CCx c x c? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?  , which 
means that the CC locus is above the XX locus in the interval ˆ[0, ( )]g q . 
From the properties outlined above we can see that from tx  to 1tx ?  the system will 










?? ??? ?? ???   .
 
The GG Locus 
The GG locus is described as  
1{( , ; ) :t t t tGG g x q g g ?? ?  .     (A.3) 
From (1.36) it is clear that the GG locus is unaffected by the effective resources per efficiency 
unit of labor, tx  , and is therefore vertical.   
 The GG loci exist as determined by the nodes shown in Chart C.  Thus for ˆq q?  there 
are three separate vertical lines corresponding to the steady state level of 
:{ ( ), ( ), ( )}L U Hg g q g q g q .  For ˆq q?  only the last of the three exists; thus there is only one 
vertical GG locus corresponding to the steady state level ( )Hg q . 
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 The system moves towards the GG locus as over time as follows:  











?? ??? ?? ???
 











?? ??? ?? ???
 
Assumptions 
 These conclusions require that several assumptions be made with respect to how the 
growth rate of efficiency units of labor, u , respond to changes in technological progress, g .  In 
particular, we have to assume that for a given ratio of types of individuals, u  changes negatively 
(or not at all) with respect to g .  Also, at the limit as tg ?? , then u  is negative.  Finally, it is 
necessary that, for a given q  , when all of the driving variables are zero, then u g? .  This is true 
if 0u ?  at the Malthusian frontier.  This is a crucial assumption since it assumes continuous 
growth in population.  
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Appendix B - The Math behind the Ramsey Simulations 
 
Using spectral theory to apply a decomposition66 to the Ramsey economic system, we 






? 0 ???h 0 ????????
D










?.  Now, using the 
spectral decomposition of D for the matrix exponential function, equation (2.41), xt ? eDt xo, 
can be written as xt ? eDt xo = ??????1??0 = ??????1?0 .  Written out this is 












?? ln c0? ln c?ssln k0 ? ln k? ss?  or 
ln ?? ? ln ???? = e?1tb11 + e?2tb12 
ln ?? ? ln???? = e?1tb21 + e?2tb22 
where 
?11 = ? 1?1??2 ??2(ln c0? ln c?ss ) + ?(ln k0 ? ln k
? ss )?, 
?12 = 1?1??2 ??1(ln c0? ln c?ss ) + ??ln k0 ? ln k
? ss ??, 
?21 = ?1(?1??2)? ??2(ln c0 ? ln c?ss ) + ??ln k0 ? ln k
? ss ??, 
?22 = ? 1(?1??2)? ??1(ln c0 ? ln c?ss ) + ?(ln k0 ? ln k
? ss )?. 
Recall that the system must obey the “no Ponzi” rule.  That means that ?11 = 0 , and ?21 = 0 
because if they did not, then both e?1tb11 and e?1tb21  would cause the system to explode.  One 
can imagine that everyone knows that the world will end at some time T ; therefore they will not 
                                                             
66 A spectral decomposition of a square matrix, ?, is defined as the factor product ? = ????1, with ?
being a diagonal matrix with elements equal to the eigenvalues of ? and ? being a matrix that has the right 
eigenvectors of ? as columns.  The spectral decomposition of the exponential of the same square matrix is 
?? = ?????1.
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want to leave any assets when they die.  Thus the initial stock of capital in any time period 
would be zero.  By setting ?21  to zero we see that ?2(ln c0 ? ln c?ss ) + ??ln k0 ? ln k? ss ? = 0 or 
that stability requires that ln c0 = ln c?ss ? ??2 (ln k0 ? ln k
? ss ).  Using that condition, the solution 
to the system is 
ln ?? ? ln ???? = e?2t(ln c0? ln c?ss ) 
ln ?? ? ln ???? = e?2t?ln k0? ln k? ss ?. 
The Numerical Simulation with Chaos 
For the Ramsey model with the guard labor externality and leisure explicitly in the utility 
function, the solution to the system follows an optimal control technique for dynamic systems.  
Using a technique pioneered by Gomes (2006), we first define the Hamiltonian: 
?(?? , ?? , ?? , ??) = ???? +? ? ??(1 ? ??) + ???+1 ?????(1+?)??(1??)(1+?) ? ?? ? ???? 
where ??  is a co-state variable.  The first order conditions are 
?? = 0 ?
1
?? = ???+1                                                                                                                      (?) 
?? = 0 ? ??(1??)(1+?)?1(1? ??) =
?
(1 ? ?)(1 + ?)???+1????(1+?)
                                    (??) 
???+1 ? ?? = ????+1 ? ????+1????(1+?)1??(1??)(1+?)                                                           (???) 
and the transversality condition that 
lim??????
??? = 0  .                                                                                                                                 (??) 
Using (i), (ii) becomes 
??(1??)(1+?)?1(1? ??) = ???(1??)(1+?)???? (1+?)      .                                                                           (v) 
In order to isolate the labor input as a function of only the parameters we have to use a Taylor-
series expansion to linearize (v) around 0 < ?? < 1.   (The values of the parameter ?? will be of 
interest in the simulation.)  This yields 
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??(1??)(1+?)?1(1? ??) ? ?1 + ?2??                                                                                                (??) 
where 
?1 = [2 ? (1 ? ?)(1 + ?)]??(1??)(1+?)?1(1? ??) + ??(1??)(1+?) 
?2 = [(1 ? ?)(1 + ?)? 1]??(1??)(1+?)?2(1 ? ??) + ??(1??)(1+?)?1. 
Putting (vi) into (v) yields the labor input in explicit terms: 
?? =
???
(1? ?)(1 + ?)??2???(1+?)
? ?1?2                                                                                        (???) 
Combining (i), (ii), and (vii) into (iii) derives 






(1? ?)(1 + ?) ?
?
??? 
?2? = ?(1? ?) +
(1 ? ?)(1 + ?)?(?1 + ?2)??+1?(1+? )
??? + ?(1 + ?)???1??+1
?[1??(1+?)] 
?3? = (1 ? ?)(1 + ?)?(?1 + ?2)(1 ? ?) ??+1?(1+?) . 




Appendix C - Vensim Code and Economic Data
 
The following pages contain the Vensim dynamic modeling software code that was used to 




 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Growth Parameter A= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<=2008, Growth Past ,Growth Future ) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Decay Rate Future= 
 0.012 
 ~  




 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Decay Rate of Intensity Reduction= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<=2008, Decay Rate Past ,Decay Rate Future) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Decay Rate Past= 
 0.012 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Fractional Growth Rate= 
 1-(1/(1+EXP(Growth Parameter A*(Efficiency Index-1)))) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Information and Communication Fraction of Capital= 
 Information and Communication Capital Growth Rate*(Aggregate Accumulated Monetary Value of Output\ 
  /7315.2) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Capital Intensity of Output= 
 Capital/Gross Domestic Product 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Intensity of Output= 
 Labor/Gross Domestic Product 
 ~  
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 ~  | 
 
Marginal Productivity of Labour= 
 Production Function parameter a*((Labor+Energy Services)/Capital) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Gross Domestic Product= ACTIVE INITIAL ( 
 Energy Services*((Labor/Energy Services)^(IF THEN ELSE(Time <=1980,0,Production Function Parameter c\ 
  )*Information and Communication Fraction of Capital))*EXP( Production Function parameter a\ 
  *(2-((Labor+Energy Services)/Capital))+Production Function parameter a*Production Function 
parameter b\ 
  * 
 ((Labor 
 /Energy Services)-1)), 
  1) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Production Function Parameter c= 
 -0.408142 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Information and Communication Capital Growth Rate= 
 0.00105 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Energy Service Intensity of Output= 
 Energy Services/Gross Domestic Product 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Marginal Productivity of Energy Services= 
 1-(Production Function parameter a*((Labor+Energy Services)/Capital))-(Production Function parameter a\ 
  *(Production Function parameter b*((Labor/Energy Services)-(Labor/Capital)))) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Monetary Value of Output= 
 Gross Domestic Product*"Reference Output t=1900" 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Marginal Productivity of Capital= 
 Production Function parameter a*(Production Function parameter b*((Labor/Energy Services\ 
  )-(Labor/Capital))) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Loss Parameter A= 
 -0.0203 
 ~  
 ~ -0.0203786 
 | 
 
Labor Decay Rate= 
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 IF THEN ELSE(Time<=Structural Shift Time D, Labor Decay Rate A*Labor, Labor Decay Rate B\ 
  *Labor 
 ) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Intensity of Capital= 
 Labor/Capital 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Loss Parameter B= 
  3 
 ~  
 ~  3 
 | 
 
Fractional Efficiency Loss Rate= 
 Loss Parameter A+Loss Parameter C*Efficiency Index^Loss Parameter B 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Loss Parameter C= 
 23.8718 
 ~  
 ~ 23.8718 
 | 
 
Technical Efficiency Limit= 
 1 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Energy Service Intensity of Capital= 
 Energy Services/Capital 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Energy Service Intensity of Labour= 
 Energy Services/Labor 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Primary Energy Intensity of Capital= 
 Primary Energy Demand/Capital 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Primary Energy Intensity of Labour= 
 Primary Energy Demand/Labor 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Energy Services Production= 
 Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion*Primary Energy Production 
 ~  
 ~  | 
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Primary Energy Production= 
 Primary Energy Demand*"Reference Primary Energy Production t=1900" 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Decay Rate A= 
 0.10913 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Decay Rate B= 
 0.117186 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Growth Rate A= 
 0.124721 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Growth Rate B= 
 0.1277 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion= INTEG ( 
 Efficiency Growth Rate-Efficiency Loss Rate, 
  Initial Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Efficiency Index= 
 Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion/Technical Efficiency Limit 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Initial Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion= 
 0.0259 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Structural Shift Time C= 
 1937.54 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Structural Shift Time D= 
 1920 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
"Reference Primary Energy Cumulative Production t=1900"= 
 24.89 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Efficiency Loss Rate= 
 Fractional Efficiency Loss Rate*Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion 
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 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor Growth Rate= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<=Structural Shift Time C, Labor Growth Rate A*Labor, Labor Growth Rate B\ 
  *Labor) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Labor= INTEG ( 
 Labor Growth Rate-Labor Decay Rate, 
  1) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Efficiency Growth Rate= 
 Fractional Growth Rate*(Primary Energy Aggregate Production/"Reference Primary Energy Cumulative 
Production t=1900"\ 
  ) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Capital= INTEG ( 
 Investment-Depreciation, 
  1) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Depreciation Rate Two= 
 0.106435 
 ~  




 Capital*Depreciation Rate 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Depreciation Rate= 
 IF THEN ELSE( Time<=Structural Shift Time DR1, Depreciation Rate One, Depreciation Rate Two\ 
   ) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Depreciation Rate One= 
 0.0590329 
 ~  




 IF THEN ELSE( Time<=Structural Shift Time SR1,Savings Rate One , Savings Rate Two) 
 ~  
 ~ Fraction of output invested (savings rate). 
 | 
 
Savings Rate One= 
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 0.0809601 
 ~  
 ~ Determined by optimisation. 
 | 
 
Savings Rate Two= 
 0.0741895 
 ~  
 ~ Determined by optimisation. 
 | 
 
Structural Shift Time DR1= 
 1930 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Structural Shift Time SR1= 
 1970 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Production Function parameter a= 
 0.129312 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Energy Services= ACTIVE INITIAL ( 
 (Energy Services Aggregate Production-Last Years Energy Service Production)/"Reference Energy Services 
Production t=1900"\ 
  , 
  1) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Energy Services Aggregate Production= INTEG ( 
 Energy Services Production, 
  1) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Initial Primary Energy Intensity of Output= 
 1 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Investment= 
 Gross Domestic Product*Savings Rate 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Last Years Energy Service Production= 
 DELAY FIXED (Energy Services Aggregate Production, 1, 0) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Production Function parameter b= 
 3.44985 
 ~  
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 ~  | 
 
"Reference Energy Services Production t=1900"= 
 0.65 
 ~ Ej 
 ~  | 
 
Primary Energy Aggregate Production= INTEG ( 
 Primary Energy Production, 
  24.89) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Primary Energy Demand= 
 Primary Energy Intensity of Output*Gross Domestic Product 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Primary Energy Intensity of Output= INTEG ( 
 -Rate of Intensity Reduction, 
  Initial Primary Energy Intensity of Output) 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Rate of Intensity Reduction= 
 Decay Rate of Intensity Reduction*Primary Energy Intensity of Output 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
"Reference Primary Energy Production t=1900"= 
 24.89 
 ~  
 ~  | 
 
Aggregate Accumulated Monetary Value of Output= INTEG ( 
 +Monetary Value of Output, 
  7315.2) 
 ~ billion 1992$ 
 ~  | 
 
"Reference Output t=1900"= 
 354 
 ~ billion 1992$ 





  Simulation Control Parameters 
 | 
 
FINAL TIME  = 2008 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The final time for the simulation. 
 | 
 
INITIAL TIME  = 1900 
 ~ Year 
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 ~ The initial time for the simulation. 
 | 
 
SAVEPER  =  
        TIME STEP 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The frequency with which output is stored. 
 | 
 
TIME STEP  = 1 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The time step for the simulation. 
 | 
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10,47,Efficiency Index,930,654,81,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,48,Technical Efficiency Limit,843,564,81,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,49,"Reference Primary Energy Cumulative Production t=1900",545,428,69,27,8,3,9,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura 
Md BT|12||0-0-0 







10,56,Fractional Growth Rate,561,500,84,28,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,57,Fractional Efficiency Loss Rate,1189,590,84,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,58,Growth Parameter A,602,662,55,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,59,Loss Parameter A,1079,667,55,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,60,Loss Parameter B,1210,660,54,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 









10,70,Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion,904,755,98,28,8,2,0,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md 
BT|12||128-128-128 
1,71,70,28,1,0,0,14,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(863,797)| 
10,72,Primary Energy Production,734,751,61,18,8,2,0,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,73,72,28,1,0,0,14,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(769,789)| 
1,74,22,18,1,1,0,14,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(593,309)| 
10,75,Decay Rate Past,1126,246,57,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,76,Decay Rate Future,1176,323,57,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 




10,81,Growth Future,482,608,41,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,82,Growth Past,463,687,41,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
1,83,81,58,0,0,0,14,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(531,630)| 
1,84,82,58,0,0,0,14,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(515,677)| 




\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names 
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored 
*Capital 
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,5,0 
10,1,Capital,940,439,40,20,3,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
12,2,48,650,440,10,8,0,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
1,3,4,2,100,0,0,23,3,0,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(705,438)| 
11,4,48,756,438,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0 
10,5,Investment,756,457,47,11,40,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
313
12,6,48,1234,439,10,8,0,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
1,7,8,6,4,0,0,23,3,0,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1162,440)| 
11,8,48,1094,440,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0 
10,9,Depreciation,1094,459,54,11,40,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
10,10,Savings Rate,852,577,48,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 
10,11,Time,955,674,35,11,8,2,0,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||128-128-128 
1,12,11,10,1,0,0,13,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(914,623)| 
1,13,10,5,1,0,0,13,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(859,516)| 
10,14,Depreciation Rate,1047,577,55,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10||0-0-0 






10,21,Savings Rate One,648,538,47,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10|I|0-0-0 
10,22,Savings Rate Two,626,627,47,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10|I|0-0-0 
10,23,Depreciation Rate One,1224,539,56,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10|I|0-0-0 





10,29,Structural Shift Time SR1,786,667,64,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|10|I|0-0-0 




\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names 
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored 
*Labour 
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,5,0 
10,1,Labor,922,419,40,20,3,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 




10,6,Labor Growth Rate,785,447,54,19,40,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 




10,11,Labor Decay Rate,1060,447,59,19,40,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,12,Labor Growth Rate A,708,550,76,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,13,Labor Growth Rate B,749,620,76,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,14,Labor Decay Rate A,1165,550,76,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,15,Labor Decay Rate B,1119,620,76,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
10,16,Structural Shift Time C,873,578,64,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 











10,27,Structural Shift Time D,1001,578,64,19,8,3,0,48,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12|I|0-0-0 
1,28,27,11,0,0,0,13,1,64,0,0-0-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1026,521)| 
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names 
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored 
*Intensity Measures 
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,5,0 
10,1,Capital,947,352,32,11,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,2,Depreciation,672,287,40,20,8,2,9,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,3,2,1,0,9,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(806,318)| 
10,4,Investment,667,367,40,20,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,5,4,1,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(804,359)| 
10,6,Energy Services,1326,534,59,10,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,7,Energy Services Aggregate Production,665,401,65,27,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md 
BT|12||128-128-128 
1,8,7,6,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(996,467)| 
10,9,Last Years Energy Service Production,662,445,74,18,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,10,9,6,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(994,489)| 
10,11,"Reference Energy Services Production t=1900",661,495,74,27,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md 
BT|12||128-128-128 
1,12,11,6,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(994,514)| 
10,13,Gross Domestic Product,760,283,68,20,8,131,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
1,14,1,13,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(872,324)| 
1,15,6,13,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1060,416)| 
10,16,Labor,674,590,44,11,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,17,16,13,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(713,447)| 
10,18,Production Function parameter a,674,555,62,19,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,19,18,13,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(714,426)| 
10,20,Production Function parameter b,669,626,62,19,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,21,20,13,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(712,461)| 
10,22,Labor,1137,436,31,11,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,23,Labor Decay Rate,807,621,55,19,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,24,23,22,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(972,527)| 
10,25,Labor Growth Rate,788,640,60,19,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,26,25,22,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(962,537)| 
10,27,Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion,1133,294,81,27,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,28,Efficiency Growth Rate,783,698,73,28,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,29,28,27,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(953,500)| 
10,30,Efficiency Loss Rate,764,717,60,28,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,31,30,27,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(943,510)| 
10,32,Energy Service Intensity of Capital,1146,528,67,18,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,33,Labor Intensity of Capital,947,436,70,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 







10,41,Primary Energy Demand,1319,600,57,18,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
1,42,13,41,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1034,439)| 
10,43,Primary Energy Intensity of Output,1301,665,69,18,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,44,43,41,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1307,639)| 
10,45,Primary Energy Intensity of Output,760,600,64,18,8,3,0,32,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,46,Rate of Intensity Reduction,733,622,49,28,8,2,2,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-128-128 
315
1,47,46,45,0,2,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(746,610)| 
10,48,Primary Energy Intensity of Labour,947,600,66,18,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 





10,54,Information and Communication Fraction of Capital,760,315,68,19,8,2,1,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura 
Md BT|12||128-128-128 
1,55,54,13,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(760,306)| 
10,56,Production Function Parameter c,760,315,59,19,8,2,1,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,57,56,13,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(760,306)| 
10,58,Capital Intensity of Output,760,352,71,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,59,Labor Intensity of Output,760,437,70,19,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 







10,67,Marginal Productivity of Labour,761,734,61,28,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,68,Marginal Productivity of Capital,947,743,61,28,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,69,Marginal Productivity of Energy Services,1148,745,76,18,8,3,0,32,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||0-0-0 
10,70,Production Function parameter a,571,605,62,19,8,2,1,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 














10,84,Production Function parameter a,1144,712,62,19,8,2,1,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,85,84,69,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1144,722)| 
10,86,Production Function parameter b,1144,712,62,19,8,2,1,35,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,Futura Md BT|12||128-
128-128 
1,87,86,69,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,255-128-0,|12||0-0-0,1|(1144,722)| 
10,88,Initial Efficiency of Primary Energy Conversion,1137,377,86,28,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-
128-128 
1,89,88,27,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(1135,342)| 




\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names 
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Output per Unit of Labor 
1900 1 
1901 1.076923121 
1902 1.036697212 
1903 1.053571377 
1904 1.063636302 
1905 1.077586238 
1906 1.1666666 
1907 1.154471492 
1908 1.101694924 
1909 1.225806427 
1910 1.218749983 
1911 1.230769294 
1912 1.261194041 
1913 1.266666673 
1914 1.234848432 
1915 1.236641279 
1916 1.234042589 
1917 1.222222167 
1918 1.377622448 
1919 1.376811582 
1920 1.30000006 
1921 1.317460301 
1922 1.422222165 
1923 1.479452075 
1924 1.503496625 
1925 1.574324252 
1926 1.614379134 
1927 1.625000039 
1928 1.620915075 
1929 1.698718072 
1930 1.630137022 
1931 1.641791039 
1932 1.584745837 
1933 1.572649659 
1934 1.739130471 
1935 1.8181818 
1936 1.916030611 
1937 1.899280671 
1938 1.976377975 
1939 2.045112737 
1940 2.107142927 
1941 2.25657902 
1942 2.374233066 
1943 2.591715956 
1944 2.80838334 
1945 2.917721524 
1946 2.537499926 
1947 2.472392774 
1948 2.567073216 
1949 2.64556944 
1950 2.82608705 
1951 2.951807346 
1952 3.023809573 
1953 3.16071435 
1954 3.279503207 
1955 3.383233677 
1956 3.408284044 
1957 3.514970082 
1958 3.63124991 
1959 3.781818098 
1960 3.849397587 
1961 3.939759092 
1962 4.100591476 
1963 4.203488313 
1964 4.346590987 
1965 4.497237901 
1966 4.711956478 
1967 4.805405529 
1968 4.946808625 
1969 4.994791858 
1970 5.026178298 
1971 5.166666822 
1972 5.256281401 
1973 5.368932392 
1974 5.309178805 
1975 5.389162431 
1976 5.490476313 
1977 5.562211645 
1978 5.653333452 
1979 5.66233777 
1980 5.669565318 
1981 5.774891984 
1982 5.748898811 
1983 5.874458888 
1984 6 
1985 6.138775375 
1986 6.2 
1987 6.234375154 
1988 6.348659142 
1989 6.436090333 
1990 6.515037355 
1991 6.528516855 
356
1992 6.656603304 
1993 6.685184785 
1994 6.691756391 
1995 6.773049941 
1996 6.837370073 
1997 6.962712062 
1998 7.062913927 
1999 7.21035641 
2000 7.330158557 
2001 7.317610053 
2002 7.20731695 
2003 7.23283589 
2004 7.299418661 
2005 7.355113503 
2006 7.397222185 
2007 7.475274258 
2008 7.400537762 
 
  
357
Future GDP 
2008 27.53 
2009 27.99 
2010 28.47 
2011 28.95 
2012 29.44 
2013 29.94 
2014 30.44 
2015 30.95 
2016 31.47 
2017 32 
2018 32.53 
2019 33.07 
2020 33.62 
2021 34.17 
2022 34.73 
2023 35.3 
2024 35.88 
2025 36.46 
2026 37.06 
2027 37.65 
2028 38.26 
2029 38.88 
2030 39.5 
2031 40.13 
2032 40.77 
2033 41.41 
2034 42.07 
2035 42.73 
2036 43.4 
2037 44.07 
2038 44.76 
2039 45.45 
2040 46.15 
2041 46.86 
2042 47.58 
2043 48.3 
2044 49.03 
2045 49.77 
2046 50.52 
2047 51.27 
2048 52.04 
2049 52.81 
2050 53.58 
2051 54.37 
2052 55.16 
2053 55.96 
2054 56.77 
2055 57.59 
2056 58.41 
2057 59.24 
2058 60.08 
2059 60.93 
2060 61.78 
2061 62.64 
2062 63.51 
2063 64.38 
2064 65.26 
2065 66.15 
2066 67.04 
2067 67.94 
2068 68.85 
2069 69.77 
2070 70.69 
2071 71.61 
2072 72.54 
2073 73.47 
2074 74.37 
2075 75.26 
2076 76.12 
2077 76.97 
2078 77.79 
2079 78.59 
2080 79.38 
2081 80.14 
2082 80.88 
2083 81.6 
2084 82.31 
2085 82.99 
2086 83.65 
2087 84.29 
2088 84.91 
2089 85.51 
2090 86.09 
2091 86.66 
2092 87.2 
2093 87.73 
2094 88.24 
2095 88.73 
2096 89.2 
2097 89.66 
2098 90.1 
2099 90.52 
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2100 90.93 
2101 91.32 
2102 91.7 
2103 92.07 
2104 92.42 
2105 92.76 
2106 93.08 
2107 93.39 
2108 93.69 
2109 93.98 
2110 94.26 
2111 94.52 
2112 94.78 
2113 95.02 
2114 95.25 
2115 95.48 
2116 95.69 
2117 95.9 
2118 96.1 
2119 96.29 
2120 96.47 
2121 96.65 
2122 96.83 
2123 97 
2124 97.17 
2125 97.33 
2126 97.48 
2127 97.64 
2128 97.79 
2129 97.93 
2130 98.07 
2131 98.2 
2132 98.34 
2133 98.47 
2134 98.59 
2135 98.71 
2136 98.83 
2137 98.94 
2138 99.05 
2139 99.16 
2140 99.26 
2141 99.37 
2142 99.46 
2143 99.56 
2144 99.65 
2145 99.74 
2146 99.83 
2147 99.91 
2148 100 
2149 100.08 
2150 100.15 
2151 100.23 
2152 100.3 
2153 100.37 
2154 100.44 
2155 100.51 
2156 100.57 
2157 100.63 
2158 100.69 
2159 100.75 
2160 100.81 
2161 100.87 
2162 100.92 
2163 100.97 
2164 101.02 
2165 101.07 
2166 101.12 
2167 101.16 
2168 101.21 
2169 101.25 
2170 101.29 
2171 101.34 
2172 101.37 
2173 101.41 
2174 101.45 
2175 101.49 
2176 101.52 
2177 101.55 
2178 101.59 
2179 101.62 
2180 101.65 
2181 101.68 
2182 101.71 
2183 101.74 
2184 101.76 
2185 101.79 
2186 101.82 
2187 101.84 
2188 101.86 
2189 101.89 
2190 101.91 
2191 101.93 
2192 101.95 
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2193 101.97 
2194 101.99 
2195 102.01 
2196 102.01 
2197 102.01 
2198 102.01 
2199 102.01 
2200 102.01 
2201 102.01 
2202 102.01 
2203 102.01 
2204 102.01 
2205 102.01 
2206 102.01 
2207 102.01 
2208 102.01 
 
